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ERRATUM 
In the Introduction to the Symposium on Genuine Tort Reform 
in the Winter 2008 issue of the Roger Williams University Law 
Review, we erroneously stated that symposium was made possible by 
a generous grant of the Roscoe Pound Foundation.  In fact, it was the 
American Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment 
(hereinafter AAJ Endowment) that made that very generous grant. 
We sincerely apologize for the error, and thank the AAJ 
Endowment for supporting our Symposium on Genuine Tort Reform 
and the important scholarship it produced. 
We also take this opportunity to set forth the mission of the AAJ 
Endowment: 
 
The mission of the AAJ Endowment, in conjunction with AAJ, is 
to preserve and protect the civil justice system and individual rights. 
It accomplishes this through the following priorities: 
 
• providing consistent public education and research to promote 
informed public dialogue on, understanding of and appreciation for 
the civil justice system; 
 
• sponsoring prestigious education programs and well-received 
publications for judges and law professors; and, 
 
• funding innovative scholarship and far reaching research on 
the civil justice system and individual rights. 
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Symposium 
Introduction: The Emerging Power of 
Context over Conventional Wisdom in 
Scholarship on Law and Terrorism 
Peter Margulies* and Laura Corbin** 
Conventional wisdom has produced two schools of thought on 
legal responses to September 11.  On the one hand, some scholars 
have argued that the law prior to September 11 provided all the 
flexibility that the government ever needed, and that measures 
such as the Patriot Act that increased government power were 
dangerous to the delicate balance between liberty and security.1 
Other scholars have been either apologists for or architects of the 
Bush administration’s policies, arguing that the legal constraints 
in place before the attacks and pressed by administration critics 
today are a form of “lawfare” exploited by America’s enemies.2  
 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.  I thank Dean 
David Logan for his generous support of this symposium.    
** J.D. 2008, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
 1. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY 
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (New Press 2007).  The description of 
this school of thought is, to be sure, a broad-brush portrayal that masks some 
concessions to the post-September 11 environment.  See id. (acknowledging 
that intervention in Afghanistan was appropriate). 
 2. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF 
THE WAR ON TERROR 106-08 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) (arguing that 
restrictions on wiretapping and data collection endanger national security).  
Some prominent commentators identified with this view nevertheless have 
voiced concern about the unilateralism of the Bush administration’s moves 
and the failure of some legal opinions to address adverse authority.  Compare 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58 (W.W. Norton and Company 2007) (describing 
 Neither view does justice to the complexities of the post-9/11 
world. 
The participants in this symposium seek to avoid such stark 
stances.3  Their contributions, presented on November 9, 2007 at 
the Roger Williams University School of Law symposium on 
“Legal Dilemmas in a Dangerous World: Law, Terrorism and 
National Security,” cover a wide range of issues, including the 
habeas corpus rights of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, the state 
secrets privilege, defense lawyering before the military 
commissions, and opportunities for Muslim-Americans to both 
comply with laws regulating the financing of terrorist groups and 
fulfill their faith-bound obligation of charitable giving.  Running 
through each essay is a conviction that the rule of law is flexible 
enough to protect national security without endangering core 
freedoms. 
In The Corruption of Civilization, Professor Timothy Kuhner 
denies that security and liberty are competing sides in a zero-sum 
game.4  Instead, Kuhner argues, our security is often best served 
by adhering to our political values, viewing war as a last resort, 
and seeking solutions through the application of “soft power,” 
including political, social, and cultural influence.5  According to 
Kuhner, preemptive war in Iraq, indefinite detention of terror 
suspects, and torture have simultaneously undermined both our 
hard won national tradition of human dignity and our end-game: 
national security.6  “War” fighters on both sides, Kuhner asserts, 
are violating international law as well as “norms of due process 
 
concept of “lawfare” against American interests), with id. at 71 (noting 
displeasure of senior Bush administration official when author, former head 
of Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, indicated legal doubts about 
counterterrorism initiative); cf. Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: 
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of 
Powers, 68 MD.  L. REV.  ( forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1097314 (discussing influence of lawfare paradigm within Bush 
administration legal circles). 
 3. This striving for balance has also marked the best discussions of 
previous national security challenges.  See Robert H. Jackson, Wartime 
Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 116 (1951) (contrasting 
“exaggerated claims of security” with opposing flaw of “contemptuously 
ignoring the reasonable anxieties of wartime”). 
 4. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Civilization, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 349, 371 & n.71 (2008). 
 5. Id. at 365 & n.56.  Kuhner discusses the merits of JOSEPH S. NYE, 
SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (Public Affairs 2004). 
 6. Id. at 363 & n.47; id. at 362. 
 and civilized treatment.”7  After laying the legal and historical 
foundations for his premise that the identity of the United States 
rests on human rights, Kuhner reinforces the idea that protecting 
human rights, and therefore the strength of our appeal to the rest 
of the world, is the path to both freedom and security.8  His 
challenge to us “as citizens in a democracy [is] to produce 
something better than a war on terrorism.”9 
Professor Nina Crimm argues in her essay, Muslim-
Americans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Terror-free 
Donor Advised Fund?, that terrorist financing restrictions can be 
counterproductive when they ignore the importance of core 
Islamic beliefs.10  Crimm notes that millions of Muslim-Americans 
face a dilemma in the aftermath of September 11 when they wish 
to uphold one of the pillars of their Islamic faith: the obligation of 
zakat or charity.11  As Crimm explains, zakat is often focused on 
assisting the “world’s neediest Muslims.”12  After September 11, 
however, donating to Muslim charities became a minefield.13  
Through an analysis of the fallout after passage of the USA 
Patriot Act and other laws, Crimm demonstrates that Muslim-
Americans fear investigation or prosecution for making a 
charitable contribution to impoverished Muslims overseas.14 
 
 7. Id. at 351 & n.7. 
 8. Id. at 372 (see text before n.72).  For more of Professor Kuhner’s 
thoughts about human rights, see Timothy K. Kuhner, Human Rights 
Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status Quo, Its Underlying Bases, and Pathways 
for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419 (2003).  See also Harold Hongju 
Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 
635 (2007) (describing how the U.S. war on terror has undermined U.S. 
human rights policy and therefore its soft power). 
 9. Id. (see text after n.73). 
 10. See Nina J. Crimm, Muslim Americans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma: 
What About a Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 375, 392 (2008). 
 11. Id. at 377 (see text before n.11). Cf. Peter Margulies, Laws of 
Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions and Transitions 
to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65 (2007) (discussing virtues and vices of 
terrorist financing statutes). 
 12. Crimm, supra note 10, at 378 & n.17. 
 13. For more of Crimm’s views on this topic, see Nina J. Crimm, High 
Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its 
Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global 
Philanthropy (High Alert), 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004). 
 14. Crimm, supra note 10, at 385-392 & nn.60-95; See Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 
 To remedy this problem, Crimm proposes creation of a “terror-
free Donor Advised Fund.”15  Such a fund, she suggests, would 
ensure that charitable contributions from Muslims in the U.S. are 
not supporting terrorism, but instead are helping to relieve 
poverty and suffering in parts of the world where those 
deprivations might “exacerbate terrorism.”16  Striking a balance 
on the financial front between Americans’ religious identity and 
national security enhances both. 
In Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and the Myth of 
Swain v. Pressley,17 Professor Stephen Vladeck moves from policy 
to legal doctrine regarding terror detainees.18  Recent doctrinal 
clashes19 have centered on the availability to detainees of the writ 
of habeas corpus.  The struggle over habeas came to a head with 
Congress’ passage of the Military Commissions Act, which 
purports to withhold access to the writ.20  In earlier cases, the 
Supreme Court has typically cited to its decision in Swain v. 
Pressley for the proposition that when Congress limits the writ 
through some means short of outright suspension, it must provide 
an adequate substitute.21  Vladeck argues that the Supreme 
Court’s dutiful citation of Pressley  in cases involving 
congressional efforts to limit access to habeas corpus masks a 
significant gap in habeas jurisprudence: the Court has repeatedly 
declined to define what procedures are adequate.22  According to 
Vladeck, Congress rushed into this vacuum with the Military 
 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
 15. Crimm, supra note 10, at 395 (see text between nn.108-09). 
 16. Id. at 385 & n.57; cf. Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security 
and International Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2007) (arguing that 
international philanthropy is an ally not an enemy in the war on terror). 
 17. 430 U.S. 372 (1977). 
 18. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and 
the Myth of Swain v. Pressley, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 411.  For more 
on Vladeck’s inquiry into the availability of habeas corpus in the context of 
the war on terror, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, 
and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 963 (2007). 
 19. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 
127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 
485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gherebi v. Bush, 
352 F.3d 1278, 1285–99 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 20. 10 U.S.C.A. § 950j(b) (West Supp. 2007).  In Boumediene v. Bush, 128 
S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Court struck down these restrictions on access to 
habeas corpus. 
 21. See Vladeck, supra note 18, at 412 & n.8. 
 22. Id. at 426-27. 
 Commissions Act.23  To ensure that Congress does not “suffocate 
the writ,”24 Vladeck concludes that the Court should relinquish 
the “myth” of Pressley and offer clear guidance.25 
Presenting doctrinal guidance on another important issue, 
Professor Robert Chesney squarely addresses the perceived 
conflict between our esteem for the rights of the individual and 
democratic accountability on the one hand and national security 
on the other in Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege.26  
The administration has cited the state secrets privilege both as a 
shield, to ensure that litigation will not result in the disclosure of 
sensitive information, and as a sword, to persuade courts to 
dismiss litigation (for example, lawsuits based on the 
government’s Terrorist Surveillance Program).27  Chesney 
recognizes that all too often government officials have exploited 
the state secrets privilege to shield the government from 
revelations of its own incompetence.28  However, Chesney also 
acknowledges that wholesale disclosure of sensitive information 
could do real damage to national security interests.29 
In search of the right balance, Chesney focuses on the newly 
introduced State Secrets Protection Act.30  He points out the Act’s 
benefits for plaintiffs: a mandate that the court examine evidence 
claimed as privileged, its provisions for substitute evidence when 
the privilege does attach, judicially appointed experts to advise 
the court, and the introduction of guardians ad litem to represent 
the non-government party in what are currently ex parte 
 
 23. Id. at 435-37 & nn.110-15. 
 24. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973). 
 25. Vladeck, supra note 18, at 441-42 & n.130. 
 26. Robert M. Chesney, Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege, 
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 442 (2008).  For further discussion of the state 
secrets privilege, see Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of 
National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007). The U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege in United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 27. See e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd, 
493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
 28. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (discussing privilege); cf. STEPHEN 
DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1043 (Aspen Publisher 4th ed. 2006) 
(noting that information for which government claimed privilege in Reynolds 
concerned not advanced technology but mere pilot error). 
 29. Chesney, supra note 26, at 457-58. 
 30. See S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access 
.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s2533is.txt.pdf. 
 hearings.31  He also suggests that the Act goes too far at times, 
potentially compromising national security by allowing attorneys 
for the non-government party to learn about evidence that is later 
found to be privileged.32  Chesney has submitted his commentary 
as testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee which held a 
hearing on the legislation in February.33 
Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky takes on conventional wisdom 
about the role of lawyers in terrorism cases in her thoughtful 
contribution, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All Odds: 
Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo 
Bay.34  After President Bush issued his order establishing the 
military commissions, some progressives criticized the order 
(which the Supreme Court in Hamdan35 ruled exceeded the 
president’s authority) by raising doubts about the independence of 
military lawyers who would defend the detainees.36  Indeed, 
supporters of the military commissions appeared to implicitly 
accept this premise, believing that military lawyers would be 
docile advocates at best.  Yaroshefsky’s essay counters this 
assumption with a compelling narrative about how the Hicks team 
succeeded by challenging the legitimacy of the commissions both 
in the tribunal itself and in the court of public opinion.37  The 
Hicks team concentrated their efforts on Hicks’ home country, 
Australia, which also happens to be an ally of the United States.  
The result was a negotiated plea for Hicks that secured his release 
from Guantanamo.38  Yaroshefsky poignantly portrays the 
lawyers’ anxiety that the plea would legitimize the Bush 
administration’s overreaching.39  Nevertheless, she argues 
 
 31. Chesney supra note 26, at 466. 
 32. Id. at 457-58. 
 33. STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT, S. Rep No. 110-938 (2008).   
     34. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All 
Odds: Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo Bay, 
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 468. 
 35. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 36. See Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice 
Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 656-57 (2002). 
     37.    Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 479. 
 38. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 490-92 & nn.106-17. 
 39. Id. at 478 & nn.49-50. For a further perspective on the ethics of 
lawyers representing clients in an arguably unfair system, see Mary Cheh, 
Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case of the Military 
Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005). 
 convincingly that the plea not only helped Hicks but also 
underscored the ongoing problems with the military 
commissions.40  Ironically, the committed and creative advocacy of 
the Hicks team furnished rare common ground for the Bush 
administration and its critics, each of whom had underestimated 
the institutional culture and pride of military lawyers. 
As the authors in this Symposium demonstrate, conventional 
wisdom only goes so far in meeting the challenges of the post-
September 11 legal environment.  In place of the old ideologically 
entrenched positions, new approaches are necessary.  The authors 
in this Symposium make substantial contributions to that crucial 
debate. 
 
 
 
 40. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 490-92 & nn.108-114. 
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The Corruption of Civilizations 
Timothy K. Kuhner* 
Remarks by other panelists at today’s conference1 have 
clarified and problematized increases in executive power, 
detriments to human rights, and the emergence of an ever-more 
adversarial and evasive political environment that removes 
transparency, accountability, rationality, and even principle from 
legal discourse.  These remarks eulogize the war on terrorism’s 
non-human casualties.  I wish to point out with acute remorse 
that these casualties all belonged to a single family and that this 
family constituted our tradition.  This was a tradition of liberal 
democracy, where torture was off the table and procedural 
protections were a centerpiece.  Aggressive warfare signaled 
criminality, not patriotism.  Human dignity, the rule of law, and 
the intelligent pursuit of peace, prosperity, and stability 
emblazoned the halls of this place where we resided.  This 
tradition was hard-won; its emergence costly and far-sighted, a 
precious gift of heritage that we were tasked with maintaining, or 
even improving. 
I also wish to say that although the rhetoric of our tradition’s 
demise is appealing for its dramatic excess, it is too conceited for 
me to maintain to the end, for it is not the demise of our tradition 
that we are witnessing but our abandonment of the same.  The 
tradition will endure, at least in a cryogenically frozen state, until 
new adherents seek it out.  My position, however, is that we 
should re-adhere to it now and save future generations the 
trouble.  Here, focusing on our treatment of detainees and 
aggressive warfare—just two of the ways we have abandoned our 
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 1. Roger Williams University School of Law, Legal Dilemmas in a 
Dangerous World: Law, Terrorism, and National Security, (Nov. 9, 2007). 
 tradition—I will lay out a brief civilizational requiem.  This 
redescribes the war on terrorism in a way that makes its excesses 
all the less appealing and its broader consequences all the more 
clear. 
I.  A DIALECTIC OF EXTREMISM 
I submit that the supposed conflict between terrorists and the 
architects of our war on terrorism is in reality a collaborative 
relationship between two groups of extremists whose modes of 
action undermine civilizational commitments.  The “clash of 
civilizations” predicted by Samuel Huntington and endorsed by 
Osama Bin Laden2 and George Bush3 alike ought to be described 
 
 2. Referring to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, Bin Laden 
sees a united front in the West: “[t]he entire West, with the exception of a few 
countries, supports this unfair, barbaric campaign, although there is no 
evidence of the involvement of the people of Afghanistan in what happened in 
America.”  He then goes on to describe creed as the basis that divides the 
East from the West:   
“This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are 
Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the 
West, who are the crusaders. Those who try to cover this crystal 
clear fact, which the entire world has admitted, are deceiving the 
Islamic nation . . .  Under no circumstances should we forget this 
enmity between us and the infidels. For, the enmity is based on 
creed . . . We should also renounce the atheists and infidels. It 
suffices me to seek God's help against them.  God says: ‘Never will 
the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow 
their form of religion.’”   
Also notable in this same speech is Bin Laden’s characterization of the 
conflict itself, which he defines as religious and having nothing to do with 
terrorism, except the terrorism that he believes the West has consistently 
committed against Muslims.  Bin Laden Rails Against Crusaders and UN, 
B.B.C. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/ 
monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm.  Phrases such as “the crusader-
Zionist alliance” also deserve mention.  Statement of the World Islamic Front,  
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ 
docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 
 3. On the night September 11, 2001, the President addressed the 
nation: “Today . . . our way of life, our very freedom came under attack.”  
George W. Bush, President, United States, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 
2001), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 
20010911-16.html  Here, I wish to be cautious, because it is the case that 
Bush has been careful in his comments about Muslims generally and making 
a distinction between terrorists ideology and Islam.  But little can be said to 
commend his description of terrorists’ motives: he wants the American public 
to believe that we are being attacked because we are free, because of who we 
are, and what we represent, when in fact transnational Jihadis have always 
had a practical set of goals relating to concrete foreign policies relating to the 
 as the corruption of civilizations.4  Huntington famously predicted 
in 1993 that the primary source of conflict in the world we now 
inhabit would be cultural differences: “The fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,” he warned; 
“[t]he great divisions among humankind and the dominating 
source of conflict will be cultural.”5  It quickly became fashionable 
to believe that we would inevitably generate conflict just by being 
ourselves and staying true to our own values.  In reality, however, 
the diverse set of conflicts relating to terrorism world-wide have 
been spurred by actors who dishonor their own civilizational 
commitments.  Leaders on both sides distinguish themselves not 
by being true to their civilizations, but by attempting to corrupt 
their civilizations. 
The underlying values and tactics among both camps are 
fundamentally similar in their violation of foundational social 
mores and legal norms.  The Bush administration and Al Qaeda6 
employ unlawful modes of warfare—preemptive warfare and 
terrorism are violations of fundamental customary and treaty 
prohibitions in international law.  Each denies civilized treatment 
to its captives—indefinite detention without charges, torture, and 
beheadings all contravene sacred norms of due process and 
civilized treatment.7  And yet, each camp proclaims itself the 
 
Palestinian people, the U.S. military presence in Muslim lands, and so on. 
 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFF., 
Summer 1993, at 22.  See also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998). 
 5. The Clash of Civilizations, supra note 4, at 454. 
 6. By referring to Al Qaeda by name, I do not mean to exclude other 
transnational jihadis.  There are of course multiple groups of doctrinaire 
jihadis, such as the Islamic Group, Islamic Jihad, and al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad.  
FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL 1 (2005). 
 7. It is in fact remarkable that the United States continues, post 
invasion of Afghanistan, to apply a war paradigm in the first place.  At the 
time of the World Trade Center bombings, there was a legal presumption 
that terrorism was not an act of war.  See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d Cir. 1974) (“The cases 
establish that war is a course of hostility engaged in by entities that have at 
least significant attributes of sovereignty.  Under international law war is 
waged by states or state-like entities.”).  In a trial that ensued after 1993, a 
federal court of appeals upheld the conviction of a terrorist acting on U.S. soil 
for conspiracy to levy war against the United States.  United States v. 
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To support a conviction for 
seditious conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 2384, the Government must 
demonstrate that:  (1) in a State, or Territory, or place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, (2) two or more persons conspired to ‘levy 
 guardian of sacred values—those of Western freedom on the one 
hand and Islamic faith on the other—while simultaneously 
employing tactics that can only be described as the gravemen of 
those same values.  Just as the great majority of Muslims decry Al 
Qaeda8 (never mind suicide bombing and the beheading of 
hostages), the majority of Americans disapprove of the Bush 
Administration9 (never mind the use of torture and preemptive 
warfare). 
The underlying similarity between both sides’ derogations 
reveals another crucial clarification: the only clash to be seen is 
one between extremists on both sides, our extremists and their 
extremists.  And upon closer examination, it may not be so much 
of a clash as a symbiosis.  Each side proclaims to its respective 
constituencies that its actions undermine the enemy, while in 
reality each camp enthrones the other.  The attacks of September 
11th have triggered a new era of fear and executive power, giving 
President Bush and his neoconservative handlers the opportunity 
they needed to invade Iraq and weaken the American commitment 
to rights.  The invasion of Iraq has succeeded in creating a strong 
 
war against’ or ‘oppose by force the authority of’ the United States 
government, and (3) that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy.”).  
Despite using the word “war,” this is a criminal charge.  The Government 
pressed criminal charges against those responsible, fighting terrorists in the 
United States in the Article III courts, not by employing the laws of war on 
its own territory.  See Stacie D. Gorman, In the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens 
Cry Out for War, but Can the United States Legally Declare War on 
Terrorism?, 21 PENN ST. INT'L. L. REV. 669, 676 (2003) (“the fact that the 
terrorists were tried in the court system--not fought on the battlefield--
indicates that terrorists are criminals, and not soldiers of war.  Although the 
charge against them was conspiracy to levy war against the United States, 
this was a criminal charge, punishable with jail time, not an act of warfare to 
be retaliated against with missiles.”).  One might compare our shift in policy 
with Spain’s staying the course, prosecuting in civilian courts those 
responsible for Al Qaeda’s bombing of a Madrid train station.  Some people 
were actually acquitted, but many were sentenced to long prison terms.  But 
they held these trials under conditions of the rule of law. 
 8. GERGES, supra note 6, at 270  (“[T]he dominant response to Al Qaeda 
in the Muslim world was very hostile, and few activists, let alone ordinary 
Muslims, embraced its global jihad . . . [Moreover,] a broad representative 
spectrum of Arab and Muslim opinion makers and Islamists utterly rejected 
bin Laden and Zawahiri’s justification for their attacks on America and 
debunked their religious and ideological rationale.”). 
 9. In the most recent New York Times/CBS News poll, for example, only 
28% of Americans approved of the job that President Bush is doing.  David 
Leonhardt & Marjorie Connelly, 81% in Poll Say Nation is Headed on Wrong 
Track, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at A1. 
 terrorist base where before there was none and elevated 
recruitment levels world-wide.10  Meanwhile, the American 
violation of civil and human rights has weakened core alliances 
and sympathies,11 playing directly into the hands of the terrorists.  
Al Qaeda and the Bush administration have established a sort of 
dialectic, a dialectic of extremism, in which each camp legitimates 
and strengthens the other.  And this is to say nothing of the 
operational and financial linkages between jihadis and Americans 
in Afghanistan during the 1980s, a theater of war where jihadis 
acquired “practical experience in combat, politics, and 
organizational matters.”12 
II.  OUR TRADITION 
As this conflict escalates—the more we torture detainees and 
drop bombs that kill civilians, the more they send their operatives 
to our shores—hatred and fear will increasingly well up in our 
guts, and we, the collective human “we,” will come to forget who 
we are and what we stand for.13  It is imperative to remember and 
to repeat the observation that most fairly characterizes this new 
era: our extremists and their extremists undermine the core 
values that define Western and Islamic civilizations.  Here, I 
mean only to comment on our fidelity to our own mores, not their 
fidelity to their own. 
The treatment of prisoners makes inroads to certain mores.  
We might bristle at our mind-boggling rate of incarceration.  We 
 
 10. See GERGES, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 11. See JOSEPH NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS, x (2004). 
 12. See GERGES, supra note 6, at 12, 14 (“Despite subsequent denials by 
both jihadis and American officials, the two camps were in a marriage of 
convenience, united in opposition to godless Communism.”).  Symbiosis 
indeed.  Jihadis and American hawks exhibit a classic case: “a relationship 
between two people in which each person is dependent upon and receives 
reinforcement, whether beneficial or detrimental, from the other.”  RANDOM 
HOUSE COMPACT UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1926 (Special 2d ed. 1996). 
 13. I do not believe it is coincidental, for example, that citizens of 
countries facing frequent terrorist attacks are far more tolerant of torture 
than citizens of countries that rarely face terrorist attacks.  In a recent 
survey, Israelis and Iraqis were far more tolerant of torture as official policy 
(42-43% approving) than were citizens of the other twenty-three other 
countries polled (29% on average supporting some torture).  See One-Third 
Support ‘Some Torture,’ B.B.C. NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6063386.stm#table. 
 are home to only 5% of the global population, but almost a quarter 
of the global prison population.14  But America never promised not 
to lock a lot of people up.  This after all can partly be attributed to 
a democratic tradition of electing judges and prosecutors at the 
state level.  “Law and order” remains a strong cultural value 
here.15  But our law and order culture is tempered by a 
commitment to rights that spans domestic and international law: 
due process, the prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures, 
equal protection, the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, adherence to the Geneva Conventions, the Torture 
Convention, the Civil and Political Rights convention, and so on.  
Although it is true that we did not promise not to lock them up, we 
have promised due process and civilized treatment. 
Bring any great voice of our tradition to Abu Graib and 
Guantanamo Bay and each of us would hear expressed the 
civilizational agony we feel in our guts.  Although on foreign 
ground, these are our prisons and Dostoyevsky said that it was 
here that “the degree of civilization in a society is revealed.”16  
Even complex figures faced with the responsibilities of power beg 
us to consider the linkage between civil liberties and civil society, 
civilized treatment and civilization.  As Chief Justice Burger put 
it, “the way a society treats those who have transgressed against 
it is evidence of the essential character of that society.”17  
Churchill gives the point more of what is due to it: 
A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the 
accused against the state, and even of convicted criminals 
against the state, a constant heart-searching by all 
 
 14. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/ 
23/us/23prison.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 15. See, e.g., MARSHALL SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 278-79 (2003) 
(discussing the tensions between law and order culture and the notion, 
expressed in police misconduct actions, that nobody is above the law). 
 16. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 76 (Constance 
Garnett trans., 1923).   Winston S. Churchill said precisely the same thing: 
“[T]he mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and 
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country.”  
See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL 
THEORY 215 n.4 (1990). 
 17. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) (“The continuing 
guarantee of these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a 
belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is 
evidence of the essential character of that society.”) 
 charged with the duty of punishment, a desire and 
eagerness to rehabilitate . . ., and an unfaltering faith 
that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the 
heart of every man, these are the symbols which in the 
treatment of crime and criminals mark and measure the 
stored-up strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof 
of the living virtue in it. 18 
We should hope that our unconscionable treatment of 
prisoners abroad indicates the sort of decline in strength and 
virtue that Churchill warned of, and not an abandonment of 
strength and virtue altogether. 
Yet, the Administration’s efforts to legitimate indefinite 
detention, change the definition of torture, and manufacture a 
doctrine embracing illegal warfare suggest the worst of these two 
scenarios.  This would seem an effort to redefine strength—
strength in power, strength in brutality, strength in shock and 
awe—and an effort to reshape virtue, now the vehemence of one’s 
self protection and the zealousness of one’s pursuit of national 
interest.  And so aggression becomes strength, and single-minded 
pursuit of security and particular advantages reshapes the 
contours of virtue. 
At one point, there was strength in reasoned restraint and 
virtue in the rare form of compassion one might feel for an enemy.  
Like many hard-won traditions of conscience, these meanings and 
the courage to pursue them are located not solely within one 
nation, but rather within a community of nations that has derived 
shared lessons from history.  These lessons, too civilizational in 
scope to be proprietary, are forward looking.  Their application is 
surely the great labor of civilizational belonging, surely a great 
benefit of civilizational belonging as well, for it is in living up to 
these lessons that we do what we know to be right and avoid the 
entanglements that flow, inevitably, from misdeed. 
The basic ethics of the long-standing, but threatened, 
civilizational project in which Americans claim membership are 
special in substance, not function.  Functionally, one is 
deontological and the other is consequentialist.  The first tells us 
that the means matter; the second tells us that the ends do too.  
 
 18. Winston S. Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (July 20, 
1910), in 2 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 
1589, 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed. 1974). 
 But the moral value, the substance, at the heart of our 
deontological ethic is nothing less than human dignity, and the 
goods that our consequentialism seeks to maximize are nothing 
less than peace, stability, and prosperity.  Perhaps all traditions 
are the same when viewed at this high level of abstraction, 
varying only in how dignity and stability are defined, so let me be 
more specific: indefinite detention without charges, torture, and 
aggressive warfare violate both of our civilizational ethics.  This 
becomes a gentle reminder that we consider such means wrong 
per se and that we already know that the ends professed for such 
means will remain elusive.  This much our tradition has learned 
already at tremendous costs; this much we ignore only at the sake 
of losing ourselves and having to begin anew in a state of 
savagery. 
Our deontological project of rights against the government is 
indeed civilizational in scope and importance.  In our tradition, 
the protection of human dignity has undergone two separate 
revolutions—one American (1776), the other international 
(1945)—but its evolution began before either and has continued 
after both.  The Supreme Court has said so quite clearly:19 
“[O]wing to the progressive development of legal ideas and 
institutions in England, the words of Magna Charta stood for very 
different things at the time of the separation of the American 
colonies from what they represented originally.”20  And since the 
conclusion of the American Revolution, we have been improving 
upon our “ancient liberties,” for these have been rooted in the 
“forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new 
expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-
government.”21 
Our project of self-government of course began with the 
 
 19. The foregoing quotations and legal standards have evolved through 
the Court’s cruel and unusual punishment and due process jurisprudence—
constitutional protections transplanted from the English Declaration of 
Rights of 1688 and the Magna Carta. 
 20. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884). 
 21. Id. at 530 (“[I]t is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the 
best securities for our ‘ancient liberties.’  It is more consonant to the true 
philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal 
liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and 
developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances 
and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, 
new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.”). 
 declaration of seemingly insincere ideas.  How could we profess 
“unalienable” rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
while holding slaves?  How could we declare consent of the 
governed the legitimizing feature of any government while 
considering a large portion of the population to be mere property, 
by nature ineligible for rights and self-authorship?22  Where were 
the political equality and popular sovereignty we professed?  
Because the Declaration of Independence was believed by the 
colonists to be compatible with slavery, we must recall its words at 
present.  The improvement in our ancient liberties, this process 
that has given new expression and greater effect to our ideals, 
defines our civilizational commitment to rights as hard-won, as a 
series of lessons learned.  We considered inhuman and unworthy 
of rights an entire class of human beings while simultaneously 
holding up human freedom as our master value, our claim to 
legitimacy and respect.  It was not until the slaves were free that 
America could even begin to live up to her principles.  This 
evolution of rights reunited us with our conscience and our 
tradition.  Indeed, the tradition of rights in this country has all 
the makings of an identity, a politically and philosophically 
genealogical feature that connects America with a tradition that is 
at once of her and beyond her. 
The Supreme Court has proven itself an astute genealogist in 
these regards.  It has described those due process rights valid 
against the states as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” 
and part of the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”23  
Due process rights are those that stand between a human being 
and indefinite detention without charges or trials without 
procedural guarantees.  To abolish such rights, the Court has said 
is to “violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”24  
Justice Cardozo famously noted that a “fair and enlightened 
system of justice would be impossible without [such rights].”25 
 
 22. And for many years after the Declaration of Independence, we might 
note that its principles posed no obstacle to treating Native Americans as a 
savage feature of the land that we were free to eradicate, another category of 
non-persons in which rights could not fully vest. 
 23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 24. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 25. Id.  Justice Cardozo died the next year.  Palko is one testament to his 
judicial philosophy, one relevant aspect of which he gave to us in these words: 
 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflects a similar 
preoccupation with the civilizational pedigree, indeed identity-
constituting importance, of fundamental rights.  In explaining 
why expatriation is cruel and unusual, a plurality of the Court 
observed that “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment 
for crime.”26  A majority of the Court affirmed this comparative 
law method of analysis in 2005,27 as well as the following 
progression of meanings.  Underlying and flowing through the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court has found “the principle of civilized 
treatment”28 and a process of “evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”29  Hearing these 
phrases alerts us that it is this clause in our Bill of Rights that 
prohibits torture and connects us with a notable trajectory from 
savagery to civilization.  The Court contextualizes our tradition of 
Eighth Amendment protection within the “affirmation of certain 
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples;”30 this, the 
Court believes, “simply underscores the centrality of those same 
rights within our own heritage of freedom.”31  These words ring of 
deep cultural and civilizational significance.  All of this, in turn, 
can be grounded upon a transcendental source that would seem to 
explain cross-border similarities and complicate derogation: “The 
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.”32 
 
“The great generalities of the Constitution have a content and a significance 
that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the 
transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them.”  
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (Yale U. 
Press 1921). 
 26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the 
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected 
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”). 
 28. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (italics added). 
 29. Id. at 100; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002). 
Also of note are references to “our Anglo-American heritage.”  See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-32 (1988). 
 30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.  I 
understand perfectly well, and doubt very much that this will be lost on 
readers, that as a formalistic matter the extraterritorial application of the 
Bill of Rights is generally dubious.  I feel, however, that as a civilizational 
matter, and as a self-definitional matter, that the seriousness of the values 
 The dignity of man perhaps never received such a blow as 
during World War II.  Retooled as human dignity, this basic 
concept came to underlie the United Nations Charter and the 
international revolution it codified.33  The dropping of two atomic 
bombs within a month and a half after the signing of the Charter 
renders facile any descriptive claim of human dignity’s triumph,34 
but its assent is, at least, normatively clear.  “We the Peoples of 
the United Nations [are] Determined . . . to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person,” the preamble explains.35  Responding to the ways in 
which human dignity and peace were compromised, the Charter 
prohibits aggressive force (i.e., preemptive war).  Another body of 
law—including the Geneva Conventions and their protocols, the 
Hague Conventions, and customary law—regulates the conduct of 
warfare, requiring, inter alia, civilized treatment of detainees and 
minimization of civilian casualties.36  Also responding to the 
causes of World War II, the Charter establishes international 
collaboration in promoting human rights.37 
And then, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which itself was labeled “the common standard of achievement for 
 
and the depth of the tradition cannot be so easily waved by a technicality 
which, importantly, is mostly rectified by our membership in human rights 
treaties and the Geneva Conventions. 
 33. It would also be fair to say that human dignity, together with 
pragmatic concern over Hitler’s expansion, motivated U.S. involvement in 
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 all peoples and all nations,” there came a further solemn 
proclamation: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”38  The 
Declaration admonishes governments that human rights are the 
entitlement of “[e]veryone . . . without distinction of any kind, 
such as race . . . religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status,” and that “no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to 
which a person belongs . . . or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty.”39  The International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the foundational human rights 
treaties, reasserts the basic deontological thrust of human rights 
and connects up with the Eighth Amendment: “these rights derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person.”40 
Through entangled treaty law and customary law that makes 
good on these precepts, the international revolution has 
established that governments are not free to treat people in their 
control however they please.  This is the crucial limitation on 
sovereignty established in law by the human rights movement.  
The prohibition on torture, in fact, has been elevated to the status 
of a jus cogens norm, a rare international law designation holding 
derogation to be impermissible under any circumstance, including 
war.41  Indeed, if human dignity is inherent, then certain rights 
are inalienable, and accordingly some things simply cannot be 
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 done.  Sole, despotic dominion of territory and persons thereon is 
thus rescinded from states.  The international revolution is an 
evolutionary leap in the “standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”42  How could our prerogatives to 
protect the dignity of man and make good on our own heritage of 
freedom be taken seriously if states were free to pursue genocidal 
policies or conquer each other at will?  It follows in an essentially 
evolutionary way that new rules and structures had to be 
established to protect human dignity in an interdependent 
community of states. 
And so respect for fundamental rights is part of the 
longstanding civilizational project in which we claim membership.  
From the Magna Carta to the United Nations Charter, the 
protection of human dignity through fundamental rights has 
figured in our heritage and best efforts at producing a just society.  
The rescinding of civil liberties at home, indefinite detention 
without trial and torture abroad—from waterboarding to 
extraordinary rendition—and the waging of preemptive warfare in 
Iraq all speak to an abandonment of our own heritage of freedom; 
the principle of civilized treatment forgotten, the principles of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people now 
uprooted, plucked.  Civilization forsaken.  Our authority, freed 
from civilizational constraints, knows no bounds—we are not 
constrained by human dignity any longer, not limited by 
constitutional law, perhaps not even aware of international law.  
What hubris!  Our extremists have reclaimed the right of conquest 
over foreign lands and the ability to revoke the personhood of 
those who threaten us.  They have returned to savagery and the 
country cannot long remain autonomous from the flavor of its 
official acts.  The rights of adverse possession will soon flow to 
those who just recently began as unlawful occupiers of the 
American tradition.  Granted, these disseisors’ occupation of our 
tradition has not always been obvious; indeed, secrecy has 
abounded.  Nevertheless, the occupation has been notorious, 
hostile and brazen; our land has been altered.  We must claim 
trespass, less we acquiesce and cede title. 
But perhaps the neoconservatives are right: in an era of 
terrorism, we cannot afford to maintain naïve principles, these 
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 inconvenient traditions, this outmoded quality of conscience, for it 
is the first duty of government—they remind us—to protect the 
homeland.  Once all terrorist groups of global reach are defeated, 
then we can return to Eden.  Here we come to the consequentialist 
ethic at the heart of our civilizational project: the search for the 
good ends of stability and peace.  I suspect most of us might come 
around to this ethic eventually if it were not so empirically 
unsound when applied to torture and wars of aggression.  General 
David Petraeus, Commanding General of Iraq, has refuted the 
argument made by our extremists:  
“Some may argue that we would be more effective if we 
sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain 
information from the enemy. That would be wrong. 
Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history 
shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor 
necessary. Certainly, extreme physical action can make 
someone ‘talk;’ however, what the individual says may be 
of questionable value.”43   
Indeed, the U.S. Army’s own field manual contains a long-
standing prohibition on torture.44 
Besides producing bad intelligence, torture produces more 
terrorists.  Fawaz Gerges, in his authoritative study of how 
doctrinaire jihadis turned their sights from local targets to the 
West and its allies, notes that “Arab/Muslim prisons, particularly 
their torture chambers, have served as incubators for generations 
of jihadis.”45  He links this “bloody history of official torture” with 
a “culture of victimhood and desire for revenge [that] enables the 
movement to mobilize young recruits and constantly renew 
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 itself.”46 
Preemptive war has also proved spectacularly 
counterproductive for the goal of increased security.  Gerges 
recounts study after study—including the findings of the director 
of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Saudi Arabia’s interior 
minister, and virtually all American, European, and Arab analysts 
to have considered the matter—that report an iron-clad 
consensus: U.S. policy pursuant to the war on terrorism, including 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq, “radicalizes Arab public 
opinion,” “fuel[s] Islamic resentment,” provides recruiting tools 
and a recruiting ground, and “play[s] directly into the hands of Al 
Qaeda and other militants.”47  Admittedly, the security issue 
would be a more complicated one had Saddam Hussein indeed 
been tied to Al Qaeda or capable of threatening the United States, 
which of course he was not.  The many spurious rationales for 
invading Iraq continue to produce distrust and sometimes 
animosity in those who value truth. 
Beyond tilting public opinion in the Muslim world closer to Al 
Qaeda, U.S. policy has caused sizable changes in global public 
opinion.  Respect for the United States has declined steeply since 
the invasion of Iraq, and not just in Muslim countries.  For 
example, the number of people in Britain, France, and Germany 
holding favorable views of the United States has decreased by 20-
30% between 2002 and 2007.48  Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the 
world’s largest Muslim country, the percentage of citizens holding 
favorable views went from 61% in 2002 to 29% in the same time 
span.49 
This does not surprise Joseph Nye.  In his book, Soft Power: 
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 The Means to Success in World Politics,50 Nye cites the 
“plummeting” popularity of the United States and explains the 
growing practical problem of securing help from Islamic countries 
in locating and eliminating terrorists.51  This is a two-sided 
problem.  As seen with Iraq, hard power policies increase the very 
problem with which we need the help of foreign leaders.  Nye 
compares U.S. power to that of the Roman Empire and cautions 
that “Rome did not succumb to the rise of another empire, but to 
the onslaught of waves of barbarians.  Modern high-tech terrorists 
are the new barbarians.”52  Relying on reports from American 
intelligence and law enforcement officials, Nye confirms Gerges’s 
findings, locating in the Iraq War a source of Al Qaeda’s growth: 
“Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups intensified their recruitment 
on three continents by ‘tapping into rising anger about the 
American campaign for war in Iraq.’”53  But, thanks to the second 
part of the problem, declining U.S. popularity makes it politically 
unpopular for foreign leaders to collaborate.  Beyond aggravating 
the problem of terrorism, the careless use of force and the 
savagery of torture are quickly destroying our good name. 
Nye writes that soft power is “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”54  He 
specifies that this source of power emanates from “culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), [  ] political values (when [a 
state] lives up to them at home and abroad), and [ ] foreign 
policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority).”55  Indefinite detention, torture, and preemptive 
warfare have made short work of these last two sources of soft 
power.  Our political values do not merely include rights and the 
rule of law; they reside in them.  And yet, our extremists have 
been quick to discard them both at home and abroad.  A foreign 
policy that includes aggressive warfare, extraordinary rendition, 
and indefinite detention is per se illegitimate and strategically 
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 disastrous.  It is to a nation’s moral authority what the 
molestation of children by priests is to a church’s moral authority, 
but perhaps worse since the imputed actions are for the most part 
orders from high in the chain of command.  Even those whose eyes 
are fixed in precisely the right direction will have trouble seeing 
that beacon of freedom said to originate in the United States; even 
her greatest admirers now begin to doubt U.S. claims about 
representing lauded values; even lovers of this country become 
estranged. 
War has this effect and an unlawful war of aggression doubles 
it.  Love is lost.  Claims fail to touch upon truth.  Freedom 
becomes just an end, its extinction our daily bread.  War, lawful or 
not, falls on the extreme end of the hard power spectrum—
coercion through violence, payments in blood.  Understandably, 
Nye counsels us to employ tools from the soft power spectrum 
more frequently to achieve the balance between attraction and 
coercion that he calls “smart power;”56 however, we cannot even 
begin to do this until we hold true to our political values at home 
and abroad, and end our illegitimate and immoral foreign policies.  
Perhaps then we can begin to think about eliminating the causes 
of terrorism, instead of adding to them; perhaps then we can begin 
to think about defeating our radical adversaries instead of 
continuing to radicalize our moderate allies. 
III.  STAYING TRUE 
Having examined the threat posed to the two ethics of our 
civilizational project by our own extremists, let us consider how to 
stay true to high-minded traditions in moments when we feel 
threatened.  Ronald Dworkin understands the tensions inherent 
in upholding rights and political values in trying times.  He 
supplies guidance for avoiding derogations that, like those we 
have seen, constitute a rescinding of the institution of rights itself.  
Through a few of his quotations, I hope to illustrate a few 
guideposts for how to re-adhere to our tradition—that is, to take 
rights seriously again.  “The concept of rights,” says Dworkin, “has 
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 its most natural use when a political society is divided, and 
appeals to co-operation or a common goal are pointless.”57  Rights 
provide the ground rules for liberal democracy itself and for the 
discourse, stability, and values of civility and restraint that 
characterize it.  Even if the political community driving U.S. 
policy is divided on how to combat terrorism, we ought to be able 
to find among the vast majority of the population common ground 
where rights lie.  Taking rights seriously means taking the rule of 
law seriously and nobody, except extremists, believes this should 
be easily discarded. 
But how do we interpret rights?  We may assume that, in a 
democracy, a government’s action and inaction alike flow from 
popular opinion and the pursuit of general utility.  Rights place 
certain courses of action off the table and require others.  Our 
government may not, for example, inflict cruel and unusual 
punishment, while it must provide certain procedural protections 
at trial.  In this way, rights circumscribe a government’s realms of 
action and passivity, and, thus, constitute a restraint on politically 
dominant preferences.  Again, moderates in the United States, 
which is to say the great majority of the population, ought to be 
able to find common ground in twin convictions implied above and 
embraced by Dworkin: rights that can be overruled in light of 
shifting opinion are not rights at all; and rights that the majority 
can revoke at will in the interest of its general utility are similarly 
vacuous.  Each situation, if taken as justifying the revocation of 
rights, reveals the institution of rights to be a sham.58 
But what if the political community is threatened?  Surely 
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 this is the reason we have given for discarding rights during our 
war on terrorism.  There is a chance that someone released from 
Guantanamo was wrongly deemed innocent.  This person will then 
rejoin the enemy and perhaps perpetrate a great attack against 
us.  Even with Jose Padilla and Hamdi, the two American citizens 
famously denied for years any semblance of due process rights, the 
government’s claims boiled down to these two individuals being 
tied to terrorists and that no chances should be taken in dealing 
with them.  Dworkin is cautious.  He writes that “There would be 
no point in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that 
involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that 
we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive 
from overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient.”59  
This is to say that general utility justifications for rights 
violations fall short.  “Yes,” we might respond, “but what if we are 
speaking not of marginal benefits but avoiding catastrophic 
harm?” 
Dworkin concedes that a genuine emergency, one of “clear and 
present danger . . . of magnitude,” may justify a curtailment of 
rights.60  International law also conditions derogation on an 
emergency of certain magnitude.  Consider the ICCPR derogation 
clause: “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the 
States Parties . . . may take measures derogating from their 
obligations . . . to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation.”61  But this clause is subject to a sizable limitation: 
The ICCPR prohibits derogation from, inter alia, those articles 
concerning torture and cruel treatment, the right to life, and 
personhood.62  This may be the first difference between Dworkin 
and the international standard: the latter places some derogations 
off of the table, irregardless of magnitude.  The second difference 
concerns magnitude itself.  The ICCPR would seem to require the 
highest possible level of danger, perhaps beyond the reach of 
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 many 9/11s and in the realm of war against an enemy that could 
actually defeat the state.  Let us be realistic, however, and 
concede that most states will not risk such outcomes. 
So let us focus on the criteria most attune to the dilemmas of 
a permanent war on terrorism: clear and present danger as 
supplied by Dworkin—i.e., the certainty of the threat—and the 
notion of all derogations being permissible only to the extent 
strictly required by the situation.  The latter requires that 
infringements on rights be narrowly tailored to accomplish a 
necessary objective.  It immediately invalidates torture and the 
War in Iraq, since these derogations only aggravate terrorism.  
Rather than strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
such unreliable, costly, and counterproductive policies ought to be 
strictly prohibited by the exigencies of the situation. 
But this logic would also eliminate the criterion of certainty, 
because it would view even an impending terrorist attack as 
irrelevant to a government interest in employing torture.  Some in 
the administration, on the other hand, must be convinced that 
waterboarding and extraordinary rendition do provide some 
benefit; otherwise they would not permit these practices.  For 
example, President Bush recently vetoed a bill that would have 
required the CIA to limit its interrogation tactics to those 
authorized by the Army Field Manual.63  “Because the danger 
remains, we need to ensure our intelligence officials have all the 
tools they need to stop the terrorists,” the President remarked.64  
And to credit this foolishness further, surely a policy of indefinite 
detention would, assuming even a 1:1,000,000 ratio of terrorists to 
innocent bystanders in detention, provide some marginal benefit 
to immediate security interests.  Support for torture is indeed an 
extreme view, even descriptively speaking, as seen in a recent 
BBC study.  When asked whether they would support torture if it 
could provide information that would save innocent lives, only 36% 
of Americans said “yes.”65 
Because there is some chance that indefinite detention would 
prevent a loss or that torture would perhaps occasionally yield 
useful information, should we not therefore rescind the prohibition 
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 on torture and the right to due process?  Dworkin grows 
impatient:   
[T]his argument ignores the primitive distinction between 
what may happen and what will happen.  If we allow 
speculation to support the justification of emergency or 
decisive benefit, then, again, we have annihilated rights.  
We must, as Learned Hand said, discount the gravity of 
the evil threatened by the likelihood of reaching that 
evil.66 
For Bush, it is not just about clinging to torture; it is also 
about clinging to unfettered executive power to judge what is 
necessary in any given situation.  The power to define the 
situation itself, though, must not be ceded.  This is the power to 
define a state of constant emergency through speculation.  If we 
are truly under grave and imminent threat, then a strong 
executive must do what he deems necessary to protect us.  So let 
us turn to the criterion of certainty, clear and present danger.  
This is the guidepost to hold dear.  Because this war on terrorism 
has no known endpoint, the constant threat of terrorism must not 
be taken as sufficient justification for overriding rights.  Consider 
President Bush’s introduction of the war on terror to a joint 
session of Congress: 
Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not 
end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated . . . 
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation 
and isolated strikes.  Americans should not expect one 
battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have 
ever seen.67 
If we are not to be in a permanent era of torture, indefinite 
detention, and revocation of the rule against aggressive warfare, 
then we must insist on a higher degree of certainty of harm before 
bowing to bald assertions of constant threat. 
And, given the depth of our tradition of rights and its value to 
us and the world, something must be said about the type of harm 
grave enough to warrant casting aside our identity and 
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 civilizational membership. Dworkin provides a test for 
determining whether a right can be defined narrowly in a 
particular case, to avoid its application in that case, without 
revealing as a sham the initial recognition of the right.  First is 
the marginal situation where the values protected by the original 
right are not at stake or only partly at stake.68  Surely our 
extremists have argued along these lines in maintaining 
Guantanamo Bay to be a legal blackhole where no law applies, 
and in insisting that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to 
unlawful combatants.  Second is a situation where extension of 
the right would abridge some competing right.69  This is 
important for the right to life of U.S. citizens, for all manner of 
rights really, that would be extinguished by a direct terrorist 
attack.  But this returns us to the problem of certainty and 
exigency already discussed—can we be so sure that an attack is 
forthcoming and that torture and indefinite detention would do 
anything to prevent it?  Third is a situation in which extending 
the right would occasion a cost to society “of a degree far beyond 
the cost paid to grant the original right.”70  I read this to require a 
weighing of the historical struggles that culminated in our 
tradition of fundamental rights.  Depending on the right in 
question, these might include the Revolutionary War, the 
movement to abolish slavery, the civil rights movement, the cost of 
World War II and the human rights movement, and all manner of 
wars over centuries that led to the jus in bello legal framework. 
These costs should give us pause, a reason to reflect on just 
how precious the institution of rights is and how only the gravest 
of costs could justify derogation.  Literally, only a traitor would 
hold that a marginal increase in the possibility of a terrorist 
attack justifies rescinding our tradition of rights.  If clear and 
present danger of the first magnitude, coupled with a reasonable 
expectation of avoidance through derogation, then perhaps.  But 
only then, lest we reveal ourselves to be imposters holding out a 
venerable tradition as our own. 
Still one matter attends us, yet it is beset by nationalism and 
provincialism.  Dworkin’s guidance was given with regard to the 
rights of citizens.  I took it broadly and applied it to citizens 
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 (Padilla, et. al) and non-citizens (Guantanamo, Abu Graib, 
extraordinary rendition, and etc.) alike.  In the late 1940s, our 
tradition began to embrace human rights, not just U.S. 
constitutional rights.  This much is formalistically clear from our 
membership in various treaties and the world community more 
generally, pursuant to which we have accepted the premise that 
human dignity matters, not just the dignity of Americans.  But we 
must also recognize it to be pragmatically important, given that 
terrorist recruitment thrives on our abandonment of our own 
values and on the reasonable perceptions of U.S. foreign relations 
impropriety that follow.  As we have seen, rights are part of the 
currency of soft power, a badge of belonging in the community of 
civilized nations, and a requirement for securing international 
collaboration to combat terrorism.  Dworkin reminds us that: 
[I}f rights make sense at all, then the invasion of a 
relatively important right [such as due process or freedom 
from cruel treatment] must be a very serious matter.  It 
means treating a man as less than a man, or as less 
worthy of concern than other men.  The institution of 
rights rests on the conviction that this is a grave injustice 
. . . ”71   
We must take this to heart with regard to all human beings if we 
wish to address terrorism and if, in the process, we wish to retain 
what is good in our identities and heritage, and what is 
indispensable for a desirable future. 
In the end, we must consider whether the juxtaposition 
between human rights and national security is false.  Perhaps the 
way to achieve freedom and security is via human rights.  Perhaps 
the deontological and consequentialist ethics of our tradition have 
been improperly separated.  Perhaps rights, rightly understood, 
are the foundation of both human dignity and peace.  But for those 
who do not accept such a premise, which is implied in Jefferson’s 
hope for our shining city on the hill and specified outright by 
Wilsonian idealists, my hope is that they will at least value their 
tradition enough to not trade it in for scrap. 
Though inconvenient at times, rights are part of who we are 
and our adherence to them gives us pride about who we are 
becoming.  It is, after all, in each of our actions that civilization 
 
 71. Id. at 199. 
 lives or dies.  Some would say that we know this by virtue of 
universal moral traits: “in the soul of man,” said Emerson, “there 
is a justice whose retributions are instant and entire.  He who 
does a good deed, is instantly ennobled himself.  He who does a 
mean deed, is by the action itself contracted.”72  Others would add 
that we know this by virtue of the consequences of our actions.  
The Arab poet Adonis sums these up when, referring to our 
infamous foreign policy actions, he cites an “anguish which 
transcends private passion and pain.”73  This, he says, “creates 
civilizational agony for man and humanity.”74  I would say that we 
know it through both means—deontology and pragmatism—and, 
thus confirmed twice over, it becomes our task as citizens in a 
democracy to produce something better than a war on terrorism. 
In the beginning of this essay, I conceded that the prospect of 
our tradition’s demise at our own hands was a conceit.  This is 
important to admit, because our piecemeal abandonment of a 
tradition should not be confused with that tradition’s demise, and 
much less with the demise of the principles on which that 
tradition was based.  Walt Whitman said this about liberty, the 
organizing principle of our tradition: 
Nothing has precedence of it and nothing can warp or 
degrade it.  Liberty relies upon itself, invites no one, 
promises nothing, sits in calmness and light, is positive 
and composed, and knows no discouragement.  The battle 
rages with many a loud alarm and frequent advance and 
retreat . . . the enemy triumphs . . . the prison, the 
handcuffs, the iron necklace and anklet, the scaffold, 
garrote and leadballs do their work . . . the cause is asleep 
. . . the strong throats are choked with their own blood . . . 
the young men drop their eyelashes toward the ground 
when they pass each other . . . and is liberty gone out of 
that place?  No never.  When liberty goes it is not the first 
to go nor the second or third to go . . .  it waits for all the 
rest to go . . . it is the last  . . . When . . . the laws of the 
free are grudgingly permitted and laws for informers and 
 
 72. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Divinity School Address (1838) in LAWRENCE 
BUELL, THE AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS 131 (2006). 
 73. GERGES, supra note 6, at 271 (quoting Adonis, Beyond History, 
Without Future, AL HAYAT, Dec. 4, 2003). 
 74. Id. 
 blood-money are sweet to the taste of the people. . .when 
the soul retires in the cool communion of the night and 
surveys its experience and has much extasy over the word 
and deed that put back a helpless innocent person into 
the gripe of the gripers . . . when the swarms of cringers, 
suckers, doughfaces, lice of politics, planners of sly 
involutions for their own preferment . . . obtain a 
response of love and natural deference from the people . . 
. or rather when all life and all the souls of men and 
women are discharged from any part of the earth—then 
only shall the instinct of liberty be discharged from that 
part of the earth.75 
It is with Whitman’s words that I close, because he is 
remarkably clear on a point that we, apparently, are not.  Our 
sacred principles are above and beyond us, and yet by doing what 
we know to be right we connect with them, becoming of them and 
them of us, and it is in this connection that we and our country 
have shown notable, if yet inconstant, greatness.  Greatness arises 
from challenges being met, especially that constant challenge of 
living up to one’s principles.  Slavery presented such a challenge, 
as did the subjugation of women and most recently homosexuals, 
and continued attention remains necessary on these fronts.  The 
War on Terrorism presents a new front on which we are called to 
live up to our principles, and if we look carefully we see 
intertwined with these principles our own identities, fates, and 
legacies.  And so it may be true that liberty, dignity, equality, and 
peace are beyond us, but we should not assume that we—in any 
form cognizable to us—are beyond them. 
 
 
 75. WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS (1855) in WALT WHITMAN: 
COMPLETE POETRY AND COLLECTED PROSE 17-18 (Library of America, 1982). 
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Muslim-Americans’ Charitable Giving 
Dilemma: What About a Centralized 
Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund? 
Nina J. Crimm* 
INTRODUCTION 
Islam and Judaism share numerous common beliefs and 
traditions.  Like Judaism, some Islamic traditions and rituals can 
be traced to the Hebrew prophet Abraham (Ibrahim).1  The Torah 
and the Qur’an both honor Abraham (Ibrahim) for his devotion 
and willingness to submit to, and sacrifice for, God.2  One such 
shared form of religious sacrifice and spiritual tradition is 
obligatory charitable giving.  Religious laws obligate Jews to give 
tzedakah.3  One of the five pillars of Islam is the imperative of 
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 1. See Mona Siddiqui, IbrahimThe Muslim View of Abraham, BBC,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ibrahim.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2007). 
 2. See id. 
 3. The word “tzedakah” is derived from the Hebrew word “tzedek,” 
which means “righteousness, justice, fairness.”  Jewish Virtual Library, 
Tzedaka, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/Tzedaka.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  Perhaps the most important obligation Judaism 
imposes on the Jewish people is to perform deeds of justice.  Id.  The Torah 
commands: “Tzedek, tzedek, you shall pursue.”  Deuteronomy 16:20, quoted in 
Jewish Virtual Library, Tzedaka, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ 
Judaism/Tzedaka.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  The Talmud instructs: 
“Tzedakah is equal to all the other commandments combined.”  TALMUD, 
Bava Batra 9b, quoted in Jewish Virtual Library, Tzedaka, http://www. 
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/Tzedaka.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2008).  The Torah provides that Jews tithe ten % of their earnings to the poor 
every third year and annually give an additional percentage of their income.  
 zakat.4 
Both Islam and Judaism also have been the inspiration for 
long-standing intellectual heritages.  Each religion claims learned 
and esteemed philosophers who have attempted to unite religion, 
knowledge, and faith.5  The most influential Jewish philosopher of 
the Middle Ages was Moses Maimonides.6  Among the themes on 
which he expressed profound sentiments was the giving of charity.  
He articulated eight degrees of worthiness in unselfish charitable 
giving, the second highest degree of which is giving to an unknown 
recipient who does not know the benefactor’s identity.7  The value 
of this proposition has long been debated in religious and non-
religious fora, but since 9/11 such discussions have adopted a more 
anxious tenor.  Maimonides, however, actually accompanied his 
 
Deuteronomy 26:12. 
 4. See BBC, Religion & Ethics - Five Pillars of Islam, http://www 
.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/practices/fivepillars.shtml (last visited Feb. 
28, 2008).  The other four pillars, or tenets, of Islam are shahadah (reciting 
the basic statement of the Islamic faith), salat (performing the ritual prayer 
five times daily), sawm (fasting during daylight during the holy month of 
Ramadan), and hajj (making pilgrimage to Mecca).  See id.  These pillars are 
considered compulsory and not merely voluntary acts.  See id.  Indeed, the 
word “Islam” is Arabic for “submission,” and the pillars are submissions to 
the deity, Allah.  See James D. Davis, Five Pillars Are Key to Keeping Faith: 
Responsibility, Prayer, Charity and Forgiveness Are Among Elements of 
Islam, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 24, 2006, at 1J.  The term 
“zakat” has its roots in the Arab word for “purification.”  See Neil 
MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving by U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 5. See, e.g., Muslim Philosophy, The Philosophers, http://www.muslim 
philosophy.com/#people (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Ibrahim Bayyumi 
Madkour, The Study of Islamic Philosophy, AL TAWHID (1983), available at 
http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/study-philosophy.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 
2008); Radical Academy, Jewish Philosophy, http://www.radicalacademy.com/ 
adiphiljewishindex.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
 6. See MileChai.com, Judaism, http://www.milechai.com/judaism/ram 
bam.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  Reflecting the Jewish sentiment that 
the greatness of Maimonides was like that of Moses, Maimonides’ grave is 
inscribed with “From Moses to Moses, there were none like Moses.”  See Ilil 
Arbel, From Moses to Moses There Were None Like Moses: Prophesy of 
Maimonides’ Birth, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA, http://www.pantheon.org/ 
areas/featured/maimonides/mm-1.html (last viewed Feb. 28, 2008). 
 7. See C.G. MONTEFIORE & H. LOEWE, A RABBINIC ANTHOLOGY 670 n.30 
(1974); JACOB S. MINKIN, THE WORLD OF MOSES MAIMONIDES WITH SELECTIONS 
FROM HIS WRITINGS 370 (1957).  Maimonides articulated the highest degree of 
almsgiving as helping a hurt fellow Jew by giving him a gift or loan, entering 
into a partnership with him, or finding work for him so that he can be self-
dependent.  See id. at 369. 
 first opinion with a less remembered and less frequently discussed 
comment: “Related to this [second highest] degree is the giving to 
the [public] alms-chest.  One should not give to the alms-chest 
unless he knows that the officer in charge is reliable, wise, 
[scrupulous] and a capable administrator.”8 
Since September 11, 2001, Maimonides’ wisdom rings 
particularly true, especially for Muslim-Americans who seek to 
fulfill their Quranic duty of charitable giving.  In the post-9/11 
national security oriented environment, many Muslim-Americans 
face the dilemma of how to satisfy their zakat obligation.  
Muslims’ stake in satisfying their duty of zakat cannot be 
overstated. They consider zakat a form of spiritual self 
purification and growth achievable by annually tithing at least 
2.5% of their wealth to the needy.9  There is no substitute for 
zakat,10 and practicing zakat is essential for one’s prayers to be 
accepted by Allah.11 
The Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which in the 2007 
calendar year began on September 13, is an especially important 
time for Muslim charitable giving.  Muslims believe that they gain 
greater heavenly rewards for zakat contributed during 
Ramadan,12 so many who have not fulfilled their zakat duty 
completely during the year will give the balance during 
Ramadan.13  Moreover, during Ramadan, a time when Muslims 
fast during daylight,14 they usually monetarily fulfill their 
 
 8. MINKIN, supra note 7, at 370. 
 9. See Davis, supra note 4; Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The 
Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for 
Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004) [hereinafter Crimm, High Alert].  Shia 
Muslims are obligated to tithe twenty percent of their income beyond living 
expenses.  See KHALIL JASSEMM, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON CHARITY 19 (2006). 
 10. See JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 78–79. 
 11. See Alex Cohen, Day to Day Show: Muslims Concerned About 
Donations, Interview of Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini (Nat’l Pub. Radio 
broadcast July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Interview of Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-
Qazwini]. 
 12. See Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Muslims Temper Ramadan Giving with 
Caution, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at B2 (stating that “the blessings of all 
donations [during Ramadan] are multiplied 70 times in the book of God”). 
 13. Robert King, Beneficence Built on Faith; Hoosiers Bestow the Bulk of 
Giving on Churches, Religious Charities, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 21, 
2004, at 1A.  One report states that humanitarian charities can collect 40%-
50% of annual donations during Ramadan.  JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 27. 
 14. BBC, Religion & EthicsFive Pillars of Islam, supra note 4. 
 additional special benevolent obligation, zakat al-fitr.  Zakat al-
fitr is the duty of every Muslim, whether rich or poor, to feed a 
needy family during the three days of Eid, a celebration that 
marks the end of, and immediately follows, Ramadan.15 
The Qur’an enumerates seven categories of people religiously 
sanctified and thus entitled to receive zakat: the poor, the 
deprived, the destitute, the homeless, the sick, the wayfarer, and 
others who are in need of help.16  There is widespread belief 
among Muslims that, according to the prophet Muhammad, the 
world’s neediest Muslims, rather than persons of non-Islamic 
faiths, must be the recipients of obligatory zakat contributions.17  
Potential Muslim recipients around the world have immeasurable 
stakes in receiving Muslim-Americans’ zakat; without those 
donations they might suffer innumerable spiritual and physical 
deprivations, some life threatening. 
In addition to zakat, many Muslims give sadaqah to aid the 
poor, to assist the incapacitated, to support social services, and to 
help other worthy recipients and causes.18  Sadaqah is voluntary 
and, in accordance with the Qur’an, should be given discreetly.19  
 
 15. JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 81; Aziz Junejo, Eid al Fitr Celebrates End 
of Ramadan Fasting, Gift of Self-Control, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at 
B5; Watanabe, supra note 12, at B2 (stating that failure to pay zakat al-fitr 
means to many Muslims that “their spiritual benefits gained from fasting 
and praying [during Ramadan] will be forfeited.”). 
 16. See Interview of Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini, supra note 11; 
MacFarquhar, supra note 4.  Islam teaches that these seven categories of 
qualified recipients actually have a right or an entitlement to receive zakat.  
See JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 77. 
 17. See Damien Henderson, Shaking the Pillars of Islam, HERALD 
(Glasgow), Dec. 7, 2004, at 12.  Many Muslims believe that Muslims need not 
be the recipients of non-obligatory charitable giving, known as sadaqah.  Id.; 
Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law:  Origin, 
Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 841, 859 
(2001) (stating that freed slaves could be waqf beneficiaries); see also Kathryn 
A. Ruff, Scared To Donate: An Examination of the Effects of Designating 
Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment Rights 
of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 472 (2005). 
 18. See Imam Ghazaali, SadaqahGiving in Charity, http://www.uwt. 
org/Sadaqah.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008); Azim Nanji, Charitable Giving 
in Islam, 5 ALLIANCE 1 (2000), available at http://www.islam.co.za/awqafsa/ 
sorce/library/Article%209.htm (last viewed Jan. 2, 2008). 
 19. See Nanji, supra note 18.  The belief that sadaqah should be given 
anonymously and without publicity parallels Maimonides’ opinion that 
unselfish, anonymous charitable giving to an unknown recipient signifies 
true charitable intentions.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 For these reasons, it is considered true charity,20 and its monetary 
value eludes calculation.21  Nonetheless, Muslim teachings, 
traditions, and culture, which regard the importance of sadaqah 
as “[o]n every bone of the fingers charity is incumbent every 
day,”22 suggest its possible magnitude. 
Prior to 9/11, Muslim-Americans often transmitted their 
philanthropy by private channels or informal means, such as 
hawalas,23 and sometimes through U.S.-based Islamic charities 
and mosques.  Since 9/11, Muslim-Americans have been reluctant 
to make contributions through those intermediaries for fear that 
they might be subjected to surveillance, or, even worse, harassed, 
implicated, arrested, or prosecuted because of links to charities 
that the U.S. government currently deems, or in the future may 
consider, illegal providers of “material support” to terrorists and 
terrorist organizations.24  Therefore, the ability to direct zakat—to 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. Sadaqah includes pecuniary as well as non-monetary charity, such as 
performing good deeds.  See Ghazaali, supra note 18.  Thus, just as a 
voluntary donation of currency to a needy individual or institution is 
sadaqah, so too is a visit to a sick person, physical assistance given a frail 
individual, or recitation of a prayer for a dying person.  See id. 
 22. MULANA MUHAMMAD ALI, A MANUAL OF HADITH ch. 16, available at 
http://aaiil.org/text/had/manhad/manhad.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
 23. See Raja Kamal & Rosanne Model, The Need for Smart Muslim 
Charities, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2004, at C31.  The hawala system is an informal 
paperless networked transfer money system ("hawala" means "trust") used by 
Muslims throughout the world, including the United States.  Alan Lambert, 
Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism, in Organized Crime, 
Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3, 9, 
14-15 (2002).  A party pays cash to another person who immediately or later 
advances the equivalent funds to, or on behalf of, another designated party 
for a specified use abroad.  Id. at 14-15.  Thus, no official bank records are 
maintained, and the funds cannot be tracked by governmental authorities.  
Id.  Some Muslim-Americans have thought that cash is harder to trace and 
thus more difficult to be tied to allegedly lending material support to a 
terrorist organization.  Kim Vo, Season of Charity: A Time of Scrutiny for 
U.S. Muslims, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (CA), Oct. 13, 2007, at 1B. 
 24. See, e.g., Greg Krupa, Muslims Seek “Safe” Charities for Giving, 
DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 5, 2007, at 1A; Audrey Hudson, CAIR Concedes 
Membership Down; Blames U.S. for Linking It to Charity on Trial for 
Terrorist Ties, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, at A1; MacFarquhar, supra note 
4; Alan Cooperman, Muslim Charities Say Fear Is Damming Flow of Money, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at A3; Talk of the Nation: Arab Americans 
Hesitant to Donate to Lebanese Charities (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast Aug. 9, 
2006); Caroline Preston, Donations Trickle in to Charities Providing Middle 
East Aid, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 27, 2006, available at 
http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2006/07/2006072701.htm; Alex Cohen, 
 whom and by what means they choose—can protect Muslim-
Americans against not only religious deprivations and spiritual 
disgraces but also long-term or permanent stains on their personal 
and business reputations, and even criminal prosecution.25 
This paper addresses the existing inhospitable philanthropic 
environment for Muslim-Americans.  Part I reviews relevant 
demographic information on Muslim-Americans.  It shows that 
Muslim-Americans’ financial resources for, and interest in, 
diaspora philanthropy certainly support an exploration of possible 
devices to help them accomplish their charitable giving obligations 
and goals.  Part II focuses on reasons for Muslim-Americans’ fears 
of charitable giving through existing channels.  It briefly discusses 
legislation, regulatory projects, and governmental agencies’ post-
9/11 initiatives aimed at combating terrorism.  It concludes that 
Muslim-Americans’ fears of being linked to terrorists and terrorist 
activities when engaging in charitable giving are not unfounded.  
Part III addresses the chilled philanthropic climate by suggesting 
that it might be moderated through the creation of a centralized 
terror-free donor advised fund (DAF) aimed specifically at 
enabling Muslim-Americans to direct their zakat and voluntary 
contributions to needy Muslims in a few targeted regions and 
communities abroad.  This part presents the essential 
requirements for a “terror-free” DAF, including two checklists.  
Part III also sets forth a brief commentary on the financial 
feasibility of the proposed endeavor.  The Conclusion suggests that 
the benefits of a terror-free DAF would inure not only to Muslim-
 
Marketplace: Giving to Muslim Charities (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast Oct. 4, 
2005); Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1349 n.16 (listing numerous 2001-
2004 news articles reporting donors’ fears).   
     Since 9/11, Muslim-Americans have been encouraged to give not only 
voluntary contributions but also their obligatory zakat domestically rather 
than overseas.  See Jane Lampman, U.S. Muslims in a Quandary over 
Charities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2004, at 11.  Some Muslim-
Americans have followed this suggested approach.  See id.; see also Laurie 
Goodstein, Since 9/11, Muslims Look Closer to Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2004, at F1.  This does not resolve, however, the tension most feel as a result 
of the Islamic beliefs that Muslims must give zakat to the neediest, with 
priority to Muslims, and that these people reside in developing and 
underdeveloped countries abroad.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1349. With readily available 
internet archives, accusations against individuals, whether true or not, can 
permanently sully reputations.  These harmful stains become non-removable 
because internet searches can produce recent and age-old, long-buried 
information that may be accurate, wrong, incomplete, or outdated. 
 Americans and the neediest Muslims abroad, but also to the 
American public. 
I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS 
A definitive population count of Muslim-Americans has 
proved elusive, but estimates currently range from 2.35 million to 
seven million.26  Nonetheless, a 2007 task force report for the 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs portrays the Muslim-American 
population as growing in number and diversity, representing 
many “ethnic, linguistic, ideological, social, economic, and 
religious groups.”27  According to a 2007 survey by The Pew 
Research Center, 65% of Muslim-Americans are first generation 
immigrants to the United States, and another 7% are individuals 
whose parents are first generation immigrants.28  Thus, fully 72% 
of Muslim-Americans are “foreign-born or have roots abroad.”29  
Nonetheless, The Pew Research Center found that Muslim-
Americans are “highly assimilated into American Society.”30 
Most foreign-born Muslim-Americans have arrived in the 
United States since the beginning of the 1990s.  Thirty-three 
percent immigrated to the United States in the 1990s, while 28% 
 
 26. See THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, TASK FORCE SERIES, 
STRENGTHENING AMERICA: THE CIVIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MUSLIM 
AMERICANS 23 (2007) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING AMERICA], available at 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/taskforce_details.php?taskforce_id=8; PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY 
MAINSTREAM 10 (2007) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM 
AMERICANS], available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?Rep 
ortID=329.  One reason for the difficulty in accurately estimating the number 
of Muslim-Americans is that neither the Census Bureau nor the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services collects information on religious 
affiliation.  STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra, at 26.  Another reason is that 
studies have relied on telephone calls to households that have landline 
service.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra, at 26.  There has 
been no way to include in the studies those households that have no 
telephone service or only cell phone service, which includes an estimated 
13.5% of the public.  Id.  Finally, language skills of Muslims have proved 
challenging for researchers.  See id. at 12–13.  The 2.35 million estimate is 
that of the Pew Research Center.  Id. at 10.  The 7 million estimate is the 
result of a 2001 survey by the Hartford Institute for Religious Research.  See 
id. at 13. 
 27. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 23. 
 28. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 15. 
 29. Id. at 10. 
 30. Id. at Report Summary. 
 came in the current millennium.31  Twenty-three percent of 
foreign-born Muslim-Americans arrived in the 1980s and only 16% 
came earlier.32  Most settled in large metropolitan areas, with the 
largest concentrations living in Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, 
Washington, D.C. and Chicago.33 
According to The Pew Research Center survey, these 
immigrants are ethnically diverse.  They are from at least sixty-
eight different countries, with more than 37% arriving from the 
“Arab region” and a large proportion from South Asia.34  
Reflective of this profile, the largest percentage of foreign-born 
Muslim-Americans who emigrated from one country came from 
Iran (12%) and Pakistan (12%).35  Thirty-two percent arrived from 
Bangladesh (5%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (4%), India (7%), Iraq 
(4%), Lebanon (6%), and Yemen (6%) combined.36 
The educations and household incomes of foreign-born and 
native-born Muslim-Americans are comparable to those of the 
U.S. population as a whole.37  Approximately 10% of Muslim-
Americans have attended graduate schools, and 14% have earned 
college degrees.38  Forty-one percent of Muslim-Americans report 
household incomes of at least $50,000, and the percentages 
making $25,000 and $75,000 annually are approximately 
proportional to the same percentages for the U.S. population as a 
whole.39  Nearly mirroring the sentiment of the general populace, 
 
 31. Id. at 15. 
 32. Id. 
 33. LEWIS MUMFORD CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REGIONAL 
RESEARCH, UNIV. AT ALBANY, TOTAL MUSLIM POPULATION: METROPOLITAN 
REGIONS (2000), available at http://mumford.albany.edu/census/data.html. 
 34. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 15.  
The Arab region is based on a UNDP classification, which defines the region 
as including twenty-two Middle Eastern and North African countries.  Id.  
The United States Department of State also has published demographic 
information on Muslim-Americans, with estimates fairly similar to those of 
the Pew Research Center survey.  U.S. Department of State, Varieties of 
Worship, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslimlife/demograp.htm (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2007).  By comparison, the Council on American-Islamic 
Relations (CAIR) estimates that 29% of Muslim-Americans immigrants are 
from Arab states. CAIR, U.S. Immigrants from Muslim Populated Regions, 
http://www.cair.com/asp/populationstats.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
 35. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 15. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 18. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  Sixteen percent of Muslim-Americans indicate household incomes 
of at least $100,000; 10% report incomes of between $75,000 and $99,999; 
 almost one-half of Muslim-Americans perceive their personal 
financial situations to be good or excellent despite the fact that a 
lower percentage reports full-time employment than the general 
U.S. population.40 
Like Americans of other religious beliefs, Muslim-Americans’ 
religious devotion to Islam ranges from “very orthodox to 
moderate to secular.”41  The largest portion of Muslim-Americans, 
about half, identify themselves as Sunni, the largest Muslim 
tradition worldwide.42  Only 16% identify with Shia Islam, the 
second largest Muslim tradition across the world.43 Twenty-two 
percent report they are Muslim without identifying a particular 
sect with which they are affiliated.44 
Muslim-Americans regard the role of Islam in their lives as 
significant.  Eighty-six percent of all Muslim-Americans regard 
the Qur’an as the word of Allah, and 50% consider that the Qur’an 
must be read “literally, word for word.”45  At least 90% report that 
religion is either a “very important” part of their lives (72%) or a 
“somewhat important” part of their lives (18%).46  Nearly one-
quarter have a high religious commitment.47  Not surprisingly, 
76% consider their duty of zakat “very important.”48  Nonetheless, 
many Muslim-Americans, slightly more than three-quarters, are 
concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism worldwide and 
disapprove of terrorists and their tactics.49 
From these demographics alone, it certainly is predictable 
 
15% specified incomes of between $50,000 and $69,999.  Id.  Fifty-nine 
percent of Muslim-Americans report household incomes of less than $50,000.  
Id.  Muslim-Americans from South Asia, especially India and Pakistan, tend 
to have a higher socio-economic profile, and perhaps are more “privileged,” 
than other Muslim-Americans.  See ADIL NAJAM, PORTRAIT OF A GIVING 
COMMUNITY: PHILANTHROPY BY THE PAKISTANI-AMERICAN DIASPORA 32-34 
(2006); Karen Leonard, American Muslims, Before and After September 11, 
2001, 35 EC. & POL. WEEKLY 2293, 2293 (2002). 
 40. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 18-19. 
 41. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 23. 
 42. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 21. 
 43. Id.  These Shia are expected to tithe more zakat than Sunnis.  See 
supra note 9. 
 44. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 23. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 24. 
 47. Id. at 25.  This includes attendance at mosque at least weekly and 
praying all five salahs daily.  Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 49. 
 that Muslim-Americans worry about how to fulfill their zakat and 
zakat al-fitr obligations, as well as how to give sadaqah.  It is 
impossible to estimate the monetary value of sadaqah donated 
and zakat required of, and given by,50 Muslim-Americans. Despite 
the lack of actual data, anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
greatest portion of donated funds before 9/11 may have been 
directed overseas.51  This pattern would be consistent with the 
widespread belief that zakat must go to the neediest Muslims 
across the world.52  Moreover, nearly 40% of Muslim-Americans 
emigrated from abroad only during the past two decades.53  Many 
of the immigrants are educated, a significant proportion of these 
consider themselves financially secure, and most are quite 
religious.54  They have special desires to satisfy their obligatory 
and voluntary philanthropy by sending money to help individuals 
in their countries of origin, many of which are war-torn, 
impoverished, and perceived as home to the neediest Muslims.55  
As a result of their post-9/11 heightened awareness of the 
operations of terrorists and terrorist organizations, these foreign-
born Muslim-Americans have become increasingly hesitant to 
undertake diaspora philanthropy.56  Likewise, native-born 
Muslim-Americans have become wary of directing their sadaqah, 
zakat, and zakat al-fitr contributions abroad to help cure Muslims’ 
deprivations, even deprivations that may give rise to or exacerbate 
 
 50. One researcher suggests that “if each of America’s estimated six 
million Muslims were to donate at the rate of the average American, their 
total giving would exceed $5.3 billion annually.”  JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 
25.  It is impossible, however, to determine whether American-Muslims 
donate at the average rate of all Americans, or to rely upon a population 
estimate of six million American-Muslims.  See supra note 26 and 
accompanying text (indicating that population estimates range between 2.35 
million and seven million). 
 51. See Goodstein, supra note 24, at F1.  But see JASSEMM, supra note 9, 
at 31 (stating that at their peak before 9/11, Muslim-American charities 
annually directed less than $23 million overseas, representing a small 
portion of Muslim-American donations). 
 52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 53. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 1. 
 54. Id. at 2, 18-26. 
 55. See, e.g., Lampman, supra note 24, at 11; Goodstein, supra note 24, at 
F1; see Ruff, supra note 17, at 471.  One researcher suggests that often 
diaspora donors prefer to give to needy individuals rather than to causes 
because of a low level of trust of government and institutions, including 
nonprofits.  Adil Najam, Diaspora Philanthropy to Asia 119, 142-43, in 
BARBARA J. MERZ,= ET AL., DIASPORAS AND DEVELOPMENT (2007). 
 56. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 terrorism, such as poverty.57  Consequently, many of these well-
intentioned people cautiously have sought legitimate, safe, and 
accessible channels for their charitable giving.  Some have turned 
to wiring money to people or villages through relatives;58 others 
have searched for more formal channels but have encountered 
significant frustrations and challenges.59 
II. CONCERNS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS ARE NOT UNFOUNDED 
Keen on preventing further acts of terrorism after 9/11, the 
U.S. government expanded the scope and reach of legislation, 
regulatory projects, administrative enforcement initiatives, civil 
and criminal sanctions, and diplomatic efforts aimed at enhancing 
national security.  These laws and programs have tremendously 
affected all Americans, but perhaps their greatest impacts have 
been on Muslim-Americans. 
In response to the 9/11 attacks, on September 23, 2001, 
President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order60 in which 
he declared a national emergency to deal with the threat of future 
terrorism.  Although the sources of the financial resources of the 
9/11 attackers were not then known,61 he surmised that they were 
expansive and included individuals, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other entities.62  He provided for the 
 
 57. See Lampman, supra note 24, at 11; Goodstein, supra note 24.  See 
also supra note 24 (commenting on the tension in giving domestically rather 
than abroad). 
 58. See Tom Pope, Charity as a Duty, NONPROFIT TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at 
1(5). 
 59. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  Some Muslim-Americans 
have transmitted funds to zakat committees in the Middle East, but this 
approach is dangerous.  Despite the U.S. government indirectly having 
transmitted humanitarian financial aid to Palestinian occupied territories in 
the Middle East through zakat committees, it alleges that such committees 
have ties to terrorist organizations, including Hamas.  See MacFarquhar, As 
Muslim Group Goes on Trial, Other Charities Watch Warily, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2007, at A14. 
 60. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).  For 
further discussion of Executive Order 13,224 and the authorizations it 
conferred, see Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1364-94. 
 61. The 9/11 Commission Report, issued in 2004, reported that 
investigations revealed that al Qaeda primarily financed the attacks through 
funds raised by individuals and charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf nations.  THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 172 
(2004). 
 62. 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079. 
 application of future financial sanctions because he considered 
“dual organizations”63—those having both military and charity 
operations—and other NGOs to be attractive targets for terrorists’ 
exploitation, and subsequently capable of funding terrorists.64  
The perceived susceptibility of charities results from their (1) 
public aura of trustworthiness combined with unwitting donors, 
(2) engagement in some legitimate charitable activities, (3) 
potential access to considerable financial resources, (4) cash-
intensiveness, (5) possible global presence, (6) limited 
governmental oversight, especially abroad, and (7) typically one-
directional transferal of donations and other funds.65  Thus, 
pursuant to presidential powers under the International 
Emergency and Economic Powers Act, President Bush froze assets 
of individuals and groups on an annexed list of designated foreign 
persons,66 persons acting on behalf of those on the list, and 
persons who have committed, or are significant risks for 
committing, terrorist acts.67  The entire annexed list contained the 
names of twenty-seven Muslim and Arab persons, known as 
specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs) and specially 
designated nationals (SDNs), twelve individuals and fifteen 
groups, including three NGOs.68  Moreover, the Executive Order 
authorized government officials to identify more SDNs and SDGTs 
 
 63. Such “dual organizations” include the well-established groups of 
Hamas and Hezbollah.  Dual organizations can operate hospitals, schools, 
and religious institutions, and can provide public services and relief, but can 
also be fertile grounds to recruit extremists for terrorist activities.  See 
Violent Islamist Extremism, Government Efforts to Defeat It: Hearing of the S. 
Homeland Security Comm. (May 10, 2007) [hereinafter Testimony of Chip 
Poncy] (testimony of Chip Poncy, Director of Strategic Policy, Treasury 
Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes), available 
at Federal News Service, LEXIS. 
 64. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Freezes 
Terrorists’ Assets (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html; Blocking Property and Prohibiting 
Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support 
Terrorism: Message from the President of the United States, 147 CONG. REC. 
H5964 (Sept. 24, 2001). 
 65. See Islamic Extremism:  Hearing Before the Committee on S. 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (May 10, 2007) [hereinafter 
Statement of Chip Poncy] (statement of Chip Poncy, Director of Strategic 
Policy, Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial 
Crimes), available at CQ Congressional Testimony, LEXIS. 
 66. The term “person” includes individuals, groups, and entities. 
 67. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079. 
 68. Annex, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,083. 
 and to freeze the assets of any foreign or domestic person 
associated with SDNs and SDGTs or “determined to assist in, 
sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support 
for, or financial or other services to or in support of” terrorism.69 
Congress quickly followed by enacting the USA Patriot Act 
(Act) on October 26, 2001, to enlarge the president’s authority and 
the ability of government agencies to engage in an unconventional 
“war on terrorism.”70  The Act permits the government to monitor, 
identify, investigate, regulate, disrupt, and dismantle not only 
terrorist operatives and their operations, but also their 
supporters.71  It enables the government to freeze and confiscate 
assets it perceives as destined to support terrorism.72  Individuals, 
as well as traditional and nontraditional structures, such as § 
501(c)(3) charitable organizations, are subject to these laws, which 
provide civil and criminal sanctions.73  Although later questioned 
by scholars and courts,74 Congress purportedly intended to protect 
innocent, well-intentioned donors by predicating an individual 
donor’s violation of the laws upon actual or constructive 
knowledge75 that the funds might be used for the support of 
terrorism, but without requiring a specific evil intent to facilitate 
terrorism.76  Since 2001, Congress has extended antiterrorism 
 
 69. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079. 
 70. Uniting and Strengthening America by Proving Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 71. 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1) (2007), as amended by the USA Patriot Act. 
The USA Patriot Act expanded the authority of the President under the 
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 72. Id. 
 73. For a broader discussion of the various laws, penalties, and their 
applications see Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1354-1437. 
 74. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-
Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 61–71 
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 76. Courts and scholars have suggested that a specific intent 
requirement for violation of the laws could permit persons to avoid liability. 
See Chesney, supra note 74, at 12–18, 61–71; Crimm, High Alert, supra note 
 laws,77 some aimed directly at financing,78 and government 
agencies have expanded their programs and initiatives to combat 
terrorism.79 
By September 11, 2007, implementation of counterterrorism 
plans by the Department of Treasury and other agencies had 
produced notable impacts.  The government had designated forty-
five Islamic-related charitable organizations, all of which have 
engaged in some charitable services or financial assistance to the 
needy, as proscribed SDNs or SDGTs.80  Of these, eight currently 
have or formerly had offices in the United States.81  Additionally, 
the government had designated eight entities as potential 
fundraising front organizations.82  As part of its enforcement 
efforts, the government had seized and frozen the assets of several 
designated charitable organizations,83 suspended the tax-exempt 
status of some Muslim-American charities without providing these 
entities any opportunity for prior challenge,84 caused a number of 
 
9, at 1410-14. 
 77. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-177 (Mar. 9, 2006). 
 78. Id. §§ 401-410. 
 79. See, e.g., Testimony of Chip Poncy, supra note 63. 
 80. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Protecting Charitable 
Organizations, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting 
/fto.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). Some are considered al-Queda related; 
a few are listed as Hamas-related; several are designated as Hezbollah-
related; and one is listed as Palestinian Islamic Jihad-related. Id. See 
Statement of Chip Poncy, supra note 65. 
 81. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Protecting Charitable 
Organizations, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting 
/fto.shtml. 
 82. Id. 
 83. In July 2007, the government designated Goodwill Charitable 
Organizations as an SDN and froze its assets, asserting that the organization 
was a fundraising arm for the Martyrs Foundation, which allegedly funnels 
money to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  See Paul 
Egan, Feds Raid Charity Suspected of Aiding Hezbollah, DETROIT NEWS, July 
25, 2007, online edition, available at LEXIS; Suzanne Perry, Federal 
Authorities Raid Two Mich. Muslim Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 9, 
2007, at 26. Prior to July 2007, the government froze assets of numerous 
other Muslim nonprofits.  See, e.g., U.S. Freezes Assets of Hezbollah Unit, 
Donations to Militant Group Banned, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2006, at A13. 
 84. See IRS Suspends Tax-Exempt Status of Michigan Charity for 
Terrorist Activities, DAILY TAX REP., July 31, 2007. 26 U.S.C. § 501(p), added 
by the Military Tax Family Relief Act of 2003, permits the I.R.S. to suspend 
the tax-exempt status of designated terrorist organizations. Pub. L. No. 108-
121, § 108, 117 Stat. 1335, 1339 (2003).  Suspension of tax-exempt status 
does not preclude the entity from continuing operations.  For further 
 Muslim-American nonprofit organizations to close,85 prosecuted a 
few charities,86 and in a federal district court case named as 
unindicted co-conspirators more than three hundred Muslim 
organizations not on the government’s SDN and SDGT lists.87 
In this same six-year period after 9/11, the U.S. government 
placed thousands of individuals, most with Muslim names, on its 
lists of SDNs and SDGTs.88 
The Department of Justice tried and won cases against 
Muslim individuals in federal courts for material support of 
terrorism and other related terrorism charges.89  In some early 
 
discussion of this statute, see Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1424–26. 
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Shuttered Organization Funneled Money to Militants, Prosecutors Say, WASH. 
POST, July 25, 2007, at A6; Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim Groups 
Form National Council of American Muslim Non-Profits (Mar. 30, 2005), 
http://www.mpac.org/article.php?id=74 (commenting that as of 2005, the 
government had shut down twenty-five Muslim-American nonprofit 
organizations). 
 86. Most recently, the trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development, accused of indirectly aiding Hamas by sending millions of 
dollars to zakat committees—none of which has been placed on our 
government’s lists of SDNs and SDGTs—opened in Texas on July 16, 2007.  
See Neil MacFarquahar, As Muslim Group Goes on Trial, Other Charities 
Watch Warily, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at A14; Leslie Eaton, Prosecutors 
Say a Charity Aided Terrorists Indirectly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A20; 
Jack Douglas, Jr., Scrutinized for Years, Foundation Faces Trial, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAPH, July 15, 2007, available at LEXIS. 
 87. See Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Groups Oppose a List of Co-
Conspirators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at A18 (reporting that the 
Department of Justice named as co-conspirators in the Texas trial of Holy 
Land Foundation for Relief and Development foreign and U.S.-based 
organizations, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic 
Society of North America, and the North American Islamic Trust). 
 88. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals 
List (SDN), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2007).  The Terrorist Screening Center, a multi-agency organization 
administered by the F.B.I., compiles a terrorist watchlist by consolidating 
domestic and international terrorist information from various governmental 
sources, including border patrols, visa reviewers, and other front-line law 
enforcement authorities.  AUDIT DIV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 07-41 1, iii (Sept. 2007). Presumably the 
compilation of more than 700,000 names, which a recent audit by the Office 
of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice reveals is faulty, 
contains many who are non-Muslim.  See id. at xxi; Philip Shenon, Inspection 
Notes Errors in Terror List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A24. 
 89. See Bob Fernandez, 31 Wins, 6 Losses & 1 Tie, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2007, 
at 24.  In the trial of Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, five 
men are accused of illegally sending millions of dollars to Hamas through the 
 cases, court decisions left the impression that, despite the 
requisite “should have known” statutory intent,90 even innocent 
donors can be prosecuted for supporting terrorism.91  Moreover, 
the government subjected mosques to surveillance, wiretapped 
phones, fingerprinted and registered more than eighty thousand 
Arab and non-national residents, identified eight thousand for 
questioning, and arrested or detained approximately five 
thousand.92 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“F.B.I.”) and Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration added to uncertainties 
in the philanthropic environment.  The F.B.I. contributed to the 
attitude that Middle Easterners and South Asians, some of whom 
are Muslims, are a population without certain legal rights and 
protections.  It issued well over one hundred thousand secret 
warrantless demands, known as national security letters, to 
financial institutions, telecommunications companies, and other 
businesses to obtain data on unknowing targeted individuals, 
some of whom are likely Muslims, and networks of people with 
whom the targets purportedly had connections.93  The Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration discredited the 
completeness of the government’s official master list of terrorists.  
 
organization, and those five defendants argue that they only wished to ease 
the deprivations of children and families in their Middle East homeland.  See 
Jason Trahan, Holy Land Case Starts with Focus on Intent: Dallas Lawyers 
Insist 5 Strived To Ease Suffering; Prosecutors Say Goal Was To Fund Terror, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2007, at B1. 
 90. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133–35 
(9th Cir. 2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part Humanitarian Law Project v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 92. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 28. 
 93. Editorial, The Wrong Balance on Civil Liberties, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 
2007, § 4, at 9 (indicating contents of a March 2007 report from the 
Department of Justice).  See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining Reached 
Beyond Initial Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at A1 (commenting on the 
scope of the people impacted by the data mining resulting from issuance of 
national security letters); Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Expands 
Intelligence Role in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at A1 (stating that 
according to a Department of Justice study, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (F.B.I.) issued more than 9,000 national security letters in 2005 
alone).  On September 6, 2007, Judge Victor Marrero declared 
unconstitutional revisions enacted in 2006 to the USA Patriot Act that 
expanded the F.B.I.’s power to use national security letters and the 1986 law 
that authorized the F.B.I. to issue the exigent letters without a warrant.  Doe 
v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 During summer 2007, he released a report that indicated the 
processes for compiling the government’s list of terrorists are 
deficient, and likely fail to identify all persons and groups whose 
names should be on the list.94  This revelation further stimulated 
fears of donors and charitable organizations that, even if they 
consulted the list, they nevertheless might direct funds to persons 
who support terrorist activities.  The resulting recommendations 
of the Treasury Inspector General suggested that the government 
considerably ramp up its efforts.  This suggestion led to greater 
insecurity among donors unsure of what steps the government 
might take next.95 
These government actions have received substantial media 
coverage, which both Muslim and non-Muslim Americans have 
followed closely.  The series of acts has been a strategically 
powerful means of repeatedly alarming many people, perhaps 
with escalating effect.  While initial governmental measures 
created a significantly chilled philanthropic climate for well-
intentioned Americans, especially Muslim-Americans, the 
unfriendliness of the environment seemed to increase as the 
government disclosed new actions and recommendations for 
changes.  This climate of fear begs for us to explore whether there 
might be a feasible means of resolving the Muslim-Americans’ 
poignant charitable giving dilemma. 
III. CAN THE CHILL BE MODERATED, AND IF SO, HOW? 
The U.S. government recently signaled some attempt to 
reverse the inhospitable philanthropic environment.  It created 
and implemented various educational and community outreach 
programs targeted to Muslim-Americans, including initiatives 
aimed directly at assisting charitable organizations.96  But those 
projects have received limited widespread press.  In response to a 
 
 94. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, SCREENING 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS’ FILING INFORMATION PROVIDES MINIMAL 
ASSURANCE THAT POTENTIAL TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES ARE  IDENTIFIED, 
May 21, 2007, available at http://www.tigta.gov. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Testimony of Chip Poncy, supra note 63 (outreach programs 
include discussions of the government’s counterterrorism policies, 
development of relationships with communities to develop guidance on means 
to promote charitable giving, and discussions with the nonprofit sector about 
developing mechanisms for delivering aid to places of need). 
 request by Muslim-American charities,97 the Department of 
Treasury since 2002 has issued two iterations of “Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Guidelines”98 (“Guidelines”) to assist U.S.-based 
charities in avoiding ties to terrorist organizations and “abuse” or 
“exploitation”99 by terrorists.  The Guidelines present broad 
governing, fiscal, and programmatic principles aimed at 
enhancing charities’ accountability and transparency.  Although 
supportive of those goals, commentators in the nonprofit sector, 
practitioners, and academics have criticized the Guidelines as 
excessively burdensome and beyond the abilities of most charities, 
inappropriately discouraging of international charitable activities 
by U.S.-based nonprofits, unlikely to have a preventive impact on 
terrorist financing, taking an untenable one-size fits all approach 
in several important areas, suggesting principles irrelevant to the 
goal of preventing diversion of funds to terrorists, overlapping in 
certain respects with existing state and federal regulation of 
charities, and failing to assure protection against potential 
liability even when followed.100  In March 2007, the Department 
 
 97. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, PO-30607: Response 
to Inquiries from Arab American and American Muslim Communities for 
Guidance on Charitable Best Practices (Nov. 7, 2002),  http://www.treas.gov 
/press/releases/po3607.htm. 
 98. The Department of Treasury released its first version in November 
2002.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: 
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requested comments from the charitable sector, responded, and revised the 
Guidelines, and finally released a revised third version on September 29, 
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VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2006), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting/docs/guideli
nes_charities.pdf; see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Updates 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines for Charitable Sector, http://www. 
treas.gov/press/releases/hp122.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
 99. The term exploitation is seen to include the employment of 
“charitable services and activities to radicalize vulnerable populations and 
cultivate support for terrorist organizations and activities.”  ANNEX TO 
GUIDELINES, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING 
GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2006), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protect 
ing/docs/guidelines_charities.pdf.  Examples given involve such “dual” 
militaristic and humanitarian organizations as Hezbollah, Hamas and 
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 100. See, e.g., Press Release, OMB Watch, Treasury Releases Third 
Version of Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, http://www.ombwatch.org/ 
article/articleview/3614/1/84/?TopicID=2 (commenting that the fundamental 
problems in the Guidelines’ first version remain in the third version); Barnett 
 of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released a 
“Risk Matrix for the Charitable Sector” (Matrix) based largely on 
the Guidelines.  The Matrix attempts to help charities identify 
and categorize hazard susceptibilities connected with their 
processes of collecting and disbursing funds, including 
disbursement to high-risk areas abroad.  OFAC intends that the 
Matrix assist charities in formulating risk-based approaches, 
compliant with U.S. laws and the Guidelines, for tackling their 
vulnerabilities to possible exploitation or abuse by terrorists.101  
The Matrix may prove somewhat helpful to charities, but it 
neither guarantees protection against terrorist abuse of charitable 
organizations102 nor shields against criminal or civil liability for 
violation of any law or regulation.103 
The nonprofit sector, including nonprofit organizations 
specifically aimed at Muslim-Americans, has offered some limited 
ideas intended to improve the charitable giving climate.  Muslim 
Advocates, a Muslim advocacy organization in the U.S., drafted 
guidance aimed at assisting Muslim-American donors in selecting 
reputable and effective charitable organizations that can direct 
donations to intended charitable causes.104  The proffered 
suggestions highlight considerations to which donors should be 
attentive, but they are quite general and cannot give donors real 
comfort that ultimately their contributions will be protected from 
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guidestar.org/DisplayArticle.do?articleId=1153.  The process utilized by 
OFAC in producing the Risk Matrix has been criticized for failing to solicit 
input from the nonprofit sector.  See Kay Guinane, Treasury Posts Risk 
Matrix for Charities, Meant To Help Avoid Financing Terrorism, April 10, 
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 ties to terrorism.  The National Council of American-Muslim 
Nonprofits, an umbrella organization, announced in 2005 that it 
would create guidelines to assist charities to protect against 
terrorist exploitation,105 but they have not been produced.  To 
date, Muslim-American charities have been unable to coordinate 
efforts to enable Muslim-Americans to give money lawfully to an 
acceptable menu of legitimate projects abroad.106  Although 
Muslim-Americans and others have suggested that the 
Department of Treasury develop a “white list” of acceptable 
Muslim charities in compliance with its Guidelines,107 the 
government has not done so. 
Thus far, there is no safe and accessible giving vehicle that 
assures Muslim-Americans protections against surveillance, 
harassment, arrest, or prosecution by the government.  Although 
some states have adopted terror-free investment policies to ensure 
that they do not invest tax dollars in a manner that could aid 
terrorism,108 there is currently no terror-free channel constructed 
specifically for, and aimed at facilitating, Muslim-Americans in 
directing their charity discreetly to needy Muslims in specific 
regions and communities abroad. 
Crafting such a mechanism could go a long way to moderating 
the current frosty charitable giving climate for Muslim-
Americans.  To ensure Muslim-Americans a safe mechanism for 
 
 105. Cohen, supra note 24. 
 106. One newspaper account suggests that the failure to orchestrate such 
a project is the result of isolated Muslim charities that do not have 
sophisticated management expertise and the fear of foreign governments and 
policymakers in empowering civil society through legislation or policymaking 
that could assist organized philanthropy. Kamal & Model, supra note 23.       
Additionally, it appears that there is not a profusion of domestic Islamic 
“friends of” charities, which would permit donor contributions to be redirected 
to specific projects abroad that the domestic “friends of” charities support. 
 107. See, e.g., Ruff, supra note 17, at 499. 
 108. For example, Ohio and Missouri have such a terror-free investment 
policy. See Richard Cordray, Ohio Treasurer of State, Terror-Free Investment 
Policy (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.tos.ohio.gov/content/view/285/39/; Press 
Release, Richard Cordray, Ohio Treasurer of State, Treasurer Cordray 
Announces New Terror-Free Investment Policy for State Treasury (Apr. 18, 
2007), http://www.tos.ohio.gov/content/view/286/41/; Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs’ Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 
Trade and the H. Comm. on Financial Services’ Subcomm. on Domestic and 
International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology (Apr. 18, 2007) 
(statement of Sarah Steelman, Missouri State Treasurer), 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ste041807.htm; Sarah Steelman, Terror-
Free Investing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at A21. 
 giving and directing zakat contributions to the neediest Muslims 
abroad, a terror-free donor advised fund (DAF) could be developed 
specifically for Muslim-Americans, as explained below.  At least 
initially, it might be wise to create one centralized, but accessible, 
terror-free DAF, and, depending on its success, others could 
follow. 
A DAF is essentially a low cost, flexible alternative to a 
private foundation.  A DAF operates as a charitable giving vehicle 
by enabling donors to contribute cash or assets to an intermediary 
entity, known as a sponsoring organization,109 which redistributes 
the donors’ contributions, without divulging the donors’ identities, 
to qualified targeted recipients.110  The ultimate qualified 
recipients are generally organizations, either domestic or foreign, 
 
 109. The sponsoring organization is essentially a nongovernmental entity, 
other than a private foundation, that would be treated as a tax-exempt 
religious, charitable, or educational organization under Internal Revenue 
Code § 501(c)(3).  26 U.S.C. § 4966(d)(1)(A)–(C) (2007).  Interestingly, the 
sponsoring organization can be either a domestic or foreign entity.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 4966(d)(1)(A). 
 110. More technically under U.S. tax laws, a DAF is a pool of donated 
assets with three features.  First, the assets contributed by the donor are 
owned and controlled by a sponsoring organization.  Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A) 
(2007). 
     Second, the DAF is composed of separate accounts identified by reference 
to a donor’s completed contributions but with respect to which the donor or 
the donor’s appointee retains the privilege of providing nonbinding advice to 
the sponsoring organization of preferred organization-beneficiaries able to 
utilize the funds consistent with the donor’s intended charitable purposes.  
Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A), as added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-280.  To avoid excise taxes, distributions generally must be made to a 
qualified organization (1) that meets the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 
170(b)(1)(A), (2) that satisfies the conditions of 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B), or (3) 
for which the sponsoring organization fulfills the expenditure responsibility 
requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h).  Id. § 4966(c)(1)–(2).  Basically, such 
recipient cannot be a natural person, and unless it is a domestic entity that 
qualifies for tax-exempt status as a § 501(c)(3), the sponsoring organization is 
obligated to undertake certain due diligence of the nongovernmental foreign 
organization-recipient. Id. § 4966(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(ii) referring to the 
expenditure responsibility rule of 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h).  See  Nina J. Crimm, 
Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal 
Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private 
Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 72-86 (2003) [hereinafter 
Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass] (discussing the 
expenditure responsibility rule of 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h).  For a discussion of the 
expenditure responsibility rule, see infra  note 130 and accompanying text. 
     Third, the assets are not distributable to a single organization or 
governmental entity.  Id. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(i) (2007). 
 that must use the contributions for charitable purposes.  The 
sponsoring organization is an intermediary for the specific 
purposes of receiving contributions, taking nonbinding advice 
from donors of preferred recipients for their donations,111 
investing and managing contributed funds,112 and undertaking all 
of the necessary legal, accounting, and philanthropic functions to 
ensure that assets reach their intended recipients.  Because the 
Internal Revenue Service considers these sponsoring 
organizations to be public charities, donors are entitled to 
charitable contribution deductions for their gifted assets, and 
their contributions can accrete in value without further 
taxation.113 
There are considerable expenses associated with creating and 
maintaining DAFs.114 Because of the risks associated with giving 
abroad and the protective due diligence that would be needed on 
an ongoing basis, a DAF that could serve as a vehicle for diaspora 
philanthropy would be more costly than one targeted only for 
domestic giving.115  Donors today initially can contribute 
relatively low sums and thereafter can add reasonable donations 
to DAF accounts where the ultimate recipients are located in this 
country.116  Whether low contributions to a terror-free DAF 
 
 111. Research has shown that diaspora donors like “hands on” 
involvement in their philanthropic endeavors.  See Najam, supra note 55, at 
125.  The advisory role that a donor to a DAF could exercise might serve to 
advance this aspiration. 
 112. A donor can plan to have the funds managed as either an 
endowment, which is invested to permit the funds’ growth and to enable 
them to be distributed annually in perpetuity, or a non-endowment, which is 
invested to permit sufficient growth for annual distributions to occur over a 
short or long period.  See Elfrena Foord, Philanthropy 101: Donor Advised 
Funds, J. FIN. PLAN., Nov. 2003, available at http://www.fpanet 
.org/journal/articles/2003_Issues/jfp1103-art8.cfm. 
 113. Because the DAF is tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3), the income 
generated by its gifted holdings is not subjected to income taxation. 
 114. These expenses can include annual administrative, investment and 
management fees.  Typically a sponsoring organization charges between .45% 
to 2.75% in fees for a $100,000 account and less if the account is worth more.  
See Foord, supra note 112. 
 115. Discussions with several DAF administrators and private foundation 
officials revealed that actual costs would be quite high, but exact amounts are 
impossible to calculate because they depend on many variables. 
 116. Donor advised funds (DAFs) traditionally have been viewed as 
financially advantageous alternatives to private foundations.  Because DAFs 
are less expensive to establish and maintain than private foundations, the 
initial funding of their donors’ accounts can be significantly lower.  A number 
 targeted abroad would be feasible is beyond the scope of this 
article.  The lower the initial and subsequent contribution 
thresholds and the ease by which Muslim-Americans can donate 
to a targeted terror-free DAF—perhaps by payroll deductions117—
the greater the potential to attract more Muslim-Americans to use 
such DAF as their charitable giving vehicle of choice. 
From a funding perspective, forming one centralized terror-
free DAF could be a financially viable endeavor.  All Muslims have 
zakat obligations to tithe at a minimum 2.5% of their incomes and 
other wealth; many also contribute financial aid as sadaqah.118  
Between 2.35 and seven million Muslims live in the U.S., 41% of 
whom live in households with incomes exceeding $50,000.119  As 
touched on briefly above, financial feasibility will also depend on 
the cost effectiveness of the DAF.  From the perspective of limiting 
costs by targeting localities of collective interest to Muslim-
Americans to receive redistributions, there are high degrees of 
concentration of Muslim-Americans who emigrated from the Arab 
region (37%) and from south Asia, with large proportions from 
specific countries, such as Iran and Pakistan.  Consequently, even 
if only a portion of all Muslim-Americans contribute to one 
 
of “commercial” DAFs, created by commercial financial businesses, as well as 
some community foundations and educational institutions that have formed 
charitable corporations for the principal purpose of offering DAFs, have been 
successful in establishing low expense DAFs.  See, e.g., Fidelity Charitable 
Gift Fund, http://www.charitablegift.org.  Some commercial DAFs require 
only an initial contribution of $5,000.  Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, The Gift 
Account Minimums and Fees, http://www.charitablegift.org/charity-giving-
programs/daf/fees.shtml (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).  Additionally, because 
the Internal Revenue Service has treated DAFs as charities, they have 
offered donors higher charitable contribution deductions than those available 
to donors of private foundations.  26 U.S.C. § 170 (2007).  The Internal 
Revenue Service currently is studying whether, as a result of the advisory 
privilege that a donor can retain, the donor advised fund vehicle should 
continue to qualify for the currently available income, gift, and estate tax 
charitable contribution deductions, and if so, the appropriate level for the 
deductions.  See Notice 2007-21, 2007-9 I.R.B. 611.  It also is studying 
whether, like private foundations, donor advised funds should be required to 
distribute a specified amount for charitable purposes.  See id. 
 117. See Noelle Barton & Peter Parepento, A Surge in Assets; Donor-
Advised Funds Are Growing Exponentially, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, 
http://philanthropy.com/premium/articles/v19/i14/14000701.htm (referring to 
DAFs established by the Renaissance Charitable Foundation for three 
companies). 
 118. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 26, 39 and accompanying text. 
 centralized terror-free DAF, demographics appear to support its 
creation and potential sustainability, especially if donors’ 
contributions are aggregated in one DAF account for 
redistribution to a highly limited number of foreign recipients.120 
DAFs characteristically have the potential not only to 
distribute funds to qualified recipients but also to invest the 
accounts’ corpus to produce income.121  Under Islamic law, 
however, giving or receiving interest is prohibited.122  Thus, even 
though the donated funds would be owned by the sponsoring 
organization, Muslim-American donors would likely want to honor 
the restriction.  Muslim recipients also might not want to receive 
money derived as interest.  Therefore, to accommodate this 
Muslim belief, the DAF funds simply would need to be devoted to 
accreting investments, such as stock, that do not produce interest, 
a manageable hurdle. 
There appear to be more significant challenges, however, to 
the establishment of a terror-free DAF.  First, a sponsoring 
organization would need to be formed.  This task should not be 
underestimated.  The risks related to investment, administration, 
and management responsibilities are enormous.  Those who 
undertake the necessary due diligence for the DAF, described 
below, cannot fully protect themselves from civil or criminal 
liability. 
There are several possible methods for forming a sponsoring 
organization.  A commercial financial institution could form a 
charitable corporation to serve as the sponsoring organization.123  
 
 120. See infra note 123 (discussing author’s telephone conversation with 
Drew Hastings on this matter and explaining DAFs) and supra notes 109-17 
and accompanying text (explaining the structure of DAFs). 
     Currently there are several U.S.-based Pakistani-American charities 
connected to specific projects in Pakistan.  See, e.g., SOS-Children’s Village 
USA, Inc., http://www.sos-childrensvillages.org (providing youth homes, 
schools, medical centers, and vocational centers) (last visited Feb. 29, 2008); 
The Human Development Foundation of North America, Project Pakistan, 
http://www.yespakistan.com/hdf/whatwedo/projectpakistan-exsummary.asp 
(establishing human development initiatives in Pakistan’s underprivileged 
communities) (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).  The Muslim Pakistani-American 
population may not be as underserved as other Muslim-Americans in having 
a safe means for their charitable giving. 
 121. See supra note 112 (explaining DAFs that operate as endowments 
and those that operate as non-endowments). 
 122. See Sheryl Jean, Beliefs and Banking, USINFO, http://usinfo.state.go 
v/products/pubs/muslimlife/bank.htm. 
 123. Such commercial for-profit financial entities include The Vanguard 
 This might be the most plausible approach because several for-
profit financial institutions now offer DAFs and have experience 
in their operation.124  Such an arrangement would not preclude 
advice and input from Muslim-American and secular nonprofits.  
Moreover, as discussed below, there are considerable costs 
associated with due diligence efforts that will be required of the 
sponsoring organization, and a commercial financial institution 
might be capable of the greatest efficiency, have the expertise in 
place, and have the deepest pockets. 
Although Muslim-Americans appear hesitant to give charity 
through Muslim-American nonprofit organizations,125 another 
possible arrangement is the creation of a sponsoring organization 
by an alliance of Muslim-American and highly respected secular 
U.S.-based nonprofit organizations.126  An alternative but perhaps 
less viable approach in the current environment would be the 
formation of a sponsoring organization by a publicly respected 
Muslim-American umbrella organization or other large nonprofit 
that has the broad trust, and represents the interests, of many 
Muslim-American nonprofit entities and the Muslim-American 
 
Group (Vanguard Charitable Endowment Fund), Fidelity Investments 
(Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund), Charles Schwab (Schwab Fund for 
Charitable Giving), and T. Rowe Price (T. Rowe Price Program for Charitable 
Giving) all of which have a number of years of experience in developing 
DAFs.  A nonprofit organization with some experience as a sponsoring 
organization for grant making overseas is the National Philanthropic Trust 
(NPT).  It has established DAFs for giving to select foreign organizations in  
several countries, such as India, Turkey, Israel, and Japan.  Telephone 
interview with Drew Hastings, V.P., NPT (Oct. 4, 2007) [hereinafter 
Telephone Conversation].  To do so, it was required to undertake the 
necessary due diligence to ensure that the redistributed funds would not 
support terrorists or terrorist organizations.  Id.; see also National 
Philanthropic Trust, http://www.nptrust.org. 
 124. See supra note 123. 
 125. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.  If Muslim-Americans 
were inclined to contribute humanitarian aid to needy areas in homelands 
through non-Muslim U.S.-based charities, established vehicles do exist.  For 
example, the American Red Cross has affiliates in many countries, including 
regions from which many Muslim-Americans emigrated. 
 126. For example, United Way and Grantmakers Without Borders might 
be explored as possible secular U.S.-based nonprofits.  Some possibilities of 
Muslim-American nonprofits for exploration might include the National 
Council of American Muslim Non-Profits, Islamic Circle of North America, 
Islamic Society of North America, Islamic Relief-USA, Council of Islamic 
Organizations of Greater Chicago, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council. 
 population.127  Finally, although also not entirely viable, a 
coalition of nonprofit Muslim-American organizations, including 
community foundations and highly respected nonprofits, might 
form a sponsoring organization.  With respect to any of these three 
possible alternative arrangements, the management and 
administrative, operational, and technical support could be 
outsourced to an experienced third-party nonprofit or for-profit 
administrator.128 
The ability of a sponsoring organization to design a DAF that 
would qualify as terror-free is likely the most momentous hurdle.  
Because a purpose of creating such a DAF is to enable charitable 
contributions to fund legitimate charitable projects targeting the 
neediest Muslims abroad, appropriate foreign nongovernmental 
organizations (FNOs) must be recipients for, and re-distributors 
of, the DAF’s distributions.129  Advice and suggestions from 
Muslim-American and secular domestic private foundations and 
charities, as well as knowledgeable Muslim-Americans and other 
Americans who have worked or are working overseas, might help 
to solve this problem.  Identifying suitable FNOs may not be an 
easy task, and the sponsoring organization’s chore of performing 
adequate due diligence will be the most difficult and crucial 
challenge. 
There are two components of due diligence currently 
 
 127. See id. (suggesting some potential Muslim-American nonprofit 
organizations). 
 128. See, e.g., Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors (http://www.rockpa.org/ 
services/donor-advised-funds/) and NPT (http://www.nptrust.org).  Both 
organizations are nonprofit.  See Telephone Conversation, supra note 123.  
NPT has limited experience as a third-party administrator for DAFs 
established for charitable giving to select foreign organizations abroad.  Id.  
NPT’s role has included the due diligence necessary to ensure that 
redistributions are protected from supporting terrorists and terrorist 
organizations.  Id.  A for-profit entity, Microedge (http://www.microedge.com), 
is also a third-party administrator. 
 129. Alternatively, the DAF could distribute funds to a domestic “friends 
of” organization, determined by the I.R.S. as a qualified charity under 26 
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which would redistribute the money to a foreign 
organization that it supports.  That chain would not remove or avoid the due 
diligence requirements from the organizational chain because the domestic 
“friends of” organization would be responsible under I.R.S. pronouncements.  
See Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 C.B. 306; Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-2 C.B. 210; 
Rev. Rul. 71-460, 1971-2 C.B. 231; I.R.S. Announcement 2003-29, 2003-1 C.B. 
928.  See also Marcus S. Owens, Legal Framework of International 
Philanthropy: The Potential for Change, 25 PACE L. REV. 193, 197-200 (2005). 
 necessary.  The first is compliance with the federal tax rule of 
expenditure responsibility,130 which is required if, as is most 
likely, the FNO is not recognized by the Internal Revenue Service  
(IRS) as a public charity under U.S. tax laws.131  The expenditure 
responsibility rule predates 9/11,132 and it is not specifically an 
antiterrorism measure.  Its application was extended to DAFs in 
2006.133  The focus of the expenditure responsibility requirement 
is to determine whether each FNO is capable of utilizing the funds 
in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes for which the 
funds were intended, and whether the FNO does so in fact.134  The 
expenditure responsibility rule mainly requires extensive 
paperwork documenting due diligence both before and after the 
DAF makes distributions to an FNO; this requirement prevents 
misuse of funds and promotes good business practices.135  
 
 130. 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h) (2007); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6 (2007).  For a 
discussion of the expenditure responsibility requirements, see Crimm, 
Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass, supra note 110, at 81-86 
(discussing the expenditure responsibility requirements in the context of 
private foundations). 
 131. 26 U.S.C. § 4966(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2007).  Failure to comply with the 
expenditure responsibility rule would subject the sponsoring organization 
and fund manager to excise taxes.  Id. § 4966(a)(1)-(2) (2007). 
      The foreign nongovernmental organization (FNO) can obtain a 
determination letter from the I.R.S. stating that it qualifies as a public 
charity under I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3).  Treas. Reg. § 
53.4945-5(a)(3) (2007); I.R.C. § 508(a), (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1 (2007).  Few 
such non-governmental foreign organizations obtain such determination 
letters because the process of acquiring, as well as the requirements for 
maintaining, § 501(c)(3) status is time-consuming, costly, and 
administratively burdensome.  See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE, 
SECTION OF TAXATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, [DRAFT] REPORT OF TASK 
FORCE ON REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF RULES APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS ("GALLAGHER-FERGUSON WHITE PAPER"), reprinted in 36 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 262, 271–72 (May 2002). 
     An alternative to obtaining an I.R.S. determination letter is for the 
sponsoring organization to make a “good faith determination” that the foreign 
organization is equivalent to a § 501(c)(3) public charity.  Treas. Reg. § 
53.4942(a)-(3)(a)(6) (2007).  This process is costly and can be administratively 
burdensome.  See Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass, 
supra, note 110, at 75-81. 
 132. It was originally enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91-172 (1969) and applied only to private foundations. 
 133. 26 U.S.C. § 4966(c)(1)(ii), added by the Pension Protection Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1231 (2006). 
 134. See Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass, supra note 
110, at 83. 
 135. See id. at 82-87. 
 Basically the sponsoring organization would need to comply with 
the following checklist:136 
• The sponsoring organization must undertake a pre-   
distribution inquiry to determine that the FNO is capable 
of fulfilling the distribution’s charitable purposes through 
the use of the funds.137 
• The sponsoring organization must enter into a pre-
distribution written agreement with the FNO.138 
• The FNO should separate the funds according to the 
charitable purposes for which they were given, and must 
repay any portion not appropriately used. 
• The sponsoring organization must obtain within a 
reasonable period annual reports from the FNO on how 
 
 136. Treasury regulations §§ 53.4945-5(b), -5(c), -5(d), -6(c) provide the 
specific expenditure responsibility requirements for private foundations. The 
checklist here is adapted for purposes of a sponsoring organization of a DAF. 
 137. The scope of the inquiry should depend on the size of the 
distributions, the purpose of the distributions, the distribution period, and 
prior experience with the FNO.  Regardless, the inquiry should: (1) identify 
the FNO and its managers; (2) determine the history of the FNO and the 
experience of its management; and (3) focus on knowledge that the 
sponsoring organization possesses or can readily obtain from available 
information concerning the FNO’s activities, practices, and management. 
 138. The written agreement must specify (1) the charitable purpose of the 
distributions and the FNO’s agreement to repay the funds if not so utilized; 
(2) the FNO’s agreement to provide annual reports; (3) the FNO’s willingness 
to maintain books and records and to make them available to inspection by 
the domestic sponsoring organization at reasonable times; (4) the FNO’s 
agreement to refrain from carrying on propaganda or otherwise influencing 
legislation, influencing the outcome of any specific public election or carrying 
on voter registration drives directly or indirectly, and undertaking any 
activity for a non-charitable purpose to the extent that such use of the funds 
would be considered a taxable expenditure. The agreement must prohibit the 
initial FNO from re-distributing the funds to another organization 
(“secondary FNO”), unless the secondary FNO complies with restrictions on 
distributions substantially equivalent to the restrictions imposed on a 
sponsoring organization.  If the secondary distribution is to an organization 
that is not a public charity or treated as a public charity under I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3), compliance with the expenditure responsibility requirements of 
I.R.C. § 4945(h) is required by the first FNO.  These restrictions can be 
phrased in the agreement in appropriate terms under foreign law or custom, 
and they will ordinarily be considered sufficient if accompanied by an 
affidavit or opinion of counsel stating that the restrictions are substantially 
equivalent to restrictions that would be imposed on a sponsoring 
organization. 
 the FNO used the distributed funds.139 
• The sponsoring organization must determine that the 
FNO maintains adequate books and records and reviews 
those books and records as appropriate. 
• During the taxable year in which the FNO gives 
distributions subject to the expenditure responsibility 
rule, the sponsoring organization must notify the I.R.S. of 
these distributions. 
Compliance with the expenditure responsibility rule requires 
ongoing effort and can be expensive; therefore, for the creation of a 
terror-free DAF for Muslim-Americans’ gifts abroad to be sensible 
and warranted, the sponsoring organization will need sufficient 
DAF contributions.140  Moreover, the rules can be 
administratively burdensome, and compliance is more difficult 
where there are no sponsoring organization employees working in 
the field abroad. 
There may be capacity, however, to reduce some of these 
challenges.  This could be accomplished with respect to the pre-
distribution inquiry of FNOs identified by the sponsoring 
organization with which private foundations and charities have 
had dealings in the past.  If those entities are willing to share 
their experiences and information, and if the sponsoring 
organization comfortably can rely on that which is shared, the 
sponsoring organization can more easily satisfy its expenditure 
responsibility duties.  Further possible support for accomplishing 
the expenditure responsibility requirements may be forthcoming.  
In July 2007, Information Age Associates released a status report 
on the feasibility of creating a centralized repository of 
information on non-U.S. based NGOs.141  The status report 
 
 139. The reports also must indicate that the FNO complied with the terms 
of its agreement and show the FNO’s progress toward achievement of the 
purpose of the distributions.  A final report, similar in nature to annual 
reports, must be made in the year that the funds are fully and finally 
expended or the distributions are otherwise terminated. 
 140. Drew Hastings, V.P. of NPT, has suggested that for any 
redistributions abroad to a single FNO, the administrative, management, 
investment, operational, and due diligence costs likely require a minimum of 
$100,000 in a DAF account.  See Telephone Conversation, supra note 123.  
One DAF account can have multiple contributors, who collectively could 
contribute the $100,000 aggregate amount.  Id. 
 141. INFORMATION AGE ASSOCIATES, POTENTIAL OF CREATING A CENTRALIZED 
 indicated a high level of support among grant-makers and 
nonprofit organizations’ leaders for the creation of such a 
project.142  Information from others can be helpful only if it 
applies to the specific FNOs identified by the DAF’s sponsoring 
organization.  This constraint may limit the usefulness of a 
centralized repository because Muslim-American donors may want 
to direct their charitable giving to regions where there has not 
been broad and ongoing experience with FNOs, or to FNOs 
without connections to traditional domestic grant-makers and 
charities. 
Assuming that the expenditure responsibility rule is not an 
insurmountable impediment, the sponsoring organization also 
must attempt to prevent the DAF from providing inadvertent 
financial support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.  As 
discussed previously, there are numerous government-
recommended antiterrorist measures, several of which overlap 
with the expenditure responsibility requirements, that must 
continually inform the charitable giving and redistribution cycles.  
They include the following cumulative checklist: 
When selecting each FNO, the sponsoring organization 
should: 
• Collect “basic information” about each FNO. 
o Name (in language of origin and English), 
acronyms used, jurisdiction(s) of physical 
presence, historical information, governing 
instruments, public filings, addresses and 
phone numbers, statement of principal 
purpose, names and postal, e-mail, and 
URL addresses of organizations that 
receive funding or support from the FNO, 
names and addresses of subcontracting 
organizations, public filings or releases by 
the FNO, and FNO’s sources of income. 
• Collect information about each FNO’s key 
 
REPOSITORY OF INFORMATION ON NON-U.S. BASED NGOS: PROJECT STATUS 
REPORT (July 2007), http://www.iaa.com/NGORepositoryFeasibilityStudy 
Report.html. 
 142. Id. 
 employees, board members, and senior 
management at all locations. 
o Name, nationality, citizenship, country of 
residence, place and date of birth. 
• Search publicly available information to 
determine whether each FNO, or one of its key 
employees, is suspected of activity relating to 
terrorism. 
o OFAC Master List of SDNs143 
 http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enf
orcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtm 
o OFAC Country Sanctions Programs144 
 http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enf
orcement/ofac/programs/ 
 No FNO should be “otherwise 
subject to OFAC sanctions.”145 
o United Nations Terrorist List 
 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/12
67/consolist.shtml 
o European Union Terrorist List 
 http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
 
 143. This OFAC master list includes the State Department’s Foreign 
Terrorist List, which can be found separately at http://www.state.gov 
/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/32678.htm.  This master list has been criticized as deficient.  
See supra note 88. 
 144. This lists countries and regions, but names of organizations 
previously listed in the executive orders for a country/region are now 
incorporated into the OFAC SDN master list. 
 145. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: 
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES 10 (2006), available at. 
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting/docs/guideli
nes_charities.pdf 
 site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_3142005113
0en00410045.pdf 
o Terror lists maintained by other countries 
 United Kingdom’s List of 
Proscribed Terrorist Groups 
• http://www.homeoffice.gov.u
k/security/terrorism-and-
the-law/terrorism-
act/proscribed-groups 
 Canada’s Terrorist List 
• http://www.publicsafety.gc.c
a/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp 
 Australia’s List of Terrorist 
Organizations 
• http://www.nationalsecurity
.gov.au/ (select “Terrorist 
Organisations” from “Quick 
links” drop box). 
 Russia’s Terrorist List146 
• http://www.cdi.org/russia/jo
hnson/2007-102-42.cfm 
 China’s Terrorist List 
• http://english.peopledaily.co
m.cn/200312/15/eng2003121
5_130432.shtml147 
 
 146. The Russian terrorist list apparently is updated annually and 
authorization is required to access the updated information. 
 147. Although the list that appears at this web site is dated 2003, the U.S. 
Department of State also has no information available on its web site as to a 
subsequently compiled Chinese terrorist list.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2005), available at http://www.state.gov 
  South Asia Terrorism Portal148 
• http://www.satp.org/satporg
tp/satp/index.html 
 Saudi Arabia’s Most Wanted List 
• http://www.saudiembassy.n
et/Issues/Terrorism/IssuesT
er.asp 
Before supplying resources to any FNO, the sponsoring 
organization should: 
• Verify each FNO’s ability to (1) accomplish the 
charitable purpose and (2) protect the resources 
from diversion. 
• Obtain references on each FNO from trusted 
sources. 
• Reduce terms of the disbursement to a written 
agreement. 
When disbursing funds, the sponsoring organization 
should: 
• Disburse funds in small increments as needed for 
specific projects or expenditures. 
• Disburse funds via check or wire transfer, and by 
cash only if necessary. 
• Maintain detailed internal records of 
disbursements. 
• Require each FNO to use a reliable banking 
 
/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm. 
 148. This web site is not an official government web site.  It contains, 
however, lists for Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka, perhaps assembled by the nongovernmental organization and based 
on government lists. 
 system or other regulated financial channels for 
transferring funds. 
After disbursing the DAF funds to an FNO, the 
sponsoring organization should: 
• Require periodic reports, preferably annually, 
from the FNO on all uses of the disbursed funds.  
With the periodic reports, require the FNO to 
provide specific documentation of the use of the 
funds. 
o E.g., receipts, video, photographs, 
testimonies, and written records. 
• Require the FNO to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that funds have neither been distributed to 
terrorists nor used for activities that support 
terrorism. The FNO should apprise the sponsoring 
organization of the steps taken. 
• Engage in ongoing monitoring of the FNO for the 
term of the distributions. 
• Perform regular, periodic on-site audits of the 
FNO to the extent permissible by personnel and 
other constraints. 
• Correct misuse of resources quickly and terminate 
relationship if misuse continues. 
• Make appropriate reports to the U.S. government, 
including, but not limited to, filings with the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
Although this list of tasks is perhaps daunting to the point of 
being overwhelming, the above checklist may be achievable by one 
entity formed proactively by Muslim-Americans to serve as the 
sponsoring organization as their sole dedicated and centralized 
terror-free DAF.  Additionally, if a centralized repository of 
information on non-U.S. based NGOs were formed, the sponsoring 
organization could have streamlined access to otherwise scattered 
information.  Nonetheless, such a repository would not relieve the 
 sponsoring organization from much of the due diligence required, 
such as obtaining periodic reports, checking the reliability of the 
reports, monitoring each FNO, undertaking audits, and making 
appropriate governmental filings.  Therefore, targeting a very few 
FNOs abroad in one or two regions or communities of common 
interest to Muslim-Americans might be important, at least 
initially, to the financial viability of the project. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, even if well-intentioned, philanthropically 
minded Muslim-Americans created and used an appropriate 
terror-free DAF, there are no guarantees that these Muslim-
Americans would be protected with absolute certainty against 
unwanted surveillance, inaccurate accusations, and worse.  
Nonetheless, a terror-free DAF could be strategically powerful for 
Muslim-Americans, inuring to their benefit in numerous ways.  It 
could contribute to a more hospitable philanthropic environment 
by reducing fears of Muslim-Americans with the desire and 
religious obligation to help the neediest Muslims worldwide.  
Drawing on the thoughts of Moses Maimonides, the terror-free 
DAF structure would enable Muslim Americans to give to the 
alms-chest, knowing that the “officer in charge is reliable, wise, 
[scrupulous], and a capable administrator.”149  And, by directing 
charitable giving through such a reputable manager, the intended 
recipients—those Muslims who are most needy and who live 
abroad—would gain financial support. 
Moreover, benefits from a terror-free DAF could inure to the 
general American public.  Giving charity through a terror-free 
DAF could reduce mistrust of Muslim-Americans by non-Muslims, 
and thus bolster public perceptions of them.  Facilitating open and 
legitimate charitable giving by well-intentioned Muslim-
Americans could send an unambiguous message that such people 
are not radical extremists, they neither espouse nor support 
terrorism, and they desire to contribute to U.S. national 
security.150 
 
 149. See supra note 8, and accompanying text. 
 150. According to recommendations of the Chicago Council of Global 
Affairs task force, expanding and recognizing Muslim-American contributions 
to national security could be greatly beneficial to Muslim Americans.  
STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 9-11. 
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Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies,  
and the Myth of Swain v. Pressley 
Stephen I. Vladeck* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The current debate over judicial review of the detention of 
“enemy combatants” is dominated by the question of whether the 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause1 applies to non-citizens detained 
outside the territorial United States, including those held at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.2 But an equally important question is 
lurking just beneath the surface in Boumediene v. Bush, the lead 
case currently3 before the Supreme Court: If the Suspension 
 
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. This 
essay was prepared in conjunction with the Roger Williams University School 
of Law’s November 2007 Symposium, “Legal Dilemmas in a Dangerous 
World: Law, Terrorism, and National Security,” for my participation in which 
I owe thanks to Peter Margulies. Thanks also to Emily Pasternak for 
research assistance.  
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196). For two differing 
academic takes on the question, compare J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and 
Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007), with 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 275 (2008). See generally Paul Halliday & G. Edward White, 
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Context, and American 
Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008). 
 3. As this article went to print, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Boumediene, holding that the Suspension Clause does apply to the 
Guantánamo detainees, and that the substitute for habeas corpus provided 
by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 is an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. See Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). For Justice Kennedy’s analysis of the latter issue, see 
id. at 2262–74, unquestionably merits a discussion that is simply not possible 
here. For now, though, it suffices to note the Boumediene majority’s 
  
Clause does protect the right to habeas corpus for non-citizens 
held abroad (or at least at Guantánamo),4 is the jurisdiction-
stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(MCA)5 actually inconsistent therewith? 
The prevailing assumption is that this question necessarily 
reduces to whether the MCA, along with the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 (DTA),6 provides an “adequate” and “effective” 
substitute for the remedy provided by the writ of habeas corpus. 
And the reason why that appears to be the ultimate question is 
the Supreme Court’s oft-cited—but seldom read—1977 decision in 
Swain v. Pressley (Pressley).7 Pressley, a case arising indirectly out 
of the 1970 reorganization of the D.C. judicial system, is 
commonly invoked for the proposition that the Suspension Clause 
is not implicated unless the relevant remedial scheme provides no 
adequate or effective substitute for habeas corpus.8 
As significant as Pressley figures in current debates, very 
little has been written about the case itself, or the rule for which it 
has since become the standard citation.9 Thus, in attempting to 
 
conclusion that “[t]he present cases . . . test the limits of the Suspension 
Clause in ways that Hayman and Swain did not,” id. at 2266, for many of the 
same reasons articulated in more detail herein. 
 4. Indeed, much of the focus of the current litigation is whether 
Guantánamo is “different,” i.e., whether there is a colorable argument that 
non-citizens held in Cuba might have a stronger claim to constitutional 
protections, including those enmeshed with the Suspension Clause, than 
those held elsewhere outside the United States. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466, 485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gherebi v. 
Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1285–99 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction 
to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on 
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by 
the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or 
is awaiting such determination.”). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–44 (2005). 
 7. 430 U.S. 372 (1977). Although the case is usually referred to in 
shorthand as “Swain,” the habeas petitioner was Jasper Pressley, and so I 
refer to the case as Pressley throughout this essay. 
 8. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001) (citing 
Pressley for the proposition that “Congress could, without raising any 
constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through the courts 
of appeals”); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2818 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9. Even recent academic discussions of the “adequate” and “effective” 
  
analyze whether the remedy provided by the MCA and DTA to 
detained “enemy combatants” comports with the Suspension 
Clause, courts and commentators have little precedent or 
academic discussion to guide them. The animating purpose of this 
symposium essay, then, is to reconstruct the Court’s decision in 
Pressley so as to understand the implications of its holding, and its 
potential relevance both to the current Guantánamo cases and to 
other recent legislative attempts to provide a substitute remedy 
for habeas corpus. 
To reconstruct Pressley, Part II begins with the Supreme 
Court’s 1952 decision in United States v. Hayman.10 In Hayman, 
the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit decision that had invalidated 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, one of Congress’s first attempts to provide a 
statutory alternative to habeas corpus. The Court’s unanimous 
decision in Hayman nevertheless reserved any question as to the 
constitutional implications of such legislation. Thus, when the 
Pressley Court considered a statute modeled on § 2255—section 
23-110(g) of the D.C. Code—it was resolving a question of first 
impression. 
As Part II concludes, Pressley did not go much further than 
Hayman had, holding only that there is no constitutional defect 
with a statute that provides an “adequate” and “effective” means 
of challenging detention other than habeas corpus. Pointedly, the 
Court in Pressley did not decide whether “inadequate” or 
“ineffective” remedies were necessarily unconstitutional, leaving 
that question open for later courts. 
In Part III, I turn to Pressley’s aftermath, and briefly survey 
those contexts wherein Swain v. Pressley has figured prominently 
since it was decided. Part III therefore begins with the Supreme 
Court’s 1996 decision in Felker v. Turpin,11 in which the Court 
upheld the so-called “gatekeeper” provisions of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)12 on the ground 
 
substitute issue have given short shrift to Pressley itself. See, e.g., 
Christopher J. Schatz & Noah A.F. Horst, Will Justice Delayed Be Justice 
Denied? Crisis Jurisprudence, the Guantánamo Detainees, and the Imperiled 
Role of Habeas Corpus in Curbing Abusive Government Detention, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 539 (2007). 
10. 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
11. 518 U.S. 651 (1996). 
12. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
  
that an alternative remedy remained available. Part III next 
turns to the context of immigration law, where AEDPA, and later 
the REAL ID Act of 2005,13 attempted to preclude immigration 
habeas petitions in favor of direct review of administrative 
decisions. Finally, Part III concludes with the application of Swain 
v. Pressley to the current cases arising out of Guantánamo, and 
the question whether the review provided by the DTA and the 
MCA constitutes an “adequate” and “effective” substitute for 
habeas corpus. 
Given that the Supreme Court is due to decide Boumediene 
later this year, and will quite likely reach the question of whether 
the DTA and MCA provide an “adequate” alternative to habeas 
corpus, Part III assiduously avoids handicapping the merits of this 
question. Instead, in Part IV, I turn to the “myth” of Swain v. 
Pressley—the extent to which the “rule” Pressley enunciates might 
actually serve to distort courts’ review of the adequacy of 
alternative remedies to habeas corpus. Because of this effect, Part 
IV suggests several reasons why Pressley is not nearly as helpful 
in defining the limits of Congress’s power to fashion alternative 
remedies to habeas corpus as is generally suggested. Whatever the 
Court ultimately holds in Boumediene, any discussion of the 
constitutional adequacy of the alternative remedy will, in reality, 
resolve a question of first impression. 
II.  ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES: FROM HAYMAN TO PRESSLEY 
Arguably, the first time Congress ever provided a statutory 
substitute for the writ of habeas corpus was in the Judiciary Act of 
1789, section 14 of which created a federal statutory cause of 
action by the same name: 
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, 
shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas 
corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by 
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their 
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles 
and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the 
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, 
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the 
 
13. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
  
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.——
Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case 
extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in 
custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United 
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the 
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to 
testify.14 
As Chief Justice Marshall would explain less than two 
decades later, although federal courts could resort to the common 
law for the “meaning” of “habeas corpus,” they were only 
empowered to exercise that jurisdiction conferred by statute.15 
Thus, at least in the federal courts, the federal “statutory” writ 
became a complete substitute for the “common-law” (or what is 
sometimes referred to as the “constitutional”) writ of habeas 
corpus.16 
Notwithstanding Bollman’s elimination of common-law 
habeas in the federal courts, questions about the substantive 
sufficiency of the federal statutory writ did not arise until well 
into the twentieth century.17 Thus, Part II begins with Congress’s 
first attempt to provide a substitute remedy for the statutory writ 
of habeas corpus, before moving onto Swain v. Pressley and its 
implications. 
A. Hayman and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
Perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court itself was largely 
responsible for the first concerted effort on Congress’s part to 
provide a substitute remedy for the federal statutory writ of 
habeas corpus. At the heart of the problem were a series of 
decisions during the 1940s that seemingly opened the door to 
potential abuses of the writ by prisoners. 
 
14. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)). 
15. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–94 (1807). 
16. On the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, see generally 
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); and 
Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605 
(1970). 
17. For a discussion of why Bollman’s preclusion of federal common-law 
habeas did not raise more serious Suspension Clause problems, see Vladeck, 
supra note 2. 
  
In Waley v. Johnston, for example, the Court for the first time 
allowed federal prisoners to contest their convictions even where 
the trial record itself was unassailable—a holding that necessarily 
contemplated review of facts dehors the record.18 In Walker v. 
Johnston, the Court held that in certain circumstances, habeas 
petitioners were entitled to a full evidentiary hearing in the 
habeas court.19 And in Ahrens v. Clark, the Court concluded that 
habeas petitions must be filed in the district of the prisoner’s 
confinement.20 
Taken together, Ahrens, Waley, and Walker created a 
logistical nightmare; at the time, most federal prisoners were held 
somewhere other than the district in which they were convicted. 
Between 1942 and 1948, for example, 63% of federal prisoners 
were held in just five districts.21 Thus, district courts considering 
(the growing number of) post-conviction habeas petitions brought 
by federal prisoners were beset by serious administrative 
problems, including the routine unavailability of the trial court 
record and of key witnesses.22 
In response to the problems posed by these decisions 
(combined with growing abuse of the writ by federal prisoners 
unintentionally emboldened by them), the Judicial Conference of 
the United States proposed legislation to create a statutory 
remedy for those in custody pursuant to a federal conviction. Such 
a motion for post-conviction relief would be filed in the district of 
conviction and sentence, rather than in the district of 
confinement.23 Although there was little movement on the 
proposal between 1942 and 1948,24 Ahrens apparently rekindled 
the momentum for such a measure, so that when the Judicial 
Code was re-codified in June 1948, it included new 28 U.S.C. § 
 
18.  316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (per curiam). 
19.  312 U.S. 275 (1941). 
20.  335 U.S. 188 (1948). 
21. See William H. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 337 (1949). In Hayman, the Court relied heavily upon Speck’s article. 
See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 n.14, 214 n.18 (1952). 
22. For an overview of the problems motivating § 2255, see John J. 
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949); Louis E. 
Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948). 
23. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 210–19 & nn.13–14, 17–19, 23, 25 
(summarizing the evolution of what became § 2255). 
24. See id. 
  
2255.25 
Critically, while creating a statutory post-conviction remedy 
in the district of conviction, § 2255 also precluded post-conviction 
habeas corpus in the district of confinement: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion 
pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it 
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, 
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such 
court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that 
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention.26 
Thus, for the first time, Congress displaced the statutory writ 
of habeas corpus unless “the remedy by motion is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of [the petitioner’s] detention.” The 
statute was silent, though, on the criteria by which “adequacy” or 
“effectiveness” was to be measured. 
The constitutionality of the preclusion of habeas corpus 
quickly came before the courts. Although the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits explicitly upheld § 2255 against constitutional 
challenge,27 the Ninth Circuit, in a controversial and divided 
opinion, disagreed.28 
At the heart of the complicated series of five opinions from the 
three judges in the Ninth Circuit was the argument that § 2255 
was not in fact an adequate alternative to habeas corpus in the 
case before the court (an appeal of the denial of a § 2255 motion).29 
On the majority’s view, the district court correctly denied 
Hayman’s § 2255 motion because, inter alia, it lacked the 
authority to produce Hayman as a witness. But such a denial 
would prejudice (if not formally preclude) his ability to challenge 
 
25. See id. at 218. 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2000). 
27. See Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1950); Martin v. 
Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949). 
28. See Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950), vacated, 
342 U.S. 205 (1951). 
29. The defendant, Herman Hayman, was convicted on six counts and 
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment by the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California. He was subsequently imprisoned in the 
federal prison at McNeil Island, Washington. See id. 457. 
  
the constitutionality of his conviction via habeas corpus. Thus, 
because the § 2255 remedy was inadequate, and because habeas 
would not effectively be available, the court (eventually) concluded 
that § 2255 was unconstitutional.30 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision.31 Conceding that “respondent’s motion 
states grounds to support a collateral attack on his sentence,”32 
the Court read § 2255 as not precluding resort to habeas corpus in 
such a case. After exhaustively recounting the background to § 
2255, Chief Justice Vinson noted how: 
[§ 2255] was passed at the instance of the Judicial 
Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen 
in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do 
we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of 
collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, 
the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties 
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the 
same rights in another and more convenient forum.33 
 
30. All three members of the panel filed opinions with respect to the 
initial decision: Chief Judge Denman wrote for the court, and held that the 
§ 2255 remedy was inadequate on the ground that the defendant was unable 
to be a witness at his § 2255 hearing, which prejudiced his ability to assert 
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See id. at 457–66. 
Judge Stephens concurred in the result, but went further, reading the § 2255 
hearing as having preclusive effect in any subsequent habeas petition, even 
if—as in the case sub judice—the § 2255 remedy was “inadequate” or 
“ineffective.” Thus, Judge Stephens concluded that the statute was an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. See id. at 466–68 (Stephens, J., 
concurring in the result). Finally, Judge Pope dissented, arguing that, as 
Hayman had not yet attempted to file a federal habeas petition, resolution of 
the constitutional question was premature. Moreover, Judge Pope disagreed 
with Chief Judge Denman that the § 2255 remedy was inadequate. See id. at 
468–71 (Pope, J., dissenting). 
      On rehearing, Chief Judge Denman came around to Judge Stephens’s 
position, and concluded that § 2255 was unconstitutional. See id. at 471–74 
(Denman, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing). Judge Pope reiterated 
his dissent. See id. at 474–75 (Pope, J., dissenting). 
31. Hayman v. United States, 342 U.S. 205, 224 (1951). Technically, the 
vote in support of Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion was 6-0. Justices Black and 
Douglas concurred in the result only (without explaining why), see id., and 
Justice Minton did not participate. See id. 
32. Id. at 210. 
33. Id. at 219. 
  
With that admonition in mind, the Court turned to the merits 
of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit 
that the defendant would not have been able to appear before the 
sentencing court,34 the Supreme Court concluded that the district 
court “did not proceed in conformity with Section 2255 when it 
made findings on controverted issues of fact relating to 
[Hayman’s] own knowledge without notice to [him] and without 
his being present.”35 In other words, the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion that the § 2255 remedy was inadequate in Hayman’s 
case was correct, but only because the district court had 
misconstrued the scope of its authority under that section—not, as 
the Ninth Circuit had concluded, because the district court lacked 
the requisite authority. There was no need for the Ninth Circuit to 
decide that § 2255 was therefore unconstitutional; it needed only 
to have remanded the proceedings back to the lower court: 
Nothing has been shown to warrant our holding at this 
stage of the proceeding that the Section 2255 procedure 
will be “inadequate or ineffective” if respondent is present 
for a hearing in the District Court on remand of this case. 
In a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be 
“‘inadequate or ineffective’,” the Section provides that the 
habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the 
necessary hearing. Under such circumstances, we do not 
reach constitutional questions. This Court will not pass 
upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress where the 
question is properly presented unless such adjudication is 
unavoidable, much less anticipate constitutional 
questions.36 
Hayman thereby endorsed a broad reading of the scope of 
review that sentencing courts could undertake pursuant to § 2255, 
while reiterating that habeas would be available where the § 2255 
proceedings were inadequate or ineffective. The Supreme Court 
did nothing to clarify what “inadequate” or “ineffective” might 
mean, but its broad construction of the sentencing court’s 
authority in entertaining § 2255 motions made that issue much 
 
34. See id. at 220–21, 221 n.33 (noting the sentencing court’s authority 
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651). 
35. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 220. 
36. Id. at 223 (footnotes omitted). 
  
less likely to arise.37 
B. Swain v. Pressley and the D.C. Courts 
A quarter-century after Hayman, the Court again confronted 
the question of whether Congress could provide a substitute 
remedy for habeas corpus in the context of section 23-110(g) of the 
District of Columbia Code, a provision expressly modeled on 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.38 
Section 23-110(g) was codified as part of the massive 
reorganization of the District of Columbia judicial system in 
1970.39 Prior to 1970, the District of Columbia had what was 
effectively a unitary court system,40 pursuant to which the courts 
of the District of Columbia exercised both local and federal 
jurisdiction.41 Indeed, it was because of the unique “hybrid” 
nature of the D.C. courts’ jurisdiction that, from 1837 to 1962, 
those courts were the only tribunals in the country with the power 
to entertain petitions for writs of mandamus against federal 
officials.42 
 
37. Indeed, the Court would subsequently characterize Hayman as 
“avoid[ing] the constitutional question by holding that § 2255 was as broad as 
habeas corpus.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 13 (1963). 
38. See Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C., 515 F.2d 1294, 1306 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
39. See generally D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. For cogent summaries, see JEFFREY 
BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY  TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE 
COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 233–35 (2001); Susan Low 
Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the 
Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 561–63 (2002); 
John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical 
View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 387–89 (2006). 
40. Technically, there were purely “local” courts in the District of 
Columbia prior to 1970, but they were courts of extremely limited subject-
matter jurisdiction, and appeals could be taken from their decisions to the 
quasi-federal courts. 
41. See generally Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 39; Roberts, supra note 
39. 
42. In 1813, the Supreme Court held that the lower federal courts 
lacked the power to issue such common-law writs. See McIntire v. Wood, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). Eight years later, the Court held that the state 
courts lacked the power to provide such relief against federal officials. See 
McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). The clever solution, 
initially theorized by D.C. Circuit Chief Judge William Cranch, was that, 
because the D.C. district court was a federal court that could also exercise 
local jurisdiction, it alone had the power to issue writs of mandamus against 
  
As part of a package of “home rule” measures (or, according to 
some, to curb the influence of the then-left-leaning D.C. Circuit 
over criminal law and criminal procedure), Congress bifurcated 
the courts into distinctly local and distinctly federal systems, and 
apportioned jurisdiction accordingly.43 Along with the criminal 
jurisdiction allocated to the new D.C. local courts (and taken away 
from the D.C. federal district court), Congress provided for a post-
conviction remedy mirroring that provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
and one that otherwise appeared to preclude post-conviction 
habeas corpus in the federal courts: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion 
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the 
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it 
appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion 
for relief under this section or that the Superior Court 
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the 
 
federal officers. See United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 5 D.C. (5 Cranch) 
163 (1837), aff’d, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See generally Roberts, supra 
note 39, at 380–82 (summarizing the background to the Kendall case). 
Finally, in 1962, Congress enacted the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1361, which confers jurisdiction on all federal district courts to entertain 
petitions for writs of mandamus against federal officers. 
     One point that bears mentioning, and that I have never seen discussed 
before, is whether the D.C. courts, a fortiori, would also have retained 
common-law habeas jurisdiction for federal prisoners during this same time 
period. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), only disavowed 
common-law habeas corpus in the Article III courts, and Tarble’s Case, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), only disavowed habeas for federal prisoners in 
state courts. Although this is a fun academic question, the 1970 
reorganization act appears to have closed this loophole and vitiated any 
potential contemporary significance. See D.C. Court Reform and Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. at 560 (codified at D.C. 
CODE § 16-1901(b)) (“Petitions for writs directed to Federal officers and 
employees shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.”). For more on this curious historical footnote, see Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District 
of Columbia, 11 GREEN BAG 2d (forthcoming 2008). 
43. On the partisan motives behind the bifurcation, see Bloch & 
Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 562 n.61; Patricia M. Wald, Ghosts of Judges 
Past, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675, 680–81 (1994). See also Patricia M. Wald, 
The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 
507, 509 (1988) (noting that “it is no secret that a major motivation for [the 
Act] was the Nixon Administration’s fierce opposition” to various decisions by 
liberal D.C. Circuit judges). 
  
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of detention.44 
Unlike in Hayman, however, the post-conviction remedy 
under D.C. law was a motion before local D.C. judges—Article I 
judges not subject to Article III’s salary and tenure protections.45 
Pressley therefore raised the issue—not considered in Hayman—of 
whether a post-conviction remedy could be an “adequate” and 
“effective” substitute for habeas corpus if it did not include 
consideration by an Article III judge. 
Interestingly, that issue was essentially sidestepped by the 
D.C. Circuit, which held in Palmore v. Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia that section 23-110(g) did not preclude the 
district court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction, but only interposed 
a requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies prior to seeking 
federal habeas relief.46 Noting that “the district court construed a 
statute which created a statutory remedy for post-conviction relief 
in the new court system as eliminating by implication a remedy 
which the inferior article III courts and the Supreme Court have 
exercised for two hundred years,”47 the en banc court found 
insufficient indication that Congress meant to force such a 
potentially significant constitutional issue.48 Instead, as Judge 
Tamm wrote for the court, “we find that Congress never intended 
to, nor does section 110 actually, affect the district court’s 
jurisdiction to entertain post-conviction habeas petitions from 
local prisoners. Instead, we hold that section 110(g) is an 
exhaustion of remedies statute, requiring initial submission of 
claims to the local courts . . .”49 
 
44. D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (1970).  There is little legislative history that 
explains why Congress would be concerned about remedying the same 
problem § 2255 was supposed to address. After all, a post-conviction remedy 
in the D.C. district court, as opposed to the D.C. Superior Court, would 
hardly raise comparable logistical difficulties. That being said, if part of the 
purpose for the reorganization of the D.C. courts was to undermine the D.C. 
Circuit’s role in shaping constitutional criminal procedure, it would have 
made little sense to allow that court to accomplish indirectly (by hearing 
habeas appeals of defendants convicted in the local D.C. courts) what the 
statute clearly precluded it from doing directly. 
45. See generally Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). 
46. 515 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
47. Id. at 1307. 
48. See id. at 1308–13. 
49. Id. at 1313. 
  
The same day, the en banc D.C. Circuit applied Palmore to 
the habeas petition of Jasper Pressley.  Pressley was convicted in 
April 1971 by the D.C. Superior Court of grand larceny and 
larceny from the government.  He was sentenced to concurrent 
prison sentences to run between twenty and ninety-six months, 
and was unsuccessful in two motions under section 23-110(g) for 
post-conviction relief.50 After an interlocutory back-and-forth with 
the D.C. Circuit, the district court denied Pressley’s habeas 
petition on the ground that “it appeared that appellant had not 
adequately exhausted his remedies in the local court system.”51 
The en banc D.C. Circuit reversed. Relying on Palmore, the 
court of appeals held that: 
[T]he local courts fully considered the constitutional 
claims on the merits. Thus, the local courts “had a full 
opportunity to determine the federal constitutional issues 
before resort was made to a federal forum, and the 
policies served by the exhaustion requirement would not 
be furthered by requiring submission of the claims to the 
(local) courts.”52 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Pressley and 
Palmore and consolidated the cases for argument,53 only to 
subsequently vacate and remand Palmore at the Solicitor 
General’s request (in light of the Court’s intervening decision in 
Stone v. Powell).54 Thus, Pressley became the vehicle for resolving 
the meaning—and constitutionality—of section 23-110(g). 
On certiorari, the Court emphatically rejected the D.C. 
Circuit’s conclusion in Palmore that section 23-110(g) was merely 
an exhaustion requirement. First, the majority noted that the 
statute expressly covers the exhaustion of local remedies, and 
provides that habeas corpus should not be available unless the 
local remedy was “inadequate” or “ineffective.”55 Second, as 
 
50. See Pressley v. Swain, 515 F.2d 1290, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en 
banc) (summarizing the background). 
51. Id. at 1292. 
52. Id. at 1293 (quoting Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 63 (1974)). 
53. Super. Ct. of D.C. v. Palmore, 424 U.S. 907 (1976) (mem.). 
54. See Super. Ct. of D.C. v. Palmore, 429 U.S. 915 (1976) (mem.) (citing 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)); see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 
372, 376 n.7 (1977) (summarizing the facts). 
55. See Pressley, 430 U.S. at 377. 
  
Justice Stevens observed, section 23-110(g) was patterned 
squarely on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was meant to preclude 
habeas corpus, and not just interpose an exhaustion 
requirement.56 
Thus, unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court was 
squarely faced with the constitutional question of whether section 
23-110(g), in divesting Pressley of the ability to pursue habeas 
corpus proceedings in the district court, violated the Suspension 
Clause. Justice Stevens made fairly quick work of this issue: 
We are persuaded that the final clause in § 23-110(g) 
avoids any serious question about the constitutionality of 
the statute. That clause allows the District Court to 
entertain a habeas corpus application if it “appears that 
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of [the applicant’s] detention.” Thus, the only 
constitutional question presented is whether the 
substitution of a new collateral remedy which is both 
adequate and effective should be regarded as a 
suspension of the Great Writ within the meaning of the 
Constitution.57 
That is to say, because section 23-110(g) precluded habeas 
unless the post-conviction remedy was “inadequate” and 
“ineffective,” the negative implication was that habeas would be 
available unless the post-conviction remedy was adequate and 
effective to test the legality of the defendant’s detention. And so, 
the only question was whether such a substitute for habeas—i.e., 
one that was both adequate and effective in challenging the 
legality of the defendant’s detention—violated the Suspension 
Clause. That question, according to Justice Stevens, had been 
answered in Hayman: “The Court implicitly held in Hayman, as 
we hold in this case, that the substitution of a collateral remedy 
which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a 
person’s detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus.”58 Thus, in one sentence, the Court in Pressley 
enunciated what appeared to be a constitutional rule. 
Three points are worth flagging: First, Hayman, as we saw 
 
56. See id. at 377–78. 
57. Id. at 381 (alteration in original). 
58. Id. 
  
above, held no such thing. Instead, the Court in Hayman 
expressly avoided the question whether § 2255 was 
constitutional,59 holding that the district court had simply 
misconstrued the scope of its authority to fashion post-conviction 
relief.60 
Second, there is an element of Justice Stevens’s analysis that 
seems tautological: under section 23-110(g), a defendant was only 
precluded from pursuing a federal habeas petition if his motion for 
local post-conviction relief was both “adequate” and “effective” in 
testing the legality of his detention. Thus, as a statutory matter, a 
defendant was entitled either to habeas, or to an adequate and 
effective substitute. So the only constitutional question the 
Pressley Court decided was whether Congress can replace habeas 
corpus with adequate and effective substitutes (which the Court 
answered in the affirmative). The Court said nothing at all about 
whether the replacement of habeas corpus with an inadequate or 
ineffective substitute would necessarily violate the Suspension 
Clause; under section 23-110(g), just as under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
that question simply could not ever arise. 
Finally, although the requirement that the substitute remedy 
be “adequate” and “effective” came from the D.C. Code, as opposed 
to the Suspension Clause, the Court went on reach the question of 
D.C. law—whether, in Pressley’s case, the local post-conviction 
remedy was in fact an “adequate” and “effective” substitute. 
Rejecting the argument that Article I judges, as a general matter, 
could not be trusted to decide federal constitutional questions,61 
 
59. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (“Under 
such circumstances, we do not reach constitutional questions. This Court will 
not pass upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress where the question 
is properly presented unless such adjudication is unavoidable, much less 
anticipate constitutional questions.”) (footnote omitted). 
60. See id. at 223–24 (“We conclude that the District Court erred in 
determining the factual issues raised by respondent's motion under Section 
2255 without notice to respondent and without his presence. We hold that the 
required hearing can be afforded respondent under the procedure established 
in Section 2255.”). 
61. See Pressley, 430 U.S. at 382–83 (citing Palmore v. United States, 
411 U.S. 389, 410–22 (1973)). Justice Stevens also noted that defendants in 
Pressley’s position still had two opportunities for Article III review—to the 
Supreme Court on direct appeal from his conviction, and to the Court again 
on appeal of the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief under section 
23-110(g). See id. at 382 n.16. 
  
the Court noted that there were no specific allegations of 
insufficiency in Pressley itself. Thus: 
[W]e have no occasion to consider what kind of showing 
would be required to demonstrate that the § 23-110 
remedy is inadequate or ineffective in a particular case, 
or whether the character of the judge’s tenure might be 
relevant to such a showing in a case presenting issues of 
extraordinary public concern.62 
In short, then, Pressley held that the mere presence of an 
Article I judge, by itself, was not enough to render the remedy 
provided by section 23-110(g) “inadequate” or “ineffective.” As 
such, Pressley was therefore not entitled to pursue habeas relief in 
the federal district court.63 The Court said nothing about what 
would constitute an “inadequate” or “ineffective” substitute, and it 
also did not say that such a substitute would necessarily violate 
the Suspension Clause; at the heart of the decision was the 
statutory safety valve, i.e., that section 23-110(g) expressly 
reserved access to habeas corpus if the post-conviction remedy 
proved “inadequate” or “ineffective.” 
In that regard, the majority opinion in Pressley is curiously 
cursory, for one might assume that those two points are related—
that a court’s analysis of whether a particular remedy is an 
“adequate” substitute for habeas corpus might depend to some 
degree on whether a negative holding would raise a serious 
constitutional question. Because of the language of section 23-
110(g), however, Pressley did not need to address any of these 
weighty questions. 
III.  ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AFTER PRESSLEY 
For two decades, Swain v. Pressley languished in obscurity. 
Congress made no new attempts to provide a substitute remedy 
for habeas corpus, and the significance (or lack thereof) of the 
Court’s discussion of the limitations on such legislation went 
 
62. Id. at 383 n.20. 
63. Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Burger—joined by 
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist—would have upheld section 23-110(g) on 
the ground that the Constitution confers no right to habeas corpus to 
collaterally attack a criminal conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
See id. at 384–86 (Burger, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
  
effectively unnoticed in both the courts and the academy. Instead, 
the potential significance of Swain v. Pressley did not become 
apparent until the enactment of a series of statutes constraining 
the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts. First, of course, was 
the enactment of “AEDPA”,64 which dramatically reworked the 
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts both in cases 
where prisoners sought to collaterally attack their state-court 
convictions and in immigration cases. Also of significance is the 
REAL ID Act of 2005,65 which reapportioned jurisdiction between 
the Courts of Appeals (on direct review) and habeas proceedings in 
the district courts. After surveying the role Swain v. Pressley 
played in these sets of cases, Part III turns to the other major area 
where Swain v. Pressley has been invoked—the detention of non-
citizens as “enemy combatants” as part of the “war on terrorism,” 
and Congress’s repeated attempts to constrain their access to the 
federal courts. 
A. Felker: Alternative Remedies and Habeas Appeals 
One of the major changes wrought by AEDPA was the 
creation of a “gatekeeper” system for “second or successive” federal 
habeas petitions filed by state prisoners seeking to collaterally 
attack their conviction.66 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), as added 
by AEDPA, a petitioner seeking to file a second or successive 
habeas petition challenging a state-court conviction must first 
obtain permission from the relevant Court of Appeals.67 If the 
court grants permission, the petitioner may proceed to file his 
petition in the district court.68 If the court denies permission, the 
statute expressly divests the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to 
review that denial either as an appeal or via a writ of certiorari.69 
In Felker v. Turpin,70 the Court considered whether AEDPA was 
 
64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)(codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
65. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
66. See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance 
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1556–
62 (2000) (discussing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)). 
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2001). 
68. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). 
69. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(E). 
70. 518 U.S. 651 (1996). 
  
unconstitutional in so precluding the Court’s review. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the 
fact that Congress had not divested all of the Supreme Court’s 
possible jurisdiction. Instead, Rehnquist invoked the Court’s so-
called “original” habeas jurisdiction, which AEDPA had left 
untouched: 
Although § 2244(b)(3)(E) precludes us from reviewing, by 
appeal or petition for certiorari, a judgment on an 
application for leave to file a second habeas petition in 
district court, it makes no mention of our authority to 
hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this 
Court. As we declined to find a repeal of § 14 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 as applied to this Court by 
implication [in Ex parte Yerger71], we decline to find a 
similar repeal of § 2241 of Title 28—its descendant—by 
implication now.72 
Thus, because Felker could have sought habeas relief directly 
in the Supreme Court once his application was denied, the Court 
concluded that AEDPA’s gatekeeping provision did not violate the 
Exceptions Clause of Article III.73 
One might also characterize such a holding in Pressley’s 
terms—i.e., that an “original” habeas petition in the Supreme 
Court was an adequate and effective substitute for an appeal of 
the denial of a habeas petition by the circuit court. As part of that 
implicit conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the 
substantive restrictions contained within AEDPA would not apply 
to the Supreme Court’s review of an original habeas petition 
(suggesting that there might be a problem if they did).74 Finally, 
the Court also rejected Felker’s argument that AEDPA’s 
gatekeeping provision violated the Suspension Clause, concluding 
that Congress was acting well within its authority in codifying 
necessary responses to the “abuse of the writ” by second and 
successive petitioners.75 
 
71. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). 
72. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661 (citations omitted). 
73. See id. at 662–63. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. at 663–64. The majority then considered—and quickly 
rejected—whether Felker would be entitled to original habeas relief. See id. 
at 664–65. 
  
Although the decision was unanimous, Justice Souter—joined 
by Justices Stevens and Breyer—wrote separately “only to add 
that if it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than 
certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, 
the question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Exceptions 
Clause power would be open.”76 In other words, from Justice 
Souter’s perspective, if the alternative remedies turned out to be 
ineffective, the constitutional question avoided in Felker would be 
squarely presented.77 
B. The REAL ID Act of 2005: Alternative Remedies and 
Immigration Law 
The harder questions raised by AEDPA vis-à-vis habeas 
corpus went to its constriction of the substantive grounds for relief 
in petitions filed by state prisoners,78 and its attempted cabining 
of the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction in immigration cases.79 
In INS v. St. Cyr,80 the Supreme Court—following the lead of 
virtually all of the circuits—adopted a somewhat counter-textual 
interpretation of various provisions in AEDPA and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA)81 in holding that neither statute actually precluded 
access to habeas corpus.82 Instead, the Court held that only the 
 
76. Id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring). 
77. Indeed, though it might seem perverse to rely on the availability of a 
remedy (an “original” habeas petition) that has not been successfully invoked 
in over eighty years, the Supreme Court has shown repeated awareness of 
the possibility of such relief as a last resort. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 547 
U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); 
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478 (2007) (Stevens and 
Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting the potential 
availability of original relief “[i]f petitioners later seek to establish that the 
Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings under the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, or some other and ongoing injury” (citation omitted)). 
78. See generally Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 665–70 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Noonan, J., concurring) (summarizing the problematic nature of post-
AEDPA review). 
79. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension 
Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555 (2002) 
(discussing the background to St. Cyr and the larger constitutional issues). 
80. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
81. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48, and 50 U.S.C.). 
82. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–305. 
  
clearest statement of congressional intent would compel reaching 
the serious constitutional questions that would arise if AEDPA 
and IIRIRA precluded habeas review.83 
Citing Swain v. Pressley, the majority in St. Cyr recognized 
Congress’s power to displace habeas by providing adequate 
alternative remedies in the courts of appeals.84 Nevertheless, the 
Court’s holding suggested that the relevant provisions of AEDPA 
and IIRIRA instead cabined the jurisdiction of the courts of 
appeals to entertain petitions for review, shifting even more 
immigration claims into the habeas jurisdiction of the district 
courts (especially where “criminal aliens” were concerned).85 Thus, 
in the ensuing years, there was mounting confusion over which 
claims had to be pressed on direct review from the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and which claims could only be 
brought via habeas, a distinction that often turned on the very 
facts in dispute in individual cases.86 
Congress eventually responded through the REAL ID Act of 
2005,87 the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of which attempted to 
reverse the direction of immigration litigation.88 Thus, the Act 
significantly expands the scope of the Courts of Appeals’ 
jurisdiction over petitions for review, while otherwise purporting 
to preclude habeas petitions in any case where an immigrant 
seeks to challenge a final order of removal.89 As new 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D) provides: 
 
83. See, e.g., id. at 301 n.13 (“The fact that this Court would be required 
to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in 
and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that 
would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.”). See also id. 
at 326–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s rationale as “a 
superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement”). 
84. See id. at 314 n.38 (majority opinion) (“Congress could, without 
raising any constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through 
the courts of appeals.”). 
85. Indeed, the same day as St. Cyr, the Court rejected the argument 
that the courts of appeals could hear otherwise precluded claims as an 
alternative to habeas. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001). See 
generally Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the 
REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006). 
86. See, e.g., Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 877–79 (9th Cir. 
2003) (citing Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
87. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005). 
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005). 
89. See Neuman, supra note 85, at 136–41. 
  
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other 
provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits 
or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as 
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of 
law raised upon a petition for review filed with an 
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this 
section.90 
In other words, the REAL ID Act of 2005 attempts to preclude 
the habeas review relied upon in St. Cyr, substituting for it the 
administrative review provided by the Courts of Appeals.91 As 
Professor Neuman cogently asks: 
Will direct review in the courts of appeals, as reframed by 
the REAL ID Act, provide an adequate and effective 
substitute for the writ of habeas corpus sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the Suspension Clause? The 
answer depends on how the statutory structure will be 
interpreted, and on what the Suspension Clause 
requires.92 
Thus, Professor Neuman highlighted as major areas of 
concern “the effect of the thirty-day filing period in limiting the 
availability of review of removal orders, the fact-finding capacity 
of the courts of appeals, and the availability of review for 
questions that arise after a removal order has been issued.”93 
Professor Neuman was writing shortly after the REAL ID Act 
was enacted, and subsequent developments in the courts have not 
added too much to his cogent analysis. For the most part, the 
courts of appeals have upheld the REAL ID Act against 
constitutional challenge, focusing in almost every case on the 
 
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (which 
provides that such review is exclusive). 
91. See, e.g., Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“These modifications effectively limit all aliens to one bite of the apple with 
regard to challenging an order of removal, in an effort to streamline what the 
Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of orders of removal, divided 
between the district courts (habeas corpus) and the courts of appeals 
(petitions for review).”). The Conference Report for the statute even relies 
upon Swain v. Pressley. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 175 (2005), 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 300. 
92. Neuman, supra note 85, at 142. 
93. Id. 
  
REAL ID Act’s expansion of the courts’ jurisdiction to review the 
administrative decision on direct appeal.94 Even when the 
adequacy of the remedy has been open to some question, courts 
have uniformly upheld the congressional displacement of habeas 
corpus.95 In Part IV, I will return to the implications of some of 
these cases. 
Ultimately, though, the REAL ID Act was really just a 
preview for the far more serious battle that was to come—the 
question of providing a substitute remedy for individuals detained 
in conjunction with the war on terrorism. 
C. Hamdan: Alternative Remedies and Guantánamo, Part I 
The scope of federal habeas jurisdiction has been at the heart 
of the United States’ detention of non-citizen “enemy combatants” 
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, since the first detainees were 
transferred there early in 2002.96 Although the lower courts 
divided over whether the habeas statute extended to petitions 
filed by the Guantánamo detainees,97 the Supreme Court, in 
Rasul v. Bush, held that it did.98 Shortly after the Rasul decision, 
and (arguably) motivated by the Court’s same-day decision in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,99 the government established “Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals” (CSRTs) to provide administrative 
review of the detainees’ claims that they were not “enemy 
combatants” in the first place.100 
 
94. See, e.g., Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2007); Jean-Pierre v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007); Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 
F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2007); De Ping Wang v. D.H.S., 484 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2007); Ramadan v. 
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007); Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522 
(8th Cir. 2007). 
95. Indeed, two decisions have expressly invoked Swain v. Pressley. See 
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. D.O.J., 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006); Enwonwu v. 
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2006). 
96. For an overview, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007). 
97. Compare Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting 
jurisdiction), and Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(same), with Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (sustaining 
jurisdiction). 
98. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
99. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality). 
100. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 
  
But it was not until December 2005, after the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld101—which challenged 
the legality of the military tribunals established pursuant to 
President Bush’s November 13, 2001 Military Order102—that 
Congress attempted to cast the CSRTs as an “alternative” to 
habeas corpus. Thus, in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,103 
Congress attempted to restrict all judicial review of the detainees’ 
claims to two avenues: an appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the 
CSRT,104 and, for certain detainees convicted by military 
commission, an appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the final judgment 
of conviction.105 
Critically, the DTA provided that such review would be 
 
450–51 (D.D.C. 2005). 
101. For the grant, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005) 
(mem.). The district court had struck down the commissions, only to be 
reversed by the D.C. Circuit. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 
(D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
102. Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and 
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57, 
833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
103. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005). 
104. Under the DTA, the D.C. Circuit could only review: 
(i) whether the status determination of the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with the 
standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that 
the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of 
the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
Government's evidence); and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and 
laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such 
standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
105. Again, the DTA limited the D.C. Circuit’s review to: 
(i) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and 
procedures specified in [Military Commission Order No. 1, dated 
August 31, 2005]; and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of 
the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards 
and procedures to reach the final decision is consistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. 
Id. § 1005(e)(3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2743. Curiously, such appeals were only as of 
right for defendants convicted and sentenced to death or to imprisonment for 
10 years or more. For defendants receiving lesser sentences, the statute 
provided that the appeal “shall be at the discretion of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.” Id. § 1005(e)(3)(B)(ii), 119 
Stat. at 2743. 
  
exclusive. The statute otherwise purported to oust the habeas 
jurisdiction of the federal courts—including the Supreme Court: 
Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider. . .an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien 
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba . . . 106 
In Hamdan, the majority sidestepped all questions as to the 
constitutionality of the DTA’s exclusive review scheme, holding 
that the statutory language was insufficiently clear concerning 
whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision should apply to 
pending cases (including Hamdan and most of the other petitions 
brought by the Guantánamo detainees).107 Thus, the adequacy of 
DTA review was irrelevant; on the Hamdan Court’s view, the DTA 
did not preclude access to habeas corpus in all cases pending on 
the date of the statute’s enactment. 
Although the majority therefore did not reach the Swain v. 
Pressley question, Justice Scalia—who concluded that the DTA’s 
applicability to pending cases was beyond question—did. In his 
view, “even if petitioner were fully protected by the [Suspension] 
Clause, the DTA would create no suspension problem.”108 In 
Justice Scalia’s view: 
[T]he “standards and procedures specified in” Order No. 1 
include every aspect of the military commissions, 
including the fact of their existence and every respect in 
which they differ from courts-martial. Petitioner’s claims 
that the President lacks legal authority to try him before 
a military commission constitute claims that “the use of 
such standards and procedures,” as specified in Order No. 
1, is “[in]consistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.” The D.C. Circuit thus retains jurisdiction 
to consider these claims on postdecision review . . . Thus, 
the DTA merely defers our jurisdiction to consider 
petitioner’s claims; it does not eliminate that jurisdiction. 
It constitutes neither an “inadequate” nor an “ineffective” 
 
106. DTA § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762–69 (2006). 
108. Id. at 2818 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
  
substitute for petitioner’s pending habeas application.109 
Whether Justice Scalia was correct or not, the DTA’s lack of 
clarity ensured that the issue would be left for another day. As it 
turned out, that day came rather quickly. 
D. Boumediene and Bismullah: Alternative Remedies and 
Guantánamo, Part II 
In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted the MCA.110 In 
addition to providing statutory authority for trials by military 
commission and creating both trial-level courts and the Court of 
Military Commission Review (CMCR),111 the MCA, in stronger 
statutory language, attempted to make the CSRT review scheme 
exclusive. Thus, section 7 of the MCA provides that: 
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear 
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed 
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States 
who has been determined by the United States to have 
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is 
awaiting such determination.112 
Although the MCA tweaks the appellate review of military 
commissions in several significant ways,113 it effectively leaves 
the DTA procedure intact with respect to judicial review of CSRT 
decisions. Thus, under the DTA/MCA, individuals determined to 
 
109. Id. at 2818–19 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
110. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
111. See id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2621 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(f)). 
112. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat at 2635 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)). The 
statute further provides that, except as provided by the DTA: 
 no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider 
any other action against the United States or its agents relating to 
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions 
of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United 
States and has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination.  
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). 
113. See id. § 9, 120 Stat. at 2636–37. Although these amendments 
appear to be technical, they solve several potential problems with the DTA’s 
review provisions, including the DTA’s limitation to challenges to the “August 
31, 2005” military commission order, its provision for discretionary appeals 
for detainees receiving sentences of less than ten years, and its limitation on 
applicability to those individuals detained at Guantánamo Bay. 
  
be “enemy combatants” by CSRTs, but not subject to trial by 
military commission, have only one appeal to the D.C. Circuit to 
test the legality of their detention.114 
Understandably, much of the focus on the MCA has been on 
the constitutionality of its foreclosure of habeas jurisdiction, which 
the D.C. Circuit addressed (and upheld) in Boumediene v. Bush.115 
As Judge Randolph wrote for the majority, the Suspension Clause 
does not protect non-citizens outside the territorial United States, 
and so the MCA could not raise a constitutional question, even if 
the substitute remedy it provided were inadequate.116 Judge 
Rogers dissented as to the reach of the Suspension Clause,117 and 
also concluded that the DTA/MCA remedy was constitutionally 
inadequate.118 In her words: 
Even if the CSRT protocol were capable of assessing 
whether a detainee was unlawfully held and entitled to 
be released, it is not an adequate substitute for the 
habeas writ because this remedy is not guaranteed. Upon 
concluding that detention is unjustified, a habeas court 
“can only direct [the prisoner] to be discharged.” But 
neither the DTA nor the MCA require this, and a recent 
report studying CSRT records shows that when at least 
three detainees were found by CSRTs not to be enemy 
combatants, they were subjected to a second, and in one 
case a third, CSRT proceeding until they were finally 
found to be properly classified as enemy combatants.119 
As Judge Rogers’s dissent underscores, the question whether 
the MCA violates the Suspension Clause (to the extent it 
applies)120 simply cannot be decoupled from questions as to the 
 
114. One hard question is whether this provision applies to Ali Saleh 
Kahlah Al-Marri, the one non-citizen held as an “enemy combatant” within 
the territorial United States. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that it did not, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 
(4th Cir. 2007), but that decision has since been vacated and is pending 
rehearing en banc. 
115. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). 
116. See id. at 988–92. 
117. See id. at 995–1004 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
118. See id. at 1004–07. 
119. Id. at 1006 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
120. On why the Boumediene majority’s argument that the Suspension 
Clause simply does not “apply” to Guantánamo is unconvincing, see Vladeck, 
  
scope of review under the DTA/MCA, which a different panel of 
the D.C. Circuit has considered in a series of opinions in 
Bismullah v. Gates.121 
In Bismullah “I,” the first appeal from a CSRT entertained by 
the D.C. Circuit, the court rejected the government’s argument 
that its review should be limited to the record produced by the 
CSRT. Thus, as Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote for the panel: 
[T]he record on review consists of all the information a 
Tribunal is authorized to obtain and consider, pursuant 
to the procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense, 
hereinafter referred to as Government Information and 
defined by the Secretary of the Navy as “such reasonably 
available information in the possession of the U.S. 
Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee 
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy 
combatant,” which includes any information presented to 
the Tribunal by the detainee or his Personal 
Representative.122 
The court went on to issue a series of orders governing the 
means by which that record should be disclosed to counsel for the 
detainees.123 The upside of the decision, though, was that review 
of a CSRT appeal could include information outside the record. 
The court then denied the government’s petition for rehearing in 
Bismullah “II,” and a divided court denied rehearing en banc. Lest 
there be any doubt about Bismullah’s significance, consider the 
Supreme Court’s order granting certiorari in Boumediene: “As it 
would be of material assistance to consult any decision in 
Bismullah . . . currently pending in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, supplemental 
briefing will be scheduled upon issuance of any decision in those 
cases.”124 
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the adequacy of DTA/MCA 
review as a substitute for habeas corpus is perhaps the most 
 
supra note 2. 
121. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Bismullah v. 
Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 
1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (mem.) (denying rehearing en banc). 
122. See Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 180. 
123. See id. at 189–91. 
124. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (mem.). 
  
important issue before the Court in Boumediene. But inasmuch as 
the D.C. Circuit’s focus has been on the scope of the factual record 
available for the court of appeals to review a CSRT decision, two 
hard legal questions remain unanswered as of this writing: 
First, does the DTA/MCA review encompass claims 
challenging whether the detainee is subject to military detention 
in the first place, let alone whether he is an “enemy combatant,” 
as defined by applicable regulations (and, now, the MCA)? That is 
to say, in challenging the procedures by which the CSRT arrives 
at its determination that a detainee is an “enemy combatant,” 
does the detainee have the ability to contest his amenability to 
military detention (and military jurisdiction) in the first place? 
Second, and separately, what is the significance of section 5 of 
the MCA, which provides that “[n]o person may invoke the Geneva 
Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or 
other civil action or proceeding [against the United States or an 
officer thereof] . . . as a source of rights in any court of the United 
States or its States or territories”?125 If habeas corpus, as a 
general matter, encompasses claims that detention is in violation 
of a duly-enacted federal treaty,126 section 5 appears to preclude 
review of one (important) ground by which the detention of some—
if not many—of the Guantánamo detainees might be unlawful. 
One answer might be that Congress has the power to override 
(or at least “un-execute”) treaties.127 But if not, then the harder 
 
125. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 
Stat. 2600, 2631. 
126. See, e.g., Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (recognizing the power 
to enforce treaties via the federal habeas statute); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) 
(2008) (providing that habeas is available to prisoners “in custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” (emphasis 
added)). For an argument that habeas might therefore provide a cause of 
action for the enforcement of “non-self-executing” treaties, see Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Case Comment, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension 
Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007 (2004). 
127. Such an argument might actually have more weight in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct 1346 (2008), which 
appears to establish—for the first time—that “non-self-executing” treaties are 
not binding federal law. See, e.g., id. at 1356-57 n.2.  Even if the MCA was 
intended to “un-execute” the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally required a clear statement from Congress when it intends to so 
provide. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 
243, 252 (1984); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). Whatever 
else might be said about the MCA, it is hardly “clear” on this point. See 
  
question remains: whether the rule of Swain v. Pressley includes 
the ability to press all possible claims that federal detention is 
unlawful. Pressley itself, again, is of little help in providing any 
answers. 
IV.  THE MYTH OF SWAIN V. PRESSLEY 
Perhaps the most important characteristic of both Swain v. 
Pressley and its predecessor, United States v. Hayman, is that the 
statutes in question in each case had a habeas “safety-valve.” 
Thus, if the alternative remedy provided by § 2255 or D.C. Code 
section 23-110(g) proved to be “inadequate” or “ineffective,” the 
statutes expressly contemplated the continuing availability of 
habeas corpus to test the legality of detention.128 Judges 
interpreting whether, in particular cases, the remedy had proven 
“adequate” or “effective” to test the legality of the petitioner’s 
confinement could therefore err on the side of caution, safe in the 
knowledge that their decision had no constitutional implications, 
and that habeas remained available in cases where the post-
conviction remedy was deemed insufficient. 
The modern substitutes, in contrast, contain no such safety 
valve. They create alternative remedies to habeas corpus, and 
then provide that those remedies are exclusive. Thus, statutes 
such as the REAL ID Act, the DTA, and the MCA, put judges in 
an incredibly difficult position, with enormous pressure to 
conclude that the substitute remedy provided by the statute is 
“adequate” and “effective,” even when (as in Boumediene, perhaps) 
there are considerable arguments to the contrary. Otherwise, 
jurists considering such claims would be left to strike down the 
 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 76–92 
(2007). 
128. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008) (“An application for a writ of 
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by 
motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained . . . unless it also 
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of his detention.”), with D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (“An application for a 
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for 
relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the 
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court . . . unless it also appears 
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 
his detention.”). 
  
statute as violating the Suspension Clause, something the 
Supreme Court has never done.129 
As a result, in a number of cases arising under the REAL ID 
Act, courts have already gone out of their way to conclude that the 
restoration of direct review provided by the statute is an 
“adequate” and “effective” substitute to habeas corpus, even when 
the analysis seems somewhat counterintuitive. Thus, courts either 
read into the statute the ability to consider claims that the statute 
seems to preclude, or the court concludes that procedural 
limitations on direct review do not actually serve to render such 
review “inadequate” or “ineffective.” 
The “myth” of Swain v. Pressley, then, is that it provides a 
meaningful test to apply to circumstances wherein Congress has 
attempted to provide an alternative remedy to habeas corpus. At 
most, it provides a useful example of how Congress might legislate 
responsibly to do so. But where Congress provides that the 
alternative remedy is exclusive, even where it might be 
inadequate or ineffective, the precedents suggest that Swain v. 
Pressley, coupled with the constitutional avoidance canon, actually 
distorts the courts’ analysis of the underlying issue. 
*     * * 
Whatever the merits of the underlying claims in the 
Guantánamo cases, one point seems clear: If the Suspension 
Clause does “apply to” or otherwise protect the Guantánamo 
detainees, the central question before the Supreme Court will be 
whether the remedy provided by the DTA/MCA constitutes an 
“adequate” and “effective” substitute for habeas corpus. As the 
above discussion demonstrates, Swain v. Pressley holds that 
Congress has the power to so provide, but does little to elaborate 
upon what “adequate” means. Moreover, because of constitutional 
avoidance, the Court would be under enormous pressure to 
conclude that the remedy is adequate and effective, even if it has 
to adopt a strained interpretation to reach such a result. 
At the very least, Boumediene provides the Court with an 
opportunity to shed light on questions that were avoided in 
Hayman, and only cursorily addressed in Pressley. And if the last 
decade is any indication, clarification of the limitations on 
 
129. The Court has shied away from even interpreting the Suspension 
Clause. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001). 
  
Congress’s power to fashion alternative remedies to habeas corpus 
will have ramifications far afield of Guantánamo and the war on 
terrorism. 
Given the unquestioned importance of the writ of habeas 
corpus, and the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that “we 
have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus 
statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or 
hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic 
procedural requirements,”130 it is long-past time for greater clarity 
in delineating the limits on Congress’s power to displace the writ 
with alternative remedies, lest that power become the means by 
which Congress further “suffocate[s] the writ.” 
 
 
130. Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973). 
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Legislative Reform of the State Secrets 
Privilege 
Robert M. Chesney* 
Few issues more directly implicate the tension between the 
rights of the individual and the government’s interest in 
preserving national security than the state secrets privilege.  This 
has long been true, but in recent years the use of the privilege in 
connection with high-profile litigation arising out of post-9/11 
events and policies—most notably the activities within the United 
States of the National Security Agency and the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s rendition program—has generated an 
unprecedented level of controversy, as reflected in litigation,1 in 
the media,2 in the work of interest groups,3 and in legal 
scholarship.4  This controversy has spurred interest in the 
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 1. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (denying motion to dismiss suit relating to NSA activity on state 
secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming dismissal of rendition lawsuit on state secrets grounds). 
 2. Various newspapers have criticized the use of the privilege by the 
Bush administration.  See, e.g., Ben Wizner, Shielded by Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2008, at A25; Editorial, Balance of Powers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2008, 
at E6; Editorial, Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18. 
 3. See, e.g., The Constitution Project, Reforming the State Secrets 
Privilege (May 31, 2007), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Reforming_ 
the_State_Secrets_Privilege_Statement.pdf; Robert E. Stein, Section of 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York: Report to the House of Delegates, 2007 A.B.A. REVISED REPORT 
116A, available at http://fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aba081307.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National 
 prospects for legislative reform of the privilege, culminating 
recently in the introduction of the State Secrets Protection Act 
(SSPA), a bill that would both codify and reform key aspects of the 
privilege.5 
The SSPA warrants attention both for narrow reasons 
relating to the privilege itself, and broad reasons relating more 
generally to the theory and practice of separation of powers.  From 
the narrow perspective of the state secrets privilege, the SSPA 
would introduce a number of significant changes to current 
practice, including limitations on the government’s ability to 
justify its assertion of the privilege through ex parte submissions 
and its ability to obtain dismissal at the pleading stage of suits 
implicating state secrets.  From the broader perspective of the 
constitutional separation of powers, the SSPA raises difficult 
questions concerning the power of Congress to legislate 
substantive and procedural rules governing the disclosure of 
information relating to national security and diplomacy, and the 
degree of deference, if any, that judges should give to executive 
officials in connection with factual assertions relating to such 
topics. 
I do not propose to resolve all of these issues in this essay.  I 
do hope, however, to enrich the ongoing debate by distinguishing 
that which should be controversial in the SSPA from that which 
should not be, by proposing less problematic solutions in a few 
instances, and by highlighting the relationship of these somewhat 
technical questions to broad background considerations of 
constitutional structure. 
I. A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CONTEXT WITH RECENT 
DEBATES 
The privilege emerged gradually in U.S. jurisprudence during 
the 1800s, reaching maturity only after the Supreme Court 
acknowledged, elaborated, and applied it in its 1953 decision 
 
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (2007); Carrie 
Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through 
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007); Amanda Frost, The 
States Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 
(2007); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive 
Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85 (2005); LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212, 245 
(2006). 
 5. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 United States v. Reynolds.6  In its modern form, the privilege 
attaches when two conditions are met.  It must be asserted with 
the requisite formalities,7 and a judge must be persuaded by the 
government’s assertion that disclosure of the information at issue 
would pose a reasonable risk of harm to national security or 
diplomacy.8  In making that determination, the judge typically 
considers classified affidavits filed by the government on an ex 
parte basis.9  In those cases in which the privilege is asserted with 
respect to a particular document or item, the courts often will also 
examine that item itself on an ex parte basis (though Reynolds 
itself discourages courts from doing this when it can be avoided).10  
Notably, the privilege is absolute rather than qualified and thus, 
 
 6. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  For an overview of the origins and evolution of the 
privilege, see Chesney, supra note 4. 
 7. The privilege can only be asserted by the head of the executive 
department charged with responsibility for the information in question, who 
must undertake a personal review of the matter at issue.  See Reynolds, 345 
U.S. at 7-8. 
 8. See id. at 8-10.  In the petitioner’s brief in Reynolds, the government 
had advanced the view that the government official’s invocation of the 
privilege should be binding upon the court, citing an array of separation of 
powers arguments boiling down to a claim of exclusive executive authority 
under Article II with respect to national security and diplomatic matters.  See 
Brief for the Petitioner at 15-16, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 
82378 (“Our position is that under the doctrine of separation of powers and 
under the statute implementing this doctrine the courts have no power to 
compel the heads of the executive departments to produce such documents . . 
. .”).  The court in Reynolds concluded, however, that “[j]udicial control over 
the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.” 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.  And while it is true that elsewhere in the opinion 
the court stated that the government’s position had “constitutional overtones 
which we find it unnecessary to pass upon,” id. at 6, the conclusion the court 
actually reached regarding the role of the judge in adjudicating an assertion 
of the privilege nonetheless implicitly rejects the claim that judges 
constitutionally are bound to accept executive conclusions with respect to the 
harm that public disclosure might cause in a given case.  See id. at 7-8. 
 9. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1306. 
 10. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11.  The Supreme Court in Reynolds was 
dealing with a tort suit brought by widows whose husbands had died during 
the crash of an Air Force B-29 that had been engaged in a flight to test 
classified radar equipment.  Id. at 2-3.  The privilege issue arose when the 
widows sought production of the Air Force’s post-accident investigative 
report.  Id. at 3.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that there was no need 
to review the report itself to reach the conclusion that public disclosure of the 
details of the radar equipment would be harmful to national security.  See id. 
at 10-11.  Many years later it was revealed, however, that the report did not 
actually contain details relating to the radar equipment in the first place.  
See FISHER, supra note 4, passim. 
 once it attaches, it cannot be overcome.11 
In some contexts application of the privilege merely tends to 
limit discovery, as occurred in Reynolds itself.12  In such cases, the 
significance of the privilege is relatively limited; it functions as a 
ground for resisting discovery requests, permitting the suit to 
continue on the basis of the non-privileged evidence that may be 
available to the parties.  In other contexts, however, the privilege 
can be fatal to the litigation, as where the “very subject matter” of 
the litigation itself constitutes privileged information or litigation 
of the case otherwise necessitates disclosure of such information.13  
The El-Masri extraordinary rendition lawsuit, for example, was 
dismissed on this basis.14 
As noted above, post-9/11 invocations of the privilege have 
generated considerable controversy.15  By and large, criticisms of 
the privilege tend to fall under either or both of two headings.  
First, some contend that that the Bush administration elects to 
resort to the privilege significantly more frequently than did its 
predecessors.16  Framed in its most persuasive terms, this is a 
harmful development not just because it forces more individual 
litigants to suffer injustice in the name of the greater good, but 
also because it tends to shield a greater swath of executive branch 
conduct from judicial review and, hence, from democratic 
accountability.  Second, some contend that apart from numbers, 
the Bush administration has used the privilege in a qualitatively 
different way than its predecessors, invoking it as grounds for 
dismissal at the pleading stage irrespective of whether the 
plaintiff ever would require discovery of protected information 
from the government in order to maintain his or her suit.17  Again, 
the cost is framed in terms both of the burden on individual 
litigants and society’s interest in ensuring that the judiciary is 
available to check unlawful executive branch conduct.18 
I addressed both lines of argument in an earlier article, 
reaching conclusions unlikely to please either the administration 
 
 11. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 12. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 13. See id. at 11 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)). 
 14. See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306. 
 15. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
 16. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
 17. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 4. 
 or its critics.19  On one hand, I concluded that the quantitative 
and qualitative critiques are mistaken insofar as they attribute 
the harms associated with the privilege to the Bush 
administration in particular.20  Quantitative criticisms—that is, 
claims that the Bush administration has misused the privilege by 
invoking it with greater frequency than in the past—are 
misguided primarily because the number of suits potentially 
implicating the privilege vary from year to year, and thus there is 
no reason to expect the number of invocations to remain constant, 
or even relatively so, over time.21  Qualitative claims—that is, 
claims that the Bush administration is attempting to use the 
privilege in unprecedented contexts or in search of unprecedented 
forms of relief—also do not withstand scrutiny.22  The fact of the 
matter is that the privilege has had a similarly harsh impact on 
litigants for decades.23 
On the other hand, I also recognized that cautious legislative 
reform might be possible and appropriate in this area, particularly 
in light of the rule of law and democratic accountability issues 
bound up in some uses of the privilege.24  “To say that the 
privilege has long been with us and has long been harsh is not to 
say . . . that it is desirable to continue with the status quo.”25  The 
real question, then, is how to craft reforms that will improve the 
lot of meritorious litigants and enhance compliance with the rule 
of law while simultaneously preserving legitimate national 
security and diplomatic interests. 
II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REFORM THE PRIVILEGE 
Before examining the particular ways in which the SSPA 
seeks to achieve the aforementioned goals, it is worth pausing to 
 
 19. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1301-07. 
 20. See id. at 1307. 
 21. We also have no way of knowing with confidence how many privilege 
invocations actually occurred in any given year, under this administration or 
its predecessors.  Many invocations do ultimately result in published judicial 
opinions, but not all do so.  Numerical claims therefore have to be taken with 
a rather large grain of salt.  I say that advisedly, having provided in my own 
article a table identifying all of the published opinions adjudicating state 
secrets claims between 1954 and 2006.  See id. at 1315-32. 
 22. See id. at 1306-07. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 1308. 
 25. Id. 
 ask whether there are limits to the power of Congress to reform 
the state secrets privilege. 
Everyone agrees that there is a state secrets privilege, but 
there is sharp disagreement with respect to its actual nature.  
Those who favor reform tend to describe it as a mere evidentiary 
rule adopted by judges through the common law process, a 
conclusion suggesting plenary legislative power to amend or even 
eliminate the privilege.26  From this perspective, the question of 
legislative authority in this context is merely an extension of the 
well-settled principle that Congress has “power under Article I, 
Section 8 and Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution to 
prescribe regulations concerning the taking of evidence in the 
federal courts.”27 
Others take the view that the privilege is not mere common 
law creation, but instead a constitutionally-required doctrine 
emanating from Article II, with the consequence that Congress 
either cannot modify the privilege or at least is significantly 
constrained in doing so.28  In this account, “the privilege is rooted 
in the constitutional authority of the President as Commander in 
Chief and representative of the Nation in foreign affairs to protect 
the national security of the United States,”29 and “is not merely a 
common law evidentiary privilege subject to plenary regulation by 
Congress.”30 
 
 26. See, e.g., State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing 
on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Kevin S. Bankston) (“The 
state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege . . . well established in the 
law of evidence, not in Constitutional law . . . it is well within Congress’s 
prerogative to reform the common law of evidence by statute.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 27. State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on 
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald). 
 28. See State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on 
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 10  (2008) (statement of Patrick F. Philbin). 
 29. State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on 
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald). 
 30. Id. 
 The best explanation, arguably, incorporates both 
perspectives.  As a historical matter, there is little doubt that the 
privilege emerged as a common law evidentiary rule, very much as 
did the attorney-client privilege and similar rules that function to 
exclude from litigation otherwise-relevant information in order to 
serve a higher public purpose.31  It does not follow, however, that 
the privilege has no constitutionally-required aspect.  In at least 
some circumstances, for example, the state secrets privilege 
conceptually overlaps with executive privilege—a doctrine 
explicitly derived from constitutional considerations.32  And 
although executive privilege is merely a qualified rather than an 
absolute privilege in most contexts, the Supreme Court did go out 
of its way in United States v. Nixon to raise the possibility that the 
answer might differ with respect to an assertion of executive 
privilege pertaining to military or diplomatic secrets.33 
In any event, let us assume for the sake of argument that the 
state secrets privilege serves constitutionally-protected values 
relating to the executive branch’s national security and diplomatic 
functions.  Would it follow that Congress is disabled from 
regulating in this area?  It is not obvious that it would.  Indeed, 
some forms of regulation would seem clearly to remain within the 
control of Congress in the exercise of the authorities mentioned 
above, even if other forms of legislation might prove more 
controversial.  The key is to distinguish between legislation 
regulating the process by which privilege assertions are to be 
adjudicated, and legislation that functions to override or waive the 
privilege itself. 
 
 31. For an account of the emergence of the privilege, highlighting the role 
that influential treatise writers played in constructing and spreading 
awareness of the concept in the 1800s, see Chesney, supra note 4, at 1270-80.  
For a different perspective, one that emphasizes the British experience with a 
comparable doctrine, see William G. Weaver & Danielle Escontrias, Origins 
of the State Secrets Privilege (on file with author), available at http:// 
works.bepress.com/william_weaver/1/. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974); 
Attorney General Janet Reno, Memorandum for the President: Assertion of 
Executive Privilege for Documents Concerning Conduct of Foreign Affairs 
with Respect to Haiti (Sep. 20, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov 
/olc/haitipot.htm; Morton Rosenberg, CRS Report for Congress: Presidential 
Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent 
Developments (Sep. 17, 2007), at 1, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy 
/RL30319.pdf. 
 33. 418 U.S. at 706, 710. 
 At a minimum, Congress should have authority to regulate 
the process through which assertions of the privilege are 
adjudicated.  This would include, for example, the power to codify 
prerequisites to the assertion of the privilege (such as the 
Reynolds requirement that the privilege be invoked by the head of 
the relevant department based on personal consideration of the 
matter)34 or to require particular procedures to be followed by the 
court in the course of resolving the government’s invocation.  
Whether Congress should be able to override the privilege once it 
attaches—for example, by compelling the executive branch to 
choose between conceding liability in civil litigation and disclosure 
of privileged information in a public setting—is far less clear. That 
question may be academic, however, at least so far as the SSPA is 
concerned.  A close review of the bill suggests that most if not all 
of its provisions are best viewed as process regulations. 
It does not follow, of course, that all the changes contemplated 
in the SSPA are wise.  On the contrary, there are at least a few 
elements in the bill that go too far in seeking to ameliorate the 
impact of the privilege.  Congress may have the authority to adopt 
these measures notwithstanding the competing constitutional 
values involved, but it is advisable to emphasize less-intrusive 
reform options whenever possible. 
III. THE SSPA IN COMPARISON TO THE STATUS QUO 
Perhaps the best way to come to grips with the SSPA is to 
compare its provisions to current practices relating to the 
privilege, with an eye towards distinguishing that which is mere 
codification of the status quo from that which constitutes a 
substantial change.  It helps, moreover, to conduct this 
comparison in a way that corresponds to the conceptual sequence 
of questions a judge must resolve when confronted with an 
invocation of the privilege. This approach demonstrates that a 
substantial part of the SSPA merely codifies practices that either 
are required or at least are common under the status quo, and 
should not be objectionable now.  That said, there are a few 
aspects of the legislation that constitute significant breaks with 
current practice.  Those provisions warrant more careful 
consideration.  In a few instances, there are alternative 
approaches that might strike a better—and more sustainable—
 
 34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953). 
 balance among the competing equities. 
A.   The Formalities of Invoking the Privilege 
The threshold question in any state secrets privilege scenario 
is whether the privilege has been invoked with the requisite 
formalities.  In theory, such requirements serve to reduce the risk 
that the privilege will be invoked gratuitously.  The SSPA does not 
introduce any significant innovations under this heading, but 
rather codifies existing practice. 
Under the SSPA, “the United States shall provide the court 
with an affidavit signed by the head of the executive branch 
agency with responsibility for, and control over, the state secrets 
involved explaining the factual basis for the claim of privilege.”35  
This closely tracks current practice.  Reynolds requires a “formal 
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has 
control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by 
that officer.”36  Both the SSPA and current practice, moreover, 
limit invocation of the privilege to the United States.37 
B. The Substantive Test for Application of the Privilege 
The substantive scope of the state secrets privilege is a 
function of three variables: subject matter, magnitude of harm 
that might follow from public disclosure, and the degree of risk 
that such harm might be realized.  Though there is room for 
disagreement on this point, the best view is that the SSPA does 
not depart significantly from the status quo with respect to any of 
these three variables. 
Consider first the question of subject matter.  Under the 
SSPA, information must relate to “national defense or foreign 
relations” in order to qualify for privilege.38  The status quo at 
least arguably encompasses a similar range of topics.39 
The next question is whether the SSPA tracks the status quo 
with respect to the magnitude of harm that might follow from 
 
 35. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(b) 
(2008). 
 36. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8. 
 37. Compare S. 2533, § 4054(a) with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
 38. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051. 
 39. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1315-32 (specifying nature of 
information at issue in published state secrets adjudications between 1954 
and 2006). 
 public disclosure of the information in question.  The SSPA frames 
the inquiry in terms of “significant harm.”40  There is no 
comparable terminology in Reynolds, nor has any standard 
terminology on this question of calibration emerged in that case’s 
progeny.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to view the “significant harm” 
standard as a meaningful change from the status quo.  Reynolds 
itself admonished that the privilege was “not to be lightly 
invoked,”41 implying that de minimus harms should not come 
within its scope. 
The third issue under this heading concerns the probability 
that disclosure of the information actually will precipitate the 
feared harm.  Under both the status quo and the SSPA, that 
variable is framed in terms of “reasonable” risk.42 
C. Authority to Decide Whether the Privilege Attaches: The Role 
of the Judge and the Question of Deference 
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Reynolds, the government 
had contended, that “the power of determination is the Secretary’s 
alone.”43  That is to say, the government argued that courts 
cannot and should not second-guess the determination of the 
relevant executive branch official that disclosure of the 
information in question would be harmful.44  Among other things, 
the government reasoned that executive officials are far better 
situated than judges to assess the probable consequences of a 
disclosure.45  On the other hand, unchecked authority to assert 
the privilege naturally would give rise to assert the privilege in 
 
 40. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051. 
 41. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
 42. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051 (“[T]he term ‘state 
secrets’ refers to any information that, if disclosed publicly, would be 
reasonably likely to cause significant harm to the national defense or foreign 
relations of the United States.”) (emphasis added). Reynolds actually is vague 
with respect to the question of how strong the likelihood of harm from 
disclosure must be (most of its discussion of risk concerns the distinct 
question of whether and when judges should personally examine allegedly 
privileged documents en route to making a decision on the privilege), but 
courts nonetheless appear to understand Reynolds to require a reasonable-
risk standard.  See, e.g., El–Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th 
Cir. 2007). 
 43. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 47. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. (stating that the government’s position rests in part “on 
reasons of policy arising from the fact that the department head alone is truly 
qualified and in a position to make the determination”). 
 circumstances where the substantive standard is not met, whether 
out of an excess of caution or even as a shield for misfeasance.  
The Supreme Court ultimately gave greater weight to that 
offsetting concern, holding in Reynolds that “[j]udicial control over 
the evidence in the case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of 
executive officers,” and insisting that the judge have the final say 
with respect to whether the privilege attaches.46 
This general principle is no longer seriously contested, but the 
relative authority of the judge and the executive branch 
nonetheless continues to be a matter of controversy because of 
lingering questions regarding how much deference the judge 
should give to the executive’s claim, even if the claim is not 
strictly binding.47  In El-Masri, for example, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the “court is obliged to accord the ‘utmost 
deference’ to the responsibilities of the executive branch” when 
determining the harm that might follow from a disclosure.48  Such 
deference was owed both “for constitutional reasons” and for 
“practical ones: the Executive and the intelligence agencies under 
his control occupy a position superior to that of the courts in 
evaluating the consequences of a release of sensitive 
information.”49  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit stated in Al-
Haramain that it “acknowledge[d] the need to defer to the 
Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and 
surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the 
Executive in this arena.”50  In light of such statements, some 
might argue that judges have final authority to determine the 
applicability of the privilege only in formal terms, while the 
mechanism of deference shifts that authority back to the executive 
branch in practical terms. 
The SSPA codifies the status quo insofar as it plainly 
contemplates that the judge shall have the ultimate responsibility 
for determining whether the privilege should attach.51  In its 
 
 46. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10. 
 47. See, e.g., El-Marsi v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“The Executive bears the burden of satisfying a reviewing court that the 
Reynolds reasonable-danger standard is met.”). 
 48. Id.  (quoting U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 51. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(e) 
(2008) (describing the judge’s role in determining whether the privilege 
 current form, however, it makes no attempt to regulate the degree 
of deference, if any, that judges should give to the executive 
branch’s judgment regarding the consequences of a disclosure. 
D.  The Mechanics of the Judge’s Review: Evidentiary Basis for 
the Ruling 
1.   When Specific Documents Are in Issue 
The paradigm state secrets privilege scenario involves an 
attempt by a private litigant to obtain a particular item during 
discovery, as occurred with respect to the post-accident 
investigative report in Reynolds.52  When the government claims 
privilege in that context, it typically justifies its assertion with an 
explanatory affidavit from the official asserting the privilege.53  
But should the judge also review the item in question in the 
course of determining whether the privilege should apply? 
The SSPA departs from the status quo to a small extent with 
respect to this issue. Under the SSPA, judges not only can, but 
must review the actual item of evidence.54  Under the status quo, 
in contrast, they are expressly admonished in Reynolds to be 
reluctant to require such in camera production unless the litigant 
has shown great need for the document.55 
The SSPA’s requirement of in camera disclosure reflects a 
lesson derived from the original Reynolds litigation.  Famously, 
the plaintiffs in Reynolds had sought production of an Air Force 
post-accident investigative report in connection with their tort 
suit, prompting the government to invoke the state secrets 
privilege on the ground that the report contained details of 
classified radar equipment.56  The Supreme Court concluded such 
details could not be disclosed publicly, which is a plausible 
conclusion under the substantive test described above.57  Although 
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 52. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 (1953). 
 53. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1202 (referring to “classified and 
unclassified declarations” filed by the Director of National Intelligence and 
the Director of the NSA). 
 54. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(d)(1) (requiring the 
United States to submit for the court’s review not only an explanatory 
affidavit but also all evidence as to which the privilege has been asserted). 
 55. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12. 
 56. See id. at 3-4. 
 57. Id. at 12. 
 it did not follow that the accident report necessarily contained 
such details, the court assumed that it did and found the privilege 
applicable on that basis.58  Notoriously, it turned out much later 
that the report did not contain substantial details about the 
radar.59  Thus conventional wisdom holds that the privilege ought 
not to have been invoked on that basis, something that almost 
certainly would have been revealed by judicial inspection of the 
document.60 
Reynolds thus has come to stand for an important, common-
sense proposition: where the privilege is asserted in connection 
with a particular document the government seeks to withhold 
from discovery, the judge should ensure that the item in question 
actually contains the allegedly-sensitive information said by the 
government to warrant application of the privilege.  It is 
important to note, however, that this type of mistake does not 
seem to occur frequently under the state secret privilege today.  
Notwithstanding language in Reynolds cautioning judges not to 
conduct in camera inspections unnecessarily, courts today 
routinely do examine documents personally in an effort to 
determine whether the privilege should attach.61  The change that 
would be wrought by the SSPA on this issue, accordingly, is to 
remove any question as to whether this should be done. 
2. When Abstract Information Is in Issue 
Not every invocation of the privilege arises in connection with 
requests for production of specific documents or records capable of 
being inspected.  The government may also have occasion to 
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 61. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (“We reviewed the Sealed 
Document in camera . . . )”. 
 invoke the privilege in connection with discovery requests seeking 
protected information in the abstract, as with an interrogatory or 
a deposition question.  In such cases there is no specific document 
or item for the court to review, other than the explanation offered 
by the government in the form of an affidavit from the official 
asserting the privilege.  In that respect, the SSPA’s requirement 
that such an affidavit be submitted merely codifies the status 
quo.62 
3. When Pleading Would Require Revelation of Privileged 
Information 
A similar scenario arises at the pleading stage when the 
allegations in a complaint would reveal state secrets if admitted or 
denied.  Here, however, the SSPA introduces a useful innovation 
that functions to put off the question of whether the privilege 
properly applies to the information at issue.  Under SSPA § 
4053(c), the government may simply plead the privilege in 
response to such allegations, rather than admitting or denying 
them as otherwise required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(b).63  The allegation(s) in question presumably then would be 
deemed denied,64 without any need for the judge at that stage to 
consider whether the privilege in fact attaches to the information 
at issue.  Arguably the government could have achieved the same 
result under the status quo by objecting on privilege grounds to 
particular allegations in a complaint, though it is not clear that 
the government ever pursued such a course.  In any event, this 
aspect of the SSPA at a minimum is a useful clarification, even if 
not an outright alteration of what is permitted under current 
 
 62. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(b).  In that sense, 
the SSPA’s adoption of an affidavit requirement is unexceptionable.  But 
there is a problem with respect to the related requirement that the classified 
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 practice. 
E. The Mechanics of the Judge’s Review: Ex Parte and In 
Camera Procedures 
When reviewing the government’s invocation of the privilege, 
should the judge permit the government to submit some or all of 
its explanation on an in camera, ex parte basis?  In current 
practice, the government routinely submits classified documents 
and affidavits on an ex parte basis in the course of asserting the 
privilege.65  The court alone reviews these submissions; they are 
not made available to opposing counsel.66  As a result, the process 
of determining whether the privilege attaches is in an important 
sense non-adversarial.  This approach is optimal from the 
perspective of ensuring against an improper disclosure of the 
information, but it is far from optimal from the perspective of 
ensuring against inaccurate determinations by the court. 
Both values are substantial.  The question, therefore, is 
whether there are solutions that would sufficiently preserve the 
government’s interest in security while simultaneously reducing 
the risk of error by introducing elements of adversariality in the 
review process.  In a major departure from the status quo, the 
SSPA seeks to accomplish precisely this. 
1. Ex Parte Proceedings 
The SSPA would break with current practice significantly by 
limiting the ability of the government to justify its invocation of 
the privilege through ex parte submissions.  First, § 4052(a)(3) 
recognizes that the judge has discretion as to whether ex parte 
submissions will be allowed at all, subject to the “interests of 
justice and national security.”67  There is little doubt that judges 
in most cases would exercise this authority wisely.68  Even if the 
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 judge decides to permit ex parte filings in the first instance, 
however, § 4052(c)(1) appears to ensure that before ruling upon 
the government’s invocation of the privilege, the otherwise ex 
parte filings will be subject to at least some degree of adversarial 
testing: 
A Federal court shall, at the request of the United States, 
limit participation in hearings conducted under this 
chapter, or access to motions or affidavits submitted 
under this chapter, to attorneys with appropriate security 
clearances, if the court determines that limiting 
participation in that manner would serve the interests of 
national security. The court may also appoint a guardian 
ad litem with the necessary security clearances to 
represent any party for the purposes of any hearing 
conducted under this chapter.69 
There is considerable wisdom in injecting some degree of 
adversariality into the ex parte portion of the privilege 
adjudication process.  The trick, however, is to manage this 
without undermining the overriding goal of ensuring that there is 
no disclosure of the assertedly-protected information unless and 
until the judge determines that it is not in fact protected.  Under 
the SSPA approach, the parties’ own attorneys might be given 
direct access to the government’s most sensitive secrets prior to 
determining whether they are in fact privileged. This goes too far, 
assuming that there are less intrusive alternatives available that 
might also address the accuracy considerations described above.  
And, as noted above, § 4052(c)(1) actually contains such a middle 
 
Act (CIPA) permits but does not on its face require the government to submit 
its filings ex parte.  See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 3, § 4 (1980).  That said, it 
appears that no court has ever barred the government from making its 
application ex parte.  See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL 
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 24.7 (2007) (observing that 
“[a]lthough this procedure denies the defendant the ability to make a 
meaningful challenge to the government’s arguments, no court in a published 
decision has prevented the government from filing its Section 4 application ex 
parte and in camera.”).   This suggests that judges can be trusted not to act 
rashly, but perhaps also that there is little point in providing an option to bar 
such filings.  CIPA § 6 hearings, in contrast, are required to be in camera but 
are not normally ex parte.  See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a).  Such hearings 
arise in a distinguishable context, however, insofar as the defendant in that 
scenario already possesses classified information, information that the 
government seeks to suppress. 
 69. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(c)(1). 
 ground alternative, in the form of a guardian ad litem 
mechanism.70 
The guardian ad litem approach has the virtue of ensuring at 
least some degree of adversarial testing, while reducing the risk of 
a leak (to the parties themselves or to the public at large) in 
comparison to having the party’s own attorneys involved.  For this 
reason, other countries are experimenting with precisely this 
approach in analogous contexts.  Canada, for example, recently 
adopted a “special advocate” system in which attorneys are 
appointed for the specific purpose of contesting otherwise ex parte 
information used by the government in connection with removal of 
non-citizens from the country.71  The U.K. has a comparable 
system, originally designed for comparable immigration 
removals.72  Unlike the SSPA’s guardian mechanism, however, 
the Canadian system does not allow the court to appoint just any 
attorney to this sensitive role, but instead requires the appointee 
to be chosen from a pre-determined list of screened and qualified 
individuals.73 
In order to strike a more reasonable and sustainable balance 
between the competing equities at stake in this sensitive context, 
§ 4052(c) should be amended to focus attention on the guardian 
mechanism as a solution to the adversariality problem (that is to 
say, the more extreme alternative of ordering the government to 
provide access directly to the parties’ attorneys should be 
removed).  At the same time, the guardian mechanism should be 
amended to create a pre-selected list of attorneys eligible for such 
an appointment.  Such a list could be created by the Chief Justice 
of the United States, for example, and following the Canadian 
example might also involve substantial training for the potential 
appointees.74  This solution is not ideal from the litigant’s 
perspective, but even from that viewpoint it does constitute a 
 
 70. See id. 
 71. See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to 
another Act, B. C-3, 39th Parliament, 2nd Sess. (2007) (as reported by Comm. 
on Pub. Safety and Nat’l Sec., Dec. 10, 2007) available at http://www2. 
parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/392/Government/C-3/C-3_2/C-3_2.PDF. 
 72. Special Immigration Appeals Act, 1997, c. 68, § 6 (Eng.). 
 73. See supra note 71, at B, C-3, § 85. 
 74. See Richard Foot, Lawyers Line Up To Become Special “Terror” 
Advocates, NAT. POST., Feb. 17, 2008, available at http://www.nationalpost 
.com/news/canada/story.html?id=315669. 
 substantial improvement over the status quo.75 
2.    In Camera Proceedings 
Beyond the question of whether filings and arguments will 
take place on an ex parte basis is the question of whether and 
when privilege litigation should take place in camera, without 
public access.76  Under the status quo, judges typically employ a 
blend of ordinary and in camera procedures when adjudicating an 
assertion of the privilege.77 
The impact SSPA § 4052(b)(1) would have on this practice is 
unclear but it will likely not constitute a significant departure 
from the status quo. This section establishes a default 
presumption that hearings concerning the state secrets privilege 
will be conducted in camera, and permits public access only “if the 
court determines that the hearing relates only to a question of law 
and does not present a risk of revealing state secrets.”78 
F. The Mechanics of the Judge’s Review: Special Masters 
One of the core difficulties associated with judicial review of 
the state secrets privilege involves the question of expertise.  
Critics of the status quo argue that judges in practice merely 
rubber-stamp executive invocations of the privilege because the 
judges do not feel confident that they can evaluate the executive’s 
claims regarding the impact of disclosure on security or 
diplomacy,79 while others draw on the same notions to contend 
that judges should in fact be extremely, if not entirely, 
deferential.80  And certainly it is true that a federal judge on 
average will not be as well-situated in terms of experience and 
fact-gathering resources as the Director of National Intelligence or 
 
 75. It is worth noting, in that regard, that nothing comparable is 
available to criminal defendants—whose very liberty is at stake—in the 
analogous context of § 4 proceedings under the CIPA, in which ex parte 
review is the rule. See supra note 68. 
 76. An in camera procedure is not necessarily ex parte, though the two 
concepts are conflated often.  See, e.g., CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 4, § 6(a). 
 77. See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 
1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting courts consideration of ex parte 
submissions in addition to public filings). 
 78. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(b)(1). 
 79. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 167-68. 
 80. See Nichols, supra note 60. 
 the Secretary of State to assess such impacts.81  At the same time, 
Reynolds itself acknowledges that the judge has ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring the validity and propriety of privilege 
assertions, lest the privilege become a temptation to abuse.82 
The tension between these values appears intractable at first 
glance, but there are mechanisms for ameliorating the problem.  
Some scholars point out, for example, that judges currently have 
authority to appoint expert advisers such as special masters under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and independent experts under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 706.83  Section 4052(f) of the SSPA 
would clarify that such authorities in fact can be used in 
connection with state secrets litigation, an approach that may 
prove particularly valuable in cases involving assertion of the 
privilege with respect to voluminous materials.84 
G. Consequences Once the Privilege Attaches: Substitutions 
SSPA § 4054(f) provides that where the privilege attaches, 
courts should consider whether it is “possible to craft a non-
privileged substitute” that provides “a substantially equivalent 
opportunity to litigate the claim or defense.”85  Drawing on the 
model set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA) § 6,86 the SSPA goes on to specify several options that 
might be used in that context, including an unclassified summary, 
a redacted version of a particular item of evidence, and a 
statement of admitted facts.87  Where the court believes that such 
an alternative is available, it may order the United States to 
produce it in lieu of the protected information.88  The U.S. must 
comply with such an order if the issue arises in a suit to which the 
 
 81. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (“[W]e acknowledge the need 
to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security 
and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive 
in this arena.”). 
 82. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953). 
 83. See, e.g., Meredith Fuchs & G. Gregg Webb, Greasing the Wheels of 
Justice: Independent Experts in National Security Cases, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. REP. 1, 3-5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/nat 
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 84. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(f). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 6. 
 87. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533m, 110th Cong. § 4052(f) (2008). 
 88. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(f)(1)-(3). 
 U.S. is a party (or a U.S. official is a party in his or her official 
capacity), or else “the court shall resolve the disputed issue of fact 
or law to which the evidence pertains in the non-government 
party’s favor.”89 
It is not clear that any of these provisions depart from what a 
court could order even in the absence of the SSPA.  But in any 
event, it is certainly advisable to codify the judge’s obligation to 
exhaust options that would permit relevant and otherwise-
admissible information to be used without actually compelling 
disclosure of that which is subject to the protection of the 
privilege. 
H.  Consequences Once the Privilege Attaches: Ending Litigation 
The most controversial aspect of current doctrine may well be 
the sometimes fatal impact it has on litigation once the privilege is 
found to attach to some item of evidence or information.  As 
discussed earlier, this phenomenon is not new.  The government 
has moved to dismiss (or in the alternative for summary 
judgment) in these circumstances with some frequency since the 
1950s, and such motions frequently have been granted.90  But the 
use of this approach in high-profile post-9/11 cases—particularly 
those relating to NSA surveillance and to rendition—has proven 
especially controversial, drawing attention to the fact that 
application of the state secrets privilege can have harsh 
consequences for litigants even where the litigants allege unlawful 
government conduct.91 Accordingly, one of the most important 
questions associated with the SSPA is whether it would limit the 
set of circumstances in which application of the privilege proves 
fatal to a suit. 
1.  When Denial of Discovery Precipitates Summary Judgment 
Under current doctrine, application of the privilege can prove 
fatal to a suit in more than one way.  First, the privilege may 
function to deprive a litigant of evidence needed in order to create 
 
 89. Id. § 4054(g).  No sanction is provided by the SSPA for scenarios in 
which the U.S. is merely an intervenor.  See id. 
 90. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1306-07, 1315-32. 
 91. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (denying motion to dismiss suit relating to NSA activity on state 
secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) 
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 a triable issue of fact, and hence survive a summary judgment 
motion. 
Let us assume that a judge has denied a discovery request 
based on the state secrets privilege.  If it so happens that the 
plaintiff has no other admissible evidence sufficient to raise a 
triable issue of fact with respect to a necessary element of his or 
her claim, this discovery ruling necessarily exposes that plaintiff 
to summary judgment under Rule 56.92  In that setting, the Rule 
56 ruling conceptually is subsequent to the state secrets ruling, 
rather than based directly on it.  The discovery ruling is no less 
fatal to the plaintiff’s case for that, however, and if the motions 
happen to be adjudicated simultaneously, it might even appear 
that the court has granted summary judgment “on” state secrets 
grounds.  It does not appear that the SSPA is intended to alter the 
outcome in this scenario, though it might be wise to clarify that 
this is so in the text of the legislation. 
2. When the Government Must Choose Between Disclosing 
Protected Information and Presenting a Defense 
A second scenario that can prove fatal to a claim under 
current doctrine arises when the government would be obliged to 
reveal protected information in order to present a defense to a 
claim.  This scenario differs from the first in that the plaintiff may 
be able to survive summary judgment with the evidence it has 
assembled.  The problem here is not the plaintiff’s efforts to 
acquire evidence, then, but the fact that the government must opt 
between presenting a defense and maintaining the secrecy of 
protected information.  In that setting, current doctrine provides 
for dismissal on state secrets grounds. 
In some senses, the SSPA codifies this result.  Under § 4055 a 
judge may dismiss a claim on privilege grounds upon a 
determination that litigation in the absence of the privileged 
information “would substantially impair the ability of a party to 
pursue a valid defense,”93 and that there is no viable option for 
creating a non-privileged substitute that would provide a 
“substantially equivalent opportunity to litigate” the issue.94  But 
 
 92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 93. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4055(3). 
 94. Id. § 4055(1).  For what it is worth, § 4055(2) also requires a finding 
that dismissal of the claim or counterclaim “would not harm national 
 § 4055 also mandates that the judge first review “all available 
evidence, privileged and non-privileged” before determining 
whether the “valid defense” standard has been met.95  This 
suggests that the judge is not merely to assess the legal 
sufficiency of the defense (assuming the truth of the government’s 
version of events, in a style akin to adjudication of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion), but instead is to resolve the actual merits of the defense 
(including resolution of related factual disputes).96  If that is the 
correct interpretation, it would seem to follow that § 4055 
contemplates a mini-trial on the merits of the defense.97 
The problem with this approach is that the court may or may 
not permit the use of ex parte and in camera procedures in this 
context.98  Denying either protection (but especially the latter) 
would put the government on the horns of a dilemma, forcing it to 
choose between waiving a potentially-meritorious defense, and 
revealing privileged information to persons other than the judge 
even in the face of the judge’s conclusion that the information is 
subject to the privilege.  This approach is questionable from a 
policy perspective insofar as it would force the government to elect 
between partial or even complete exposure of concededly protected 
information and the loss of a meritorious defense and hence 
potential civil liability (including injunctive as well as financial 
consequences).  And for similar reasons, this approach presumably 
will precipitate constitutional objections as well.  At a minimum, 
therefore, § 4055 should be amended to provide that the judge’s 
assessment of the merits of a defense must take place on an in 
camera basis.  Any move away from ex parte procedures in this 
context, moreover, should be limited to the modified guardian-ad-
litem mechanism recommended above.  Beyond that, it might also 
be wise to structure the judge’s review of the defense at issue in 
terms of a Rule 12(b)(6)-style legal-sufficiency inquiry rather than 
as a mini-trial.99 
 
security.”  Id. 
 95. See id. § 4055. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
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 3.   When the Very Subject Matter of the Action Implicates State 
Secrets 
One scenario remains.  Under current doctrine, “some matters 
are so pervaded by state secrets as to be incapable of judicial 
resolution once the privilege has been invoked.”100  The idea here 
is not that certain discovery should be denied to the plaintiff, nor 
that the government has a defense it could present if only it were 
not necessary to preserve certain secrets.  Rather, the notion is 
that some types of claims are not actionable as a matter of law 
because they inevitably would require disclosure or confirmation 
of state secrets in order to be properly adjudicated.  Under this 
approach, a suit may be dismissed at the pleading stage even if 
the plaintiff could have assembled sufficient evidence to create 
triable issues of fact on all the necessary elements of a claim, and 
even if the government is not prevented by its secrecy obligation 
from presenting a defense to that claim.  Not surprisingly, this is 
the most controversial dismissal scenario in current doctrine. 
The SSPA overrides this result in the narrow sense that it 
permits suits to survive that under current doctrine would have 
been dismissed at the very outset.  First, as noted above, the 
SSPA permits the government to avoid affirming or denying 
sensitive fact allegations by citing the privilege in its responsive 
pleading.101  Second, § 4053(b) plainly states that “the state 
secrets privilege shall not constitute grounds for dismissal of a 
case or claim” unless, as described above, the government has a 
“valid defense” it would present but for privilege concerns.102  
Taken together, these provisions require cases in what might be 
called the “very subject matter”103 category to go forward at least 
to the discovery stage. 
Ultimately, however, the SSPA will not necessarily spare such 
suits from dismissal.  During the course of discovery, the privilege 
remains wholly functional as a shield against production of 
protected documents or information, which may expose the 
plaintiff to summary judgment in the end. The SSPA expressly 
authorizes the government to use the privilege as a sword, 
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 moreover, enhancing the prospects for dismissal in the “very 
subject matter” scenario.104  Specifically, § 4054(a) states that the 
government may not only use the privilege to resist discovery, but 
also “for preventing the introduction of evidence at trial.”105  Much 
turns on the interpretation of this language. 
This language appears to allow the government to move to 
suppress otherwise-admissible evidence in the plaintiff’s 
possession, on state secrets grounds.  In that case, a plaintiff who 
is otherwise able to assemble sufficient evidence to create a triable 
issue of fact without discovery from the government, nonetheless, 
may find himself or herself without critical evidence at trial, 
necessitating judgment in the government’s favor.  The only 
question then would be whether the government must await the 
plaintiff’s case-in-chief in order to exercise this suppression power, 
setting the stage for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 
50(a), or if it, instead, could exercise this option prior to trial and 
thus proceed under Rule 56.106  The language of § 4054(a) 
suggests the former, but if the option is to be allowed at all it 
makes far more sense from an efficiency perspective to permit pre-
trial resolution.107  Section 4054(a) accordingly should be 
amended to say as much.108 
The important point is that the “sword” aspect of § 4054(a)109 
will likely produce an end result comparable to that under the 
current doctrine’s “very subject matter” line of cases.110  The 
difference, which is by no means unimportant, is that under the 
SSPA the litigation process will proceed through the pleading and 
discovery stages, with the privilege being wielded as a scalpel 
rather than a bludgeon.  Combined with the other procedural 
elements of the SSPA—including especially the role of special 
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United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)). 
 masters, guardians-ad-litem, and the emphasis on finding 
substitutions when possible—the net effect of this 
“proceduralization” of the privilege should ensure more careful 
tailoring to the facts and evidence in a particular case.  This in 
turn should reduce the risk of erroneous application (and thus 
injustice).  Though this benefit will come at the cost of increased 
litigation expense and complexity, it is a cost that is most likely 
worth bearing.  At the very least, the experiment is worth 
undertaking. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The SSPA will not entirely please either critics or supporters 
of the state secrets status quo.  By subjecting the privilege to a 
more rigorous procedural framework, the SSPA may reduce the 
range of cases in which the privilege is found to apply, and in 
some respects it may cause marginal increases in the risk that 
sensitive information will be disclosed (though with the 
amendments proposed above such risks would be significantly 
diminished).  On the other hand, even under the SSPA, the 
privilege will continue to have a harsh impact on litigants who 
bring claims that implicate protected information: discovery will 
still be denied, complaints will still be dismissed, and summary 
judgment will still be granted.  Such tradeoffs are inevitable, 
however, in crafting legislation designed to reconcile such 
important public values as national security, access to justice, and 
democratic accountability.  The SSPA has its flaws, to be sure, but 
subject to the caveats noted above it marks an important step 
forward in the ongoing evolution of the state secrets privilege. 
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Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against 
All Odds: Major Mori and the Legal 
Team for David Hicks at Guantánamo 
Bay 
Ellen Yaroshefsky* 
David Hicks, an Australian citizen, was detained in 
Afghanistan in December of 2001 and brought to Guantánamo 
Bay (Gitmo) in January of 2002.  He was denied access to military 
and civilian lawyers for nearly two years, but eventually was 
permitted to have counsel only because the government believed 
that a lawyer would help secure a guilty plea,1 and David agreed 
not to discuss the conditions of his captivity.2  Eventually, more 
than five years later, and as a consequence of an international 
political campaign, he was charged and pleaded guilty to material 
support of terrorism for his association with al Qaeda operatives 
in Afghanistan.  He was the first Guantánamo detainee to have 
his case presented to a military commission.  He obtained an 
agreed-upon lenient sentence, served an additional six months, 
and was returned to Australia.  He is now out of custody with 
restrictions that remain in force for one year from the date of 
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 sentence; the most notable restriction is that he will not speak 
publicly about the conditions of confinement. 
This essay describes the remarkable lawyering on behalf of 
David Hicks and demonstrates that zealous and strategic 
advocacy in the face of severe constraints can result in a 
successful resolution, even in a fundamentally unfair system.  
Operating within a structure of ad hoc procedures designed to 
produce guilty verdicts (termed a “rigged system” by many 
observers3), Hicks’ lawyers engaged in advocacy using a carefully 
coordinated legal, political, and media strategy that remained 
fine-tuned  as the legal and political landscape shifted.  Despite 
their firm and continual stance that the system was unauthorized 
by law and fundamentally unjust, Hicks’s lawyers successfully 
maneuvered that system for their client’s benefit.  This essay 
focuses upon Hicks’s most visible and publicly touted attorney, 
Major Michael “Dan” Mori of the Marine Corps.4 
Military lawyers are not typically perceived as being among 
the “brave band” of lawyers and others who go to the edge of the 
law for a “cause.”5  Yet, in this and many other cases, military 
lawyers were often at the edge of the law because zealous 
representation of their clients demanded such action.6  Their jobs 
 
 3. Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems?  The 
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 forced them to confront profound ethical dilemmas, rarely 
confronted by their civilian counterparts.  While lawyers in all 
terrorism-related cases face significant challenges in their ability 
to represent their clients diligently, competently and zealously, 
the limitations on representation before military commissions 
after 9/11 are unparalleled in United States history.7  Under such 
a military commission system, Mori and other military lawyers 
were often unable to obtain evidence or share it with their clients.  
They were subject to a panoply of other restrictions that would be 
unthinkable in a typical court martial or case or courtroom in the 
United States.8 
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Guantánamo Military Commissions’ rules).  See also United States v. Reid, 
214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002) (striking down requirement that defense 
lawyers sign onto SAM’s as a precondition for access to their client); Saudi 
Convicted in Embassy Bombing Sues, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002 (on the 
monitoring of attorney-client communications in over a dozen cases).  For a 
riveting account of GTMO lawyering, see generally CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, 
EIGHT O’CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN 
GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2007). 
 8. One “glaring condition” of the military commissions noted by the 
Supreme Court in its Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision is that “[t]he accused and 
 These commissions were so fundamentally flawed that in 
June 2006 the Supreme Court would find in its landmark 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision that they were both in violation of 
the Uniform Military Code of Justice and Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.9  It found that specific flaws of structure and 
procedure included the admissibility of hearsay and other 
evidence gained through coercion, and the fact that the defendant 
could be barred from hearing all evidence against him or even be 
barred from his own trial.  The Court found that the 
[commissions] were not “regularly constituted courts” as 
understood by the Geneva Conventions.10 
In 2003, a team of lawyers including Mori believed the 
military commissions to be fundamentally flawed, but they could 
not be assured of vindication by a court.  It would be three years 
before the commissions would be struck down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and replaced by yet another roundly criticized 
system.  The Hicks team had a client to represent with the goal of 
his return to his native country. 
This essay traces the lawyering of Major Mori and the Hicks 
team beginning in 2003, when it was an uphill struggle even to 
secure a hearing.  It necessarily details, in chronological order, the 
defense team’s legal, political, and media strategy in confronting a 
government that claimed, as it still does today, that it could 
 
his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning 
what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding that either 
the Appointing Authority or the presiding officer decides to ‘close.’”  Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 614 (2006).  See also Reply to Opposition to 
Petition for Rehearing app. at iv, Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 
(2007) (No. 06-1196) [hereinafter Abraham] (Declaration of Stephen 
Abraham), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/ 
Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf. 
 9. 548 U.S. 577, 577.  The ruling states that Hamdan's military 
commission “lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures 
violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Geneva 
Conventions.”  Id. at 567. 
 10. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, a Judge Advocate General 
officer who had submitted a declaration in a previous suit in 2002, stated 
that, in [their proceedings], “[w]hat were purported to be specific statements 
of fact lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible 
evidence.”  Abraham, supra note 8, at vi.  Moreover, Lt. Colonel Abraham 
noted that there was pressure from above to reach an “enemy combatant” 
verdict in the tribunals, which were often composed of personnel with limited 
or no intelligence experience.  Id. at vii. 
 indefinitely hold detainees without access to a hearing or trial; 
and it addresses the ethics issues these lawyers confronted in 
ultimately securing an extremely favorable resolution for David 
Hicks. 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
David Hicks, a twenty-four year old Australian national, had 
a fairly mundane background and history for a man described by 
President George W. Bush’s administration as among “the worst 
of the worst.”11  Born and raised in Adelaide, Australia, Hicks 
would later be described as a “wanderlust in search of a 
purpose.”12  He did poorly in school and got expelled for trouble 
with drinking and drugs.  He drifted around Australia, working a 
number of jobs, including stints as a kangaroo skinner and a hand 
on cattle ranches.  He tried to join the Australian army but was 
rejected.  After fathering two children with an aboriginal woman, 
he set off to travel the world.13  He went to Japan where he did 
very little except watch television.  One of the ironies of his 
circumstances was that the only English language television 
station was CNN International which covered extensively the 
Balkan wars between the Serbs and Kosovars.  This was the first 
time that David Hicks became interested in international affairs 
and his own brand of heroism: 
I just had something inside that said I had to go and do 
that, like a spur of the moment sort of thing. . . . I found 
out there was one group . . . training in northern Albania.  
 
 11. Katty Kay, No Fast Track at Guantánamo Bay, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2648547.stm (quote attributed 
generally to U.S. officials); Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will Be Freed, 
Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A14; Neil A. Lewis & Eric 
Schmitt, Cuba Detentions May Last Years, NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 13, 2004, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E5D8113AF930A25751
C0A9629C8B63&scp=1&sq=cuba+detentions+may+last+years&st=nyt).  An 
admiral quoted in a Defense Department press release said, “They are the 
worst of the worst, and if let out in the street, they will go back to the 
proclivity of trying to kill Americans and others.”  Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S. 
Gains Custody of More Detainees, DEFENSELINK, Jan. 28, 2002, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43813. 
 12. Raymond Bonner, Australia Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at A7. 
 13. Id. 
 They were going into Kosovo and I realised that maybe, 
at a wild guess, I could go there and try it and I did it.  To 
me that was doing the impossible.14 
In 1999 Hicks went to Albania, joined the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) and completed their basic military training.15  By the 
time Hicks got to Albania, the war was nearly over and he was 
sent home when the peace accord was in place.  When he returned 
to Australia, he began to investigate and later convert to Islam.  
He soon left Australia for Pakistan with names of contacts to 
travel around Asia.16  Traveling to Afghanistan, he was invited to 
attend an Al Qaeda training camp.  Beginning in January of 2001, 
he trained at various Al Qaeda camps.  He spouted anti-U.S. 
rhetoric, supporting the Taliban.  He claimed he met Osama bin 
Laden more than twenty times.17  He left Afghanistan on 
September 9, 2001, went to Pakistan to visit a friend, and watched 
the 9/11 attacks on television.18  He had no advance knowledge of 
the 9/11 attacks.19  He later told the Australian Federal Police, 
“It’s not Islam, is it?  It’s like the opposite of what I was . . . 
wanted to do.  Meant to help the people, stop oppression.  And 
they did the opposite.”20 
On September 12, 2001, Hicks decided to return to 
Afghanistan.  He later said that he wanted to gather his 
belongings.  “It might sound stupid, but I’ve got lots of nice Islamic 
clothes I’d been saving.  There’s lots of money in them with stuff I 
could have had home.”  Had he not gone back, he says, “I would 
have lost my Islam.”21 
Once in Afghanistan, Hicks joined Al Qaeda forces in the 
Kandahar airport.  He was given an automatic rifle and, in 
 
 14. Debbie Whitmont, The Case of David Hicks, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP., 
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1494795.htm. 
 15. See LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 6.51 (these facts—stipulated to by the 
prosecution and defense—were the basis for David Hicks’s ultimate guilty 
plea). 
 16. David Hicks: Nothing but an Echo, CLARK CMTY NETWORK, Jan. 22, 
2007, http://securingamerica.com/ccn/node/10638 [hereinafter Nothing but an 
Echo]. 
 17. He later told Australian federal police that he was “just trying to 
make himself sound important by boasting.”  Id. 
 18. See LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 9.4. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Whitmont, supra note 14. 
 21. Id. 
 October 2001, sent to guard a Taliban tank.22  After moving to 
other locations with Al Qaeda forces, he decided to leave the 
country for Pakistan when the United States closed the borders.  
He sold his weapons to pay for a taxi to Pakistan.23  He was 
picked up by the Northern Alliance24 which sold him to the United 
States for several thousand dollars.25 
Hicks was held on a Navy ship and then blindfolded and 
taken by chopper to an unknown place for interrogation.  He 
claimed that he was brutally beaten and tortured.26  In January 
2002, he was brought to Guantánamo Bay, where the United 
States claimed that he and others could be held indefinitely 
without charge.27  His treatment was severe, but less so than 
other detainees—David was white, Australian, and spoke 
English.28  He became the first plaintiff in what ultimately 
became the landmark case of Rasul v. Bush, which established 
that Guantánamo detainees had the right to judicial review of 
their detention.29 
In December, 2003, nearly two years after his capture, Hicks 
was referred for a military commission.  The authorities believed 
that Hicks would plead guilty, thereby legitimating the 
commissions.30  They permitted him access to counsel solely for 
the purpose of entry of a guilty plea.31 
 
 22. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 6.64. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at  ¶¶ 46-49. 
 25. Bonner, supra note 12. 
 26. “New Evidence” Backs Hicks’s Torture Claim, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP., 
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1494779.htm 
(citing August 5, 2004 affidavit filed by David Hicks’s attorneys). 
 27. LASRY, supra note 2, at 3, 5 (citing the United States government’s 
position in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,466 (2004)). 
 28. Whitmont, supra note 14. 
 29. Hicks was represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights and 
its cooperating attorney, Joseph Margulies.  See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
 30. Interview of Maj. Michael Dan Mori, United States Marine Corps, in 
N.Y., N.Y. (May 3, 2007). 
 31. See infra note 39. 
 LAWYERING IN THE “LEGAL BLACK HOLE”32 
Major Michael Dan Mori of the U.S. Marine Corps is a now-
celebrated military officer who was detailed to represent David 
Hicks.33  In June 2003 Mori returned from his station in Hawaii to 
do so.  Hicks was also represented by FAC (Foreign Attorney 
Consultant) Australian attorney Steve Kenny.34 
Mori entered the case in a “court martial mindset.”35  He 
expected that rules and procedures would be fair and that he 
would be able to obtain the facts and apply the law as he had been 
trained in the JAG corps to understand it.  He was sorely 
surprised as he got into the commission system.  The entire 
structure of the military commissions was, as he put it, “set up 
with a vested interest in convictions.”36  There was no 
independent judge; hearsay was permitted, as was evidence 
 
 32. The press uses this term extensively.  See, e.g., Editorial: A Legal 
Black Hole; Guantánamo Detainees Deserve Habeas Relief, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 
2007; Editorial: Black Hole: By Stripping Detainees of Legal Rights, U.S. Has 
Created a Judicial Conundrum, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 8, 2007. 
 33. This was Mori’s sole assignment for nearly four years until the case 
was resolved.  Mori traveled to Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Australia nearly ten 
times to conduct investigations and engage in other activities on behalf of 
Hicks. 
 34. The FAC’s were essentially Australian equivalents of military Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) officers and were allowed to “consult” with Hicks, 
subject to the U.S. Defense Department’s rules on security restrictions.  For 
the Defense Department’s outline of these rules, see Press Release, United 
States Department of Defense, U.S. and Austrailia announce agreements on 
Guantánamo Detainees (Nov. 25 2003), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5818.  The types 
of pressures and constraints imposed on Hicks’s American lawyers were 
echoed, if not amplified, for their Australian counterparts.  Australian 
attorneys McLeod and Griffin, who replaced Kenny in 2005, had to sign 
lengthy agreements with the U.S. military including a provision saying that 
they would be extradited to the U.S. for prosecution if they were found to be 
violating commission rules on classified information.  Kenny had signed a 
similar document in 2003, but was able to get the extradition clause taken 
out.  McLeod said of the agreement, “I’ve never seen anything like it.  It goes 
on for pages.  It was very intimidating but the problem was, if you didn't 
agree to sign it, you weren’t going to get access to David Hicks.”  Fenella 
Souter, Keep Quiet or Face Extradition to the U.S.: Hicks Lawyers Made To 
Sign Gag Order, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 23, 2006, 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/keep-quiet-or-face-extradition-to-us-
hicks-lawyers-made-to-signgag-order/2006/09/22/1158431897922.html. 
 35. Mori Interview, supra note 30. 
 36. Id. 
 obtained under coercion.  Attorney client conversations could be 
monitored.37  As Mori said: 
Stepping into it, I thought I was going to be involved in 
courts martial.  I have plenty of experience dealing with 
court martials and that’s the laws we would be using.  
Unfortunately what I found out [was] that we were in 
something different, something completely made up and 
resurrected from 1492.38 
As many lawyers recognized, “basically there were no rules.  
They made them up as they went along.”39  The highly respected 
Independent Observer for the Law Council of Australia, who was 
a former justice on the Supreme Court of Victoria, would later call 
these “ad hoc” procedures and term the ultimate proceedings 
“shambolic.”40  Critical flaws included: (1) a person could be 
convicted based on secret evidence and summary evidence; (2) 
“evidence” could be based on rank hearsay (e.g., interrogators 
reading statements from other detainees whether obtained 
through abuse, coercion or torture) and without any defense 
access to those witnesses; (3) military officers were the judges and 
juries and the rules for who served on the judicial panels were 
arbitrary; (4) judges on the panel other than the presiding judge 
need not be lawyers; (5) civilian counsel could not readily gain 
access to the accused, witnesses, and evidence; (6) attorney client 
discussions could be monitored; and (7) counsel was restricted 
from speaking to the press.41 
Representation before such a body presented the most 
profound of ethical dilemmas.  How could a lawyer represent 
anyone in such a system?  This was a front burner issue for the 
criminal defense bar, particularly just after March 2002 when the 
procedures for the operation of the commissions were established 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Transcript from an interview with Maj. Mori on Enough Rope, with 
Andrew Denton, Australian Broadcasing Corporation, (Aug. 14 2006) 
available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s1709428.htm. 
 39. Interview with attorney Joshua L. Dratel, in N. Y., N.Y. (Jun. & Nov. 
2007) and Interview with attorney Joshua L. Dratel, in Washington, D.C. 
(Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Dratel Interviews]. 
 40. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 5.64. 
 41. See Dratel Interview, supra note 39; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
577, 614. See also Abraham, supra note 8; note 42, below. 
 by the Secretary of Defense.42  Significantly, in August 2003, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) 
issued an Ethics Opinion declaring that it was unethical for a 
civilian lawyer to represent a detainee before the commissions 
with procedures that deny fundamental due process.43  Mori, 
however, was detailed to represent Hicks.  Mori and Steve Kenny 
visited him in December 2003.  The appointing authority 
permitted this attorney client meeting solely for the purpose of 
discussing a plea bargain and imposed restrictions on Mori’s 
ability to speak about the case with the media.  Despite the press’s 
intense interest in the Hicks case, Mori did not make public 
statements.  He was cautious.44 
Mori had no experience in cases involving the law of war.  He 
sought assistance.  Shortly after this first Guantánamo visit, 
civilian defense attorney, Joshua Dratel, joined the Hicks defense 
team.45  Dratel, then co-chair of the NACDL committee on 
military tribunals, was a highly respected civilian criminal 
defense lawyer who had handled the “embassy bombing” case in 
New York and marshaled expertise on terrorism cases.46  He had 
previously obtained security clearance and thus, was readily 
available to consult with Hicks.47 
The government attempted to impose restrictions on Dratel’s 
representation of Hicks—the precise terms that led to the NACDL 
Ethics Opinion that it was unethical to represent Gitmo detainees.  
 
 42. See Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-
United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. § 9 (2008). 
The military commissions were created by Presidential Order on Nov. 13, 
2001. See Press Release, The White House, President Issues Military Order 
(Nov. 13, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html.  See also Williams Michael, Jr. & 
Joseph Margulies, Trying Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 59 BENCH 
& B. MINN. 20 (Feb. 2002). 
 43. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-
04 (Aug. 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/ethicso
pinions/$file/ethics_op_03-04.pdf.  See Cheh, supra note 3; see also Lasry, 
supra note 2. 
 44. Mori Interview, supra note 30. 
 45. “Civilian defense counsel” are private lawyers who apply to and must 
be approved by the Office of Military Commissions Chief Defense Counsel to 
defend detainees (along with military counsel) in the commissions. 
 46. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 47. Dratel Interview, supra note 39. 
 It presented Dratel with an affidavit that required him to 
acknowledge that his attorney-client consultations could be 
monitored, that all of his work on the case had to be completed at 
Guantánamo, and that the defense team would not include 
consultants. Dratel refused to sign.  The government then 
negotiated the terms of the affidavit.  Two days later, it withdrew 
nearly all conditions.  The government backed down because it 
wanted Dratel to consult Hicks so the guilty plea could be 
secured.48 
Dratel and Mori visited Hicks on January 9, 2004.49  No 
doubt, this case was unique and could not be treated like any 
other criminal case where a lawyer seeks to discuss disposition of 
criminal charges.  On the one hand, the lawyers believed that a 
plea bargain might, as the government hoped, provide some 
legitimacy to the commission system and Hicks’s detention.50  
They were loathe to serve as justification for this system.  On the 
other hand, they were zealous advocates for an individual client, 
and as any zealous defense lawyer in a criminal case, had to 
discuss the potential benefit of a plea bargain.51  The lawyers 
acknowledged this classic potential conflict, discussed it, and then 
proceeded to discuss plea bargaining with Hicks.  Of course, as 
 
 48. Id.  The affidavit, known as Annex B, also contained a condition that 
defense counsel acknowledged that he would not be present during a hearing 
on the use of classified information.  Dratel ultimately signed an affidavit 
that indicated that he could challenge his lack of presence at such a hearing. 
 49. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.  Dratel was the first civilian lawyer 
permitted access to a client at Guantánamo Bay. 
 50. The government, expecting that a plea bargain with terms 
prohibiting Hicks from talking about conditions of his confinement, hoped 
this information would not become public knowledge.  Dratel Interview, 
supra note 39.  See p.492 infra regarding conditions of Hick’s ultimate plea 
bargain. 
 51. This potential conflict between the lawyer’s representation of an 
individual client and the lawyer’s personal and political goals—often termed 
“cause lawyering”—was hardly unique.  Criminal defense lawyers confront 
such potential conflicts in many settings.  It is amplified in the Guantánamo 
cases where the system is viewed as, and ultimately adjudged to be, 
fundamentally unfair.  See SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, supra note 5; Mark 
Denbeaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in 
Guantánamo Bay, 30 FORDHAM. INT’L L.J. 491, 491 (2007); Margareth 
Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1195, 1195 (2005); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7. Ultimately there 
was no conflict of interest.  See p.495  infra. 
 there were no existing criminal charges, there could not be a full 
discussion of disposition until the charges were concretized which 
they expected would be in April 2004.  Hicks and the lawyers soon 
realized that a guilty plea was not an appropriate resolution, as 
there appeared to be no options to secure release within the 
military commission system, nor could the lawyers wait for the 
resolution of the civil cases that challenged the legality of the 
military commissions.52  “It would take years,” Mori later said, 
“and David would still languish at Guantánamo subject to abuse 
that is now well documented.”53 
With no meaningful recourse in the military commissions, 
Hicks’ legal team shifted their focus to the broader political 
context.  They strategized that the route to securing Hicks’s 
release would be primarily through the court of public opinion.  
They would, of course, continue to zealously advocate in the 
commissions and in the United States courts, but they knew that 
the Hicks case had to be brought to the Australian people, as well. 
Only they could put pressure on their government to acknowledge 
the necessity for a meaningful legal process that conformed to 
requirements of law.54 
It was daunting to overcome the public’s perception of David 
Hicks because there was a strong and loud sentiment in Australia 
 
 52. Dratel Interview, supra note 39. 
 53. Mori Interview, supra note 30.  Mori’s assessment was borne out by 
events.  Despite Supreme Court rulings in Rasul v. Bush, 452 U.S. 466, and 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, many Guantánamo detainees still 
languish without ability to appear in fair proceedings.  See, e.g., David 
Bowker & David Kaye, Guantánamo by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2007, at A15 (noting that as of publication, over three hundred detainees 
remained at the camp, and not a single one had gone to trial); William 
Glaberson, U.S. Mulls New Status Hearings for Guantánamo Inmates, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A16 (placing number of detainees at 330).  In early 
February of 2008, the government announced military commission charges 
against six “high value” detainees.  See William Glaberson, 6 at Guantánamo 
Said To Face Trial in 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at A1. It has since 
dropped the case of one, Mohammed al-Qahtani, without explanation. 
Qahtani’s military lawyer suspects this is because the evidence that would 
have been used against him was “derived by torture.” William Glaberson, 
Case Against 9/11 Detainee Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008. The 
proceedings in Qahtani’s case clearly demonstrate the “heads I win, tails you 
lose” logic of the military commissions: The fact that he is not being tried 
means simply that Qahtani can continue to expect indefinite detention at 
Guantánamo. 
 54. LASRY, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
 that Hicks was a dangerous and high-level terrorist.55  Ultimately 
the blame for this sentiment was put on the United States’ release 
of a photo of Hicks with a rocket launcher that implied that he 
was at a terrorist training camp.  There was widespread and 
consistent publication of this photo in Australia.  In fact, the photo 
was from his 1999 training with NATO allies in Albania.  As Mori 
stated: 
Unfortunately the photo makes it appear as if he is firing 
a rocket launcher.  If they showed the whole picture, 
you’d see there is nothing in it, it’s just the tube.  I have 
my pictures in my military books, I’m holding my 
machine gun on my waist, and everybody’s has got their 
buddy picture.56 
Media perception of Hicks had to be reversed. 
Mori, who had only spoken to the media once before in his 
career, decided that such public comment was essential to zealous 
representation of his client.  He discussed the idea of media 
commentary with military colleagues.  He was nervous.  Up to 
that point, no military lawyer had publicly criticized the military 
commissions.  They said “are you sure that you want to do this?”57  
But Mori reasoned that the government itself had made his client 
a media case,58 and that Hicks therefore had to be defended in the 
media—particularly because there was no actual court in which to 
do so.59 
 
 55. See id. at ¶¶ [6.51-.52.]. 
 56. Enough Rope with Andrew Denton (ABC television broadcast Aug. 14, 
2006) (transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcript 
s/s1709428.htm). 
 57. Mori Interview, supra note 30. 
 58. Through frequent press releases and public statements, as in the case 
of Jose Padilla, government officials had made David Hicks a household 
name; the popular media and the Defense Department itself simply referred 
to him as the “Australian Taliban.”  See Australian-Taliban To Be Handed 
over to U.S. Military, CNN.COM, Dec. 14, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/12/14/ret.australia.taliban/; Kathleen T. Rhem, 
Military Commission Proceedings To Resume for ‘Australian Taliban,’ 
DEFENSELINK, Sept. 21, 2005, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17250. 
 59. During 2004, the appointing authority slowly shifted its views on 
military counsel’s ability to exercise First Amendment rights and to speak to 
the press.  Initially, the legal affairs officer expressed skepticism about any 
statements to the press.  Then Mori obtained permission to give his opinion 
 Mori carefully reviewed the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.60  Gentile and subsequent ethics 
rules that protect lawyers from discipline when the public 
statements about a pending case are made to overcome the 
prejudicial effect of publicity not initiated by the lawyer.  He and 
others with whom he consulted believed that Mori’s press 
statements were necessary to overcome the severe prejudice 
caused by the government’s release of numerous statements and 
the resulting articles.61 
The defense launched a three-country media strategy in 
Australia, Great Britain, and the United States, including a 
frontal attack on the system that would be used to try Hicks.  Mori 
traveled to Australia numerous times in early 2004 and proceeded 
to speak out strongly against the legal regime in Guantánamo 
Bay.  He believed that it was essential for Australians to 
understand the Guantánamo system that its government 
supported.  His March 2004 trip made him a “minor celebrity.”62  
A self-described apolitical person, he said of the tribunals, “It 
offends my understanding of what justice is that’s been ingrained 
in me by the Marine Corps and by my legal training.”63 
In April 2004, he surprised an audience of Oxford University 
students with his candor when he spoke out, along with military 
lawyers Lieutenant Commander Swift and Major Mark Bridges, 
and denounced the tribunals. He told them that “the system is not 
set up to produce even the appearance of a fair trial,” and declared 
that they were “kangaroo courts.”64  He argued that Hicks should 
be tried in conformity with international legal standards, or else 
returned to Australia.65  Mori also spoke at public rallies in 
Australia.  His statements and speeches harshly criticizing the 
 
on the rules and procedures of the military commissions but was not 
permitted to make more specific comments about Guantánamo or the Hicks 
case.  As the Hicks case began to receive significant media attention, these 
restrictions were relaxed.  See Mori Interview, supra note 30. 
 60. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6. 
 61. Mori Interview, supra note 30; Dratel Interview, supra note 39. 
 62. Neil A. Lewis, Military’s Lawyers for Detainees Put Tribunals on 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A1. 
 63. Raymond Bonner, Marine Defends Guantánamo Detainee, and 
Surprises Australians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 13. 
 64. Neil A. Lewis, Military Lawyers for Detainees Put Tribunals on Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A1. 
 65. Id. 
 tribunals rattled his superiors.66  He still confined his comments 
to the lack of fundamental fairness in the commission process, 
however, and was careful not to discuss conditions of confinement 
or the specific facts of the Hicks case. 
The defense worked closely with the human rights community 
in Australia.  Geoff Robertson, one of Australia’s highest profile 
human rights lawyers, challenged the Howard government for not 
demanding the release of an Australian citizen and said that it 
could face war crimes for “willfully depriving a prisoner of war of 
the right of a fair and regular trial.”67 
Despite the media attention, the Australian government 
would not heed any requests that it should demand a fair legal 
process or the return of its citizen.  Prime Minister Howard’s 
rationale was that they could not bring him home because there 
was no crime that he could be charged with in Australia.  The 
Howard government believed that the Bush administration had 
the situation “under control.”68 
By spring 2004, Mori had become a minor celebrity in 
Australia.  He visited regularly and his interviews appeared 
frequently.  One reporter for a major national television network 
said that news accounts “compared Major Mori to Tom Cruise, 
who played a valiant military defense lawyer at Guantánamo in 
the film ‘A Few Good Men.’”  The Aussies loved him.  “Mori has 
come to represent everything about Americans that Aussies love 
to admire.”69 
In the United States Mori took reporters to the Lincoln 
Memorial in Washington D.C. to talk about the Hicks case.  
Though Mori’s statements were confined to criticism of the 
commissions, his public stance and participation in rallies were 
angering his superiors. 
April through June 2004 were watershed months for Hicks 
and Gitmo detainees.  In April 2004, after the Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in Rasul v. Bush, the government decided to 
permit habeas corpus lawyers into Guantánamo and leaked 
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 information about the conditions under which the detainees were 
held.70  The Abu Ghraib scandal was front-page news and lead to 
subsequent allegations and investigations of abuses in military 
prisons.71  In June of 2004, the Supreme Court decided Rasul v. 
Bush, declaring that detainees had the right to judicial review, 
and the infamous “Torture Memo” was leaked to the press.72  
Slowly Dratel and Mori began to speak more openly with the press 
about the facts of Hicks’s confinement and his case. 
In June 2004 official charges were finally filed against Hicks.  
These charges were unknown to the law of war and “inherently 
flawed.”73 First, even though Hicks was an Australian who owed 
no formal allegiance to the United States, he was charged with 
“aiding the enemy.”  He was also charged with the crime of 
conspiracy—which the Supreme Court noted in the Hamdan case 
was “not a recognized violation of a law of war”74—and  of 
attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent.75 
Hicks was arraigned on the charges in August 2004 and 
preliminary motions were argued in October 2004.  The day after 
arguments on the Hicks motions, the entire proceeding was stayed 
as a consequence of the District Court’s ruling in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld that the military commission were violative of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.76  Once again, Hicks had no 
legal recourse in the military commissions. 
Relying upon Hamdan, the defense filed an amended 
complaint in federal court and in the military commissions 
attacking the structure and procedures of the commissions.  These 
cases were stayed pending resolution of the Hamdan case.  The 
Howard government, publicly criticized for its position in the 
Hicks case, said that the defense lawyers bore responsibility for 
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 the delay.77 
By this time, however, the public perception of Howard’s 
criticisms of the Hicks team had shifted.  This resulted, in part, 
from comments from Lex Lasry, the prominent Australian lawyer 
who had attended the October 2004 preliminary hearings as an 
independent observer and representative of the Law Council of 
Australia.  Upon his return to Australia, he roundly condemned 
the proceedings.78  This provided impetus for the involvement of 
the established legal community.79 
The case had now become of widespread concern to the 
Australians as the public became increasingly knowledgeable 
about Hicks’s case.  With the shift in public perception and the 
pressure on the Howard government to utilize its “moral 
authority” to insure that the government’s “integrity was not 
compromised by its support of [the military commission] process,” 
the lawyers could now hopefully engage in behind the scenes 
negotiations with the government.80  David McLeod and Michael 
Griffin, military reserve lawyers with private practices, became 
Australian counsel to the Hicks case.81 
While pursuing negotiations in Australia and with legal 
proceedings stayed in the United States, the defense turned to the 
British legal system.  During one GTMO meeting with Mori and 
Griffin, the lawyers learned that Hicks’s grandparents were 
British citizens.  Britain had recently changed its laws so that 
Hicks could now obtain British citizenship based upon his lineage.  
During 2005, the legal team secured the services of solicitors and 
barristers in London to file for Hicks’s citizenship.  The British 
government had demanded and successfully secured the release of 
nine of its citizens from Gitmo, and the legal team hoped that 
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 when Hicks obtained citizenship, it would do so for him.82 
In December 2005, the British High Court, over the 
government’s objection, ordered that Hicks should be registered as 
a British citizen.83  The British Home Office appealed numerous 
times, and the High Court finally ordered that it would not allow 
additional appeals.84  The Home Office complied and “secretly” 
made Hicks a citizen while in his cell at Guantánamo.85  The next 
day the British Home Secretary personally revoked citizenship.86  
The defense then filed a legal action that was never resolved.87  
The Hicks citizenship issue led to increased awareness of the 
Hicks case in Britain, and exacerbated public concern in 
Australia. 
In the summer of 2005, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district 
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 court in Hamdan thus permitting the resumption of the military 
commissions.88  The hope faded for a negotiated return of Hicks to 
Australia, and the Howard government pressed for a hearing 
date.89  First scheduled for September 2005, the date was 
adjourned until November 2005, with the Howard government 
maintaining that the defense lawyers were responsible for the 
delay.90  The proceedings were soon stayed again when the United 
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in Hamdan. 
During 2006, the Australian public clamored for the Howard 
government to press for Hicks’s return.91  There were rallies 
throughout the country and regular press accounts of Hick’s 
unlawful detention.  Events had progressed to the extent that 
Dratel and Mori, in an April 2006 trip to Australia, had meetings 
to discuss the rules and conditions for a transfer agreement if 
Hicks was returned to Australia.  The defense team also engaged 
lawyers who began a legal action in Australia to order Hicks 
returned.92 
In June 2006, the historic Hamdan decision, which declared 
the military commissions to be violative of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, nullified 
the military commission proceedings against Hicks.  The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) was passed in response to 
Hamdan.93 
Mori remained on the offensive in the media, attacking the 
structure and proceedings established under the new MCA.  In 
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 August 2006, he went on a lecture tour in Australia on behalf of 
Hicks, attending a rally in Adelaide and leading a march to the 
office of the Australian Foreign Minister.  He charged the Bush 
administration with creating another illegal system that violated 
Hicks’s rights and reiterated that the new military commission 
system—like the old one—was “rigged for convictions only.”94  
Speaking at an almost sold-out event organized by the Australian 
Lawyers’ Alliance at the Brisbane Convention Center, Mori noted 
that “providing information to the public and elected officials had 
to become part of defending [Hicks].”95 “I’m sure some ministers in 
the Australian Government would just like us to go away quietly 
and let David get done over by an unfair system,” Mori remarked, 
“but that wouldn’t be doing justice to an Australian citizen.”96 
Howard’s approval ratings continue to decline.  Especially 
when joined with the issue of the Iraq war, Hicks’s case seemed to 
symbolize the Howard government’s willingness to acquiesce to 
American demands—a vulnerability particularly noted in 
Australia’s 2007 elections that linked him to the increasingly 
unpopular President Bush.97  In Australia in November 2006, 
Mori attended the signing of the Fremantle Declaration, a 
“declaration demanding the Commonwealth take action to ensure 
Guantánamo Bay detainee David Hicks is immediately brought to 
trial.”98  All attorneys general of the States and territories of 
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 Australia attended with the pointed exception of the Federal 
Attorney General, Philip Ruddock, who refused to attend.  His 
absence was highlighted in the press.99 
In February 2007 the charges were dismissed and two new 
charges were sworn against Hicks: (1) Attempted murder in 
violation of the law of war; and (2) providing material support for 
terrorism.  The Convening Authority for the Military Commissions 
referred only the material support for terrorism charge for trial.100  
This charge was not available under the old military commissions, 
but was introduced in the MCA of 2006. 
Just as Hicks was about to be arraigned on these new 
charges, Colonel Morris Davis, the then chief prosecutor for the 
military commissions, publicly warned that Mori’s “politicking” on 
behalf of Hicks could result in prosecution for his actions under 
Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which 
forbids officers from speaking “contemptuous words” about the 
President, Vice President, or Secretary of Defense.101  Davis 
claimed, among other things, that “certainly in the U.S. it would 
not be tolerated having a U.S. marine in uniform actively 
inserting himself into the political process.  It is very 
disappointing to see that happening in Australia and if that was 
one of my prosecutors, they would be held accountable.”102 
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 While Davis’s notion that Mori could have been prosecuted103 
appears far-fetched—Article 88 has rarely been invoked in 
military courts-martial, and only in extreme cases104—Davis’s 
allegations were serious enough to cause Mori to worry that he 
might be impeding Hicks’s case by continuing to represent him.105 
The defense once again went on the offensive.  Dratel, in 
public comment, said that Davis’s threats were the “latest 
example of the corrupt system that will try Hicks.”106  Dratel and 
Synder filed a motion to disqualify Davis based upon prosecutorial 
misconduct.  They charged: 
The curious timing of Col. Davis’ initial accusations . . . 
suggests that Col. Davis made the accusation to chill and 
hinder Maj. Mori’s representation of Mr. Hicks and to 
derail the defense shortly before the arraignment.  These 
allegations diverted the defense team from preparing for 
Mr. Hicks’ trial, forcing them to focus instead on 
assessing the potential conflict of interest between Maj. 
Mori and Mr. Hicks.  They also required Maj. Mori to 
refrain from making public comments on behalf of Mr. 
Hicks until he could obtain legal advice on the issue.107 
The threat of a court martial of Mori led to press accounts 
that Hicks’s case would be delayed yet again if Mori was recused 
from representation. 
The defense filed numerous motions all the while, negotiating 
a plea bargain on favorable terms for Hicks.  The anticipated plea, 
of course, would be premised upon a charge that was without 
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 foundation under the law of war—the very point made by the 
defense in one of its motions to dismiss.  Nine eminent lawyers 
had provided affidavits to the commission to the effect that there 
was no such crime as material support for terrorism under the law 
of war, and that in any case, it was clearly “retrospective in its 
application to Hicks and was a recently invented and new war 
crime.”108  Additional arguments provided convincing support that 
the charge was “brought and prosecuted in violation of 
international law.”109 
On March 26, 2007, Hicks pled guilty to providing material 
support for terrorism, notwithstanding the fact that the charge 
was arguably not sustainable and that the proceedings were held 
before a body without legal authority and lacking in fundamental 
due process.110 
The proceedings demonstrated the arbitrariness of the 
process.111  Two of Hicks’s three attorneys were dismissed by the 
Judge at the outset.  Rebecca Snyder was dismissed because the 
Judge claimed that she was not on active duty and therefore could 
not qualify as military counsel, nor did he interpret the MCA to 
permit her to remain as civilian counsel.112  The judge would not 
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 permit Dratel to appear as counsel unless he would sign a consent 
agreement to be bound by all rules, including those which were 
not yet in existence.  Dratel’s argument that he could not sign a 
“blank check” but that he would sign an agreement to be bound by 
“all applicable rules presently in existence” was not acceptable to 
the Judge.113  Dratel left the courtroom as Hicks stated, “I am 
shocked.  I just lost another lawyer.”114  Mori remained at Hicks’s 
side in the proceedings and ultimately entered a guilty plea in 
proceedings described by the independent observer as 
“shambolic.”115 
The plea agreement, worked out at the highest levels of 
government without knowledge of the prosecutor,116 provided for a 
sentence that permitted Hicks to return to Australia to serve only 
nine remaining months.117  Hicks also agreed to refrain from 
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Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSSYD10287 
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 speaking to the media for one year and, notably, to make a 
statement that he “has never been illegally treated,” along with a 
promise not to file any lawsuits pursuant to his treatment in 
Guantánamo.118  The “deal helped Australian Prime Minister 
John Howard, a U.S. ally, avoid a bruising domestic 
controversy.”119  The case was widely reported in the media.  The 
U.S. Department of Defense issued a press release claiming, 
“Military commissions are regularly constituted courts, affording 
all the necessary judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples for purposes of common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions.”120 
The Military Commissions spokeswoman said that the Hicks 
case showed that Guantánamo commissions offer a “fair, 
legitimate and transparent forum,”121 while the Washington Post 
reported that the guilty plea “marks a victory for the Bush 
administration.”122 
Hick’s father’s statement was, perhaps, more representative 
of the public’s view: Hicks pled guilty, he said, just to “escape the 
isolated prison.”123  The press reported the dismay of military 
authorities when the imposed seven year sentence was reduced to 
nine months in accordance with the plea bargain.124 
Mori was made an honorary member of the Australian Bar 
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 Association in a ceremony where he was touted for advocacy called 
“fearless and passionate.”125  In the past year, he has received 
numerous awards for dedicated, zealous lawyering.126  And while 
Major Mori avoided prosecution, his zealous advocacy was not 
rewarded by the military.  He was reassigned to a base in San 
Diego as soon as Hicks left Guantánamo and has been passed over 
for promotion twice since taking on his case.127  In January 2008 
he was sent to Iraq. 
LAWYERING IN HINDSIGHT 
Mori and the defense team undertook a remarkable challenge 
in what was described by the Australian Law Council’s 
Independent Observer as an “inherently oppressive and coercive 
system” where “liberty is a bargaining chip that the State may use 
to avoid accountability and buy impunity.”128 
Recognizing that the case would be resolved in the political 
arena, a self-described apolitical military lawyer employed a 
strategy that is often described as “political lawyering” or “cause 
lawyering.”129  Engaging in a relatively novel tactic for a military 
lawyer, Mori extensively utilized the media to overcome negative 
public perception of his client and promote the need for a fair 
process.  The media strategy assisted the international campaign 
of human rights organizations and activists.  Mori continued his 
 
 125. Honorary Membership for Major Mori, NEWS.COM.AU, June 29, 2007, 
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21990165-1702,00.html. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Mori Reassigned to ‘Top Gun’ Marine Base, AUSTL. BROAD. NEWS 
ONLINE, May 22, 2007, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/05/22/1929231.htm. 
 128. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 7.3. 
 129. These terms are defined in varied ways and often used 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An 
Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 287 (1996) (deliberate efforts to use 
law to change society or to alter allocations of power); David Luban, The 
Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 955 (1995) (articulating a theory of “moral activism” in which “lawyers 
have substantial moral responsibilities to parties other than the client.”); 
Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of 
Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client 
Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493 (1996) (arguing that individual 
client representation may be “cause lawyering”); Etienne, supra note 51 at 
1196-97 (defining cause lawyers as those who “use the law as a means of 
creating social change in addition to a means of helping individual clients.”). 
 highly visible public advocacy even when threatened with 
prosecution that could have been a disqualifying conflict of 
interest. 
Mori and the defense team successfully coordinated the legal 
strategy with the political one across three continents as the 
landscape shifted during five years.130  They did so understanding 
that Hicks’s situation presented potential conflicts.  While the 
lawyers necessarily mounted a highly visible campaign to bring 
Hicks before a tribunal, all the lawyers believed that the military 
commissions were unlawful and that its processes were 
fundamentally unfair.  They did not want to legitimate those 
commissions by participation in the process, especially because 
their client would be the first detainee to participate in a military 
commission.  They correctly could predict that the U.S. 
government would claim legitimacy and victory by Hicks’s 
participation and guilty plea.  Moreover, the lawyers did not 
believe that the ultimate charge against Hicks was legally valid.  
Nevertheless, the duty to David Hicks was paramount; the end of 
his detention and his return to Australia were the goals. 
These potential conflicts, present in many criminal cases and 
notably in those defined as “cause lawyering,” did not become 
actual conflicts.  Ultimately, the lawyers’s goal was the traditional 
one for all criminal defendants: resolution of their case on the 
most favorable terms for their client.  That goal was served by the 
defense team’s creative and effective multi-pronged strategy 
employed for the “cause” of challenging the unlawful regime at 
Guantánamo Bay and upholding the rule of law.  Both “causes” 
were served by the Hicks guilty plea and sentence.  As Dratel said: 
From the outset, there was always a tension between 
what we call “cause lawyering” vs. “client lawyering” and 
my hope was always that we could serve the client 
without undermining the cause. . . . As it turned out, we 
achieved that even in unanticipated ways.  We have done 
as much as we can to demonstrate that it is an invalid 
 
 130. Similar strategies have been employed in a wide range of cases. See 
e.g., Michael D. Davis & Hunter R. Clark, Thurgood Marshall: Warrior at the 
Bar, Rebel on the Bench 100-12 (1992); Arthur Kinoy, RIGHTS ON TRIAL (1983); 
Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantánamo HIV Camp: The 
Intersection of Politics and Litigation, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187 (1998). 
 system and we hope that was achieved . . . .  At the same 
time there was disillusionment from the other side—this 
is the “worst of the worst” and you are freeing him?” . . . 
The “Hicks deal” is now a term of art.  People say, “I want 
a Hicks deal.”  It robbed the commissions of any 
authority.131 
 
In these extraordinary circumstances, the judgment that the case 
had to be resolved in the political arena required the zealous 
lawyering undertaken by Mori and the defense team.  It was, 
perhaps, the only way to provide meaningful legal representation 
at all. 
 
 
 131. Dratel Interview, supra note 39. 
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Notes & Comments 
Fear Mongering, Filters, the Internet 
and the First Amendment: Why 
Congress Should Not Pass Legislation 
Similar to the Deleting Online 
Predators Act 
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to 
protect liberty when the government’s purposes are 
beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but 
without understanding.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress maintains that “[t]hough the Internet represents 
tremendous potential in bringing previously unimaginable 
education and information opportunities to our nation’s children, 
there are very real risks associated with the use of the Internet.”2  
Accordingly, Congress has “repeatedly reaffirmed”3 the 
government’s compelling interest in protecting children from 
potentially harmful material on the Internet.4  Juxtaposed against 
this legitimate concern is the First Amendment, which guarantees 
Americans that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
 
 1. Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. CHILDREN’S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT, S.REP. NO. 106-141, at 2 
(1999). 
 3. Id. at 7. 
 4. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982). 
 freedom of speech, or of the press.”5  Early attempts at regulating 
the harmful material available to minors over the Internet were 
unsuccessful because the Supreme Court found each to be a 
flagrant violation of the First Amendment.6  Congress succeeded 
in balancing concern for child welfare with constitutional 
requirements when it passed the Children’s Internet Protection 
Act (CIPA) in 2000.7  For the first time, Congress addressed fears 
“that the E-rate and Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) 
programs were facilitating access to illegal and harmful 
pornography.”8  To curtail growing concern, CIPA conditioned 
funding from these subsidized programs, requiring that schools 
and libraries have technology filters in place to prevent children 
from accessing obscene or harmful material on the Internet, and 
that these filters could be disabled if necessary.9  The filter 
requirement was upheld by the Supreme Court, and for the first 
time Congress believed it had made strides in adopting an 
effective policy of Internet safety.10 
What Congress did not anticipate, given the rapidly evolving 
reach of the Internet, was the rise of social-networking sites, and 
the wave of panic that news stories regarding these sites would 
create.11  As a result, the House of Representatives, in an attempt 
to “appear pro-child and pro-family,” introduced the Deleting 
Online Predator’s Act (DOPA) in 2006.  Riding on a wave of 
“MySpace Madness,”12 the House of Representatives fed off the 
mostly unwarranted fears of parents, which were promulgated by 
the media, and then accused dissenters of being weak on child 
protection.13  The DOPA departed from the constitutionally 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA II), 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004); Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
845 (1997). 
 7. M. Megan McCune, Comment, Virtual Lollipops and Lost Puppies: 
How Far Can States Go To Protect Minors Through the Use of Internet Luring 
Laws, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 503, 520 (2006). 
 8. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 200 (2003). 
 9. Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000)). 
 10. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201. 
 11. See Nat’l Coal. Against Censorship, The Dangers of the Deleting 
Online Predators Act, July 27, 2006, http://www.ncac.org/Internet/20060515~ 
USA~Deleting_Online_Predators_Act.cfm. 
 12. Tom Zeller Jr., Link by Link: A Lesson for Parents on MySpace 
Madness, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at C4. 
 13. See Nat’l Coal. Against Censorship, supra note 11. 
 acceptable filters required under the CIPA, and conditioned filters 
based on technology and not on content.14  The proposed filters 
under the DOPA are aimed at the dreaded commercial social-
networking site, yet would not necessarily block all harmful 
material and would purposefully ensnare a tremendous number of 
valuable websites, which are protected by the First Amendment.15  
This constitutional infirmity cannot be cured through the 
implementation of disabling features.  “Treating MySpace sites 
like poison,”16 proponents of the DOPA touted it as “legislation not 
designed to limit speech or infringe on the rights of law-abiding 
adults,”17 but to combat social-networking sites which “have made 
it easier for pedophiles and child predators to contact children and 
to groom, or befriend, and seduce, them.”18 Luckily, a new session 
of Congress in January of 2007 assured that the DOPA would not 
become law.19  However, those who were concerned with the clear 
First Amendment violations of the DOPA cannot rest easy, for on 
January 4, 2007, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska proposed the 
Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act, which includes a 
section that mirrors the DOPA word for word.20  Protecting 
children from harm when they are often not capable to do it 
themselves is a vital goal of government and “every right-thinking 
and decent American;”21 however, Congress cannot partake in 
 
 14. See Alex Halperin, No Space for MySpace?, BUSINESS WEEK, May 12, 
2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2006/tc20060512 
_299340.htm. 
 15. See Am. Library Ass’n Office for Intellectual Freedom, Podcast Script: 
Online Social Networking and Intellectual Freedom, http://www.ala.org/ala/ 
oif/ifissues/issuesrelatedlinks/podcastnetworking.htm (last visited May 12, 
2008). 
 16. Declan McCullagh, Lawmakers Take Aim at Social-networking Sites, 
CNET NEWS, Dec. 19, 2006, http://news.com.com/Lawmakers+take+aim+at+ 
social-networking+sites/2100-1028_3-6071040.html?tag=sas.email. 
 17. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5886 (July 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Fitzpatrick). 
 18. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 109TH CONG., 
REPORT ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET, 2 (Comm. 
Print 2007). 
 19. H.R. 5319 [109th]: Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5319 (last visited May 12, 
2007). 
 20. S. 49 [110th]: Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-49 (last visited May 12, 
2007). 
 21. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5888 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
 “fear mongering”22 as motive to ignore the requirements of the 
First Amendment.  The DOPA, and any similar legislation would 
fail to meet constitutional requirements due to the large burden 
placed on protected speech.  Because the proposed filters target 
the technology of the site, and not necessarily the content, the 
reach of this legislation is so broad that it is irrational. 
Part II of this Comment examines the ways in which 
Congress has attempted to protect children from potential harm 
on the Internet.  Part III provides information on social- 
networking sites, and the fear that they have engendered.  Part IV 
discusses the actual language of the DOPA, and Part V illustrates 
how the DOPA and similar subsequent legislation do not survive 
constitutional scrutiny on First Amendment grounds.  In addition, 
Part VI alerts the reader to the newly proposed Protecting 
Children in the 21st Century Act, which mimics the DOPA word 
for word. 
II. PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT 
CHILDREN AGAINST HARMFUL MATERIAL ON THE INTERNET 
Congress has a significant interest in protecting children from 
being harmed by material they view on the Internet.23  Since the 
founding of the Internet, this concern has prompted Congress to 
pass legislation in an attempt to effectuate its paramount goal: 
protecting children from harm.  Early Congressional attempts at 
regulating material on the Internet were promptly met with First 
Amendment challenges and were ultimately held unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court,24 and it was only when Congress focused 
on filtering material on the Internet, and linking these mandatory 
filters with federal subsidies, that it found success.25 
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, was Congress’s first attempt to 
regulate children’s access to harmful information on the 
 
 22. Halperin, supra note 14 (quoting Anne Collier, co-founder of 
BlogSafety.com). 
 23. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757-58. 
 24. See COPA II, 542 U.S. at 670; Ashcroft v. Free Sp. Coal., 535 U.S. 
234, 240 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997). 
 25. See McCune, supra note 7. 
 Internet.26  The CDA “criminalized the online transmission of  
‘any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other 
communication which is . . . indecent’ to a person known to be 
under the age of eighteen, as well as the display of ‘patently 
offensive’ material ‘in a manner available to’ a person under 
eighteen.”27  Senator James Exon, sponsor of the legislation, 
argued before the Senate that “the most disgusting, repulsive 
pornography is only a few clicks away from any child with a 
computer,”28 and not just “Playboy or Penthouse magazines,”29 
but “[t]he most hardcore, perverse types of pornography, photos 
and stories featuring torture, child abuse, and bestiality.”30 
The CDA was “quickly challenged”31 by theAmerican Civil 
Liberties Union in Reno v. ACLU.32  The Supreme Court of the 
United States recognized “the legitimacy and importance of the 
congressional goal of protecting children from harmful 
materials,”33 yet ultimately found that the CDA abridged the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.34  The 
Court found the breadth of the CDA’s coverage wholly 
unprecedented,35 and that the CDA differed from various laws 
and orders upheld in previous cases in that: 
[I]t does not allow parents to consent to their children’s 
use of restricted materials; is not limited to commercial 
transactions; fails to provide any definition of ‘indecent’ 
and omits any requirement that ‘patently offensive’ 
material lack socially redeeming value; neither limits its 
broad categorical prohibitions to particular times nor 
bases them on an evaluation by an agency familiar with 
the medium’s unique characteristics; is punitive; applies 
 
 26. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 
Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000). 
 27. ROBERT S. PECK, LIBRARIES THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CYBERSPACE 
126 (Eloise L. Kinney ed., American Library Association 2000) (quoting CDA 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 28. 141 CONG. REC. S8310, S8330 (June 14, 1995) (Statement of Sen. 
Exon). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 167 (New York University Press 2003). 
 32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 845. 
 33. Id. at 849. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 877. 
 to a medium that, unlike radio, receives full First 
Amendment protection; and cannot be properly analyzed 
as a form of time, place, and manner regulation because it 
is a content-based blanket restriction on speech.36 
The portion of the CDA prohibiting the knowing transmission 
of obscene materials was the only portion of the regulation that 
survived constitutional scrutiny, as obscenity does not enjoy First 
Amendment protection.37 
B. The Child Pornography Prevention Act 
The Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) attempted to 
expand the existing law regarding child pornography on the 
Internet to include computer generated images  “of what appear to 
be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, that are 
virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from 
unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”38 The statute prohibited “possessing or 
distributing these images, which may be created by using adults 
who look like minors or by using computer imaging.”39 Congress 
stressed that the elimination of child pornography and the 
protection of children from sexual exploitation provide a 
compelling governmental interest for prohibiting the production, 
distribution, possession, sale, or viewing of visual depictions of 
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, including both 
photographic images of actual children engaging in such conduct 
 
 36. Id. at 845.  The Court’s opinion compared the CDA to the rulings in 
three cases relied upon by the government: Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 646 (1998) (Upholding the constitutionality of a New York statute that 
prohibited selling to minors under 17 years of age material that was 
considered obscene as to them even if not obscene as to adults); Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (Court upheld a zoning ordinance 
that kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods. The 
ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the films shown in the theaters, 
but rather at the "secondary effects"such as crime and deteriorating 
property valuesthat these theaters fostered); and FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 
726, 730 (1978) (Court upheld a declaratory order of the FCC, holding that 
the broadcast of a recording of a 12-minute monologue entitled "Filthy 
Words" that had previously been delivered to a live audience "could have 
been the subject of administrative sanctions”).  Id. at 845. 
 37. Id. at 883. 
 38. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000)). 
 39. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240. 
 and depictions produced by computer.”40 
The Free Speech Coalition challenged the constitutionality of 
the CPPA in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.41  The Court found 
that “by prohibiting child pornography that does not depict an 
actual child, the statute goes beyond New York v. Ferber, which 
distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit 
speech because of the State’s interest in protecting the children 
exploited by the production process.”42  The CPPA’s restrictions on 
images that appear to involve a minor, or images that convey the 
impression that person pictured is a minor, were overbroad, in 
that the statute “bans materials that are neither obscene nor 
produced by the exploitation of real children.”43  Essentially, the 
CPPA criminalized speech “that records no crime and creates no 
victims by its production.”44  Although the government argued 
that virtual child pornography “whets the appetites of pedophiles 
and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct,”45 the Court 
held that “[t]he government may not prohibit speech because it 
increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some 
indefinite future time.’”46  Ultimately, the CPPA failed because 
the Court ruled that “[p]rotected speech does not become 
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter,”47 and “[t]he 
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning 
unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is 
prohibited or chilled in the process.”48 
C. The Child Online Protection Act 
In direct response to the Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU,49 
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in 
1998.50  COPA was essentially “a bar on commercial Internet 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 234. 
 42. Id. at 240 (citing Ferber, 45 U.S. at 757-58). 
 43. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240. 
 44. Id. at 250. 
 45. Id. at 253. 
 46. Id. (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)). 
 47. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255. 
 48. Id. 
 49. PECK, supra note 27, at 131-32. 
 50. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1401-1406, 112 
Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000)). 
 expression that is harmful to minors.”51  In an attempt to 
narrowly tailor the regulation, Congress “incorporated the 
Supreme Court’s test for obscenity, as stated in Miller v. 
California,”52 which hinges upon community standards to 
determine if the material is obscene.53  With “[t]he limitation to 
commercial expression and the harmful to minors standard,”54 
Congress was anxiously trying to “fit within the rubric of the Reno 
decision.”55  Committee reports evidence that Congress firmly 
believed “that the bill str[uck] the appropriate balance between 
preserving the First Amendment rights of adults and protecting 
children from harmful material on the World Wide Web.”56  In 
addition to providing much clearer terms, the COPA gives explicit 
examples of good faith affirmative defenses that would allow a 
commercial entity to protect itself from prosecution.57  Under the 
COPA, these defenses consist of “requiring use of a credit card, 
debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification 
number, or. . . any other reasonable measures that are feasible 
under available technology.”58 
The constitutionality of the COPA was challenged by the 
American Civil Liberties Union in Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA I),59 
and was appealed to the Supreme Court after the Third Circuit 
affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the COPA’s use of 
contemporary community standards to identify material that is 
 
 51. PECK, supra note 27, at 131 (internal quotations omitted). 
 52. McCune, supra note 7, at 517 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
24 (1973)).  “The test announced by the Supreme Court to determine whether 
communications are obscene is: 
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prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”)  
McCune, supra note 7, at 517 n.110. 
 53. McCune, supra note 7, at 518. 
 54. PECK, supra note 27, at 132. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Child Online Protection Act, H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 (1998) (alteration 
in the original). 
 57. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1401-1406, 112 
Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA I), 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002). 
 harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.60  
The Court ultimately held that “the COPA’s reliance on 
community standards to identify ‘material that is harmful to 
minors’ does not by itself render the statute substantially 
overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment,”61 and remanded 
the case back to the Third Circuit to review the constitutionality of 
the COPA according to the ruling.62  The “second review by the 
Third Circuit found that the COPA did not use the least 
restrictive means to protect children from harmful material and 
consequently violated the First Amendment.”63  In Ashcroft v. 
ACLU (COPA II),64 the Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit’s 
ruling on the COPA, but the “Court’s reasoning was based on a 
narrower, more specific rationale than the court of appeals.”65  
The Court agreed that, “the Government has failed, at this point, 
to rebut the plaintiffs’ contention that there are plausible, less 
restrictive alternatives to the statute,”66 and that “filtering 
software may be a less restrictive means and more effective 
protection then the COPA in protecting children on the 
Internet.”67  The Court again remanded the case to allow further 
evidence to “be introduced on the relative restrictiveness and 
effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.”68 
D. The Children’s Internet Protection Act 
Notwithstanding the failure of the CDA, the CPPA, and the 
COPA, Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act in 
2000 (CIPA).69  Unlike the other statutes, the CIPA reflected 
“Congress[‘s] fear that federal subsidies for the Internet were 
facilitating access in public libraries to obscenity, child 
 
 60. Id. at 564. 
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 62. See id. at 586. 
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 pornography, and other materials harmful to minors.”70  While 
the CDA, the CPPA, and the COPA “focused primarily on Web site 
operators, CIPA focuses on Internet users.”71  Schools and 
libraries that “participate in certain federal programs,”72 namely 
the E-rate73 program and programs under the Library Service and 
Technology Act of 199674 would be “obligated to comply” with the 
CIPA. 75  The E-rate program  “ensure[s] that schools and libraries 
have affordable access to advanced telecommunications.”76  The 
Library Service and Technology Act of 1996,” makes grants to 
state library administrative agencies to electronically lin[k] 
libraries with educational, social, or information services, assis[t] 
libraries in accessing information through electronic networks, 
and pa[y] costs for libraries to acquire or share computer systems 
and telecommunications technologies.”77  The CIPA requires 
libraries and schools to have “in place a policy of Internet safety 
for minors that includes the operation of a technology protection 
measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet access 
that protects against access through such computers to visual 
depictions that are, obscene; child pornography; or harmful to 
minors.”78 The term “technology protection measure” is defined as 
“a specific technology that blocks or filters Internet access”79 to 
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 obscene material, child pornography or other material that may be 
harmful to minors.  The “CIPA permits libraries to disable the 
filtering technology to allow access for bona fide research or other 
lawful purposes.”80  When the library/school receives E-rate 
funding, 81 the filters may only be disabled for adults, but when 
libraries receive LSTA funding, the filters can technically be 
disabled for both children and adults. 82 
The American Library Association challenged the 
constitutionality of the CIPA in United States v. American Library 
Association.83  Plaintiffs in the case “argued that the filtering 
requirement was overbroad and that it unconstitutionally 
infringed upon patrons’ First Amendment rights.”84  The Court 
ruled that “Internet access in public libraries is neither a 
traditional nor a designated public forum,”85 and that libraries do 
not provide access to the Internet in order to create a public 
forum, but “facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits 
by furnishing materials of the requisite and appropriate 
quality.”86  The Court reasoned that “while a library could limit its 
Internet collection to just those sites it found worthwhile, it could 
do so only at the cost of excluding an enormous amount of 
valuable material,”87 and “[g]iven that tradeoff, it is entirely 
reasonable for public libraries to reject that approach and instead 
exclude certain categories of content.”88  The Court further held 
that any concerns over blocking protected speech were “dispelled 
by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software 
disabled.”89  The Court also determined that there were no valid 
issues concerning the funding correlation, because “when the 
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is 
entitled to define the limits of that program.”90  Ultimately the 
Court upheld the CIPA “[b]ecause public libraries’ use of Internet 
filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment 
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 rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, 
and is a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power.”91  The CIPA 
“provoked tension between two competing interests: protecting 
minors from cyber pornography and safeguarding First 
Amendment rights,”92 and for the first time Congress was 
successful in tipping the scales in its favor. 
Prior to the DOPA, Congress could pass legislation regulating 
the Internet if: the legislation is aimed at unprotected speech, the 
legislation does not prohibit speech just because it increases the 
chance that a crime will be committed in the future,93 the 
legislation contains specific and narrowly tailored definitions 
regarding what material Congress is attempting to combat,94 and 
the legislation contains disabling provisions that allow adults 
and/or children access to potentially overblocked material.95  In 
addition, if the legislation is reviewed under heightened scrutiny, 
there will inevitably be problems if the legislation does not use the 
least restrictive means possible to prevent children from access to 
harmful material.96 
III. THE RISE OF SOCIAL-NETWORKING SITES AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT RISE OF THE DELETING ONLINE PREDATORS 
ACT 
While the Internet had always contained potentially harmful 
material, the rise of social-networking sites and interactive web 
based applications presented a host of new challenges for 
Congress.  Hyped up concern surrounding these new sites, 
particularly MySpace, and their possible link to online child 
predation, prompted Congress to once again introduce legislation 
aimed at regulating children’s use of the Internet. 
A. Interactive Web Applications and Social-Networking Sites 
Interactive web application “is a broad term encompassing 
many types of online tools, many of which allow people to 
communicate with each other either in real time or through 
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 posts.”97  These applications include “online distance education, 
instant messaging, chat rooms, message boards, photo and video 
sharing sites, blogs that allow comments, and even sites like 
Amazon.com and Evite.”98  These applications “are changing how 
we all work with the Web,”99 but crucial to their success is the fact 
that the “people who use the tools make them even more useful by 
contributing their knowledge and data.”100 
“Interactive web application” also encompasses social-
networking sites which “are, generally speaking, online spaces 
where people connect with others who share similar interests.”101  
These sites were developed to allow members to “interact with 
current friends and to meet new ones,”102 while “sharing thoughts, 
ideas, and information.”103  There are literally “hundreds of these 
sites on the Web, including Facebook, Friendster, LiveJournal, 
and MySpace.”104  Facebook calls itself “a social utility that 
connects you with the people around you,”105 that “is made up of 
many networks, each based around a company, region, high school 
or college,”106 which will allow you to “share information with 
people you know, see what’s going on with your friends, and look 
up people around you.”107 Friendster’s website states that 
“Friendster is the best way to stay in touch with your friends and 
it’s the fastest way to discover the people and things that matter 
to you most.”108  LiveJournal “is a simple-to-use communication 
tool that lets you express yourself and connect with friends 
online,”109 which you can use “in many different ways: as a private 
journal, a blog, a social network and much more.”110  Lastly, 
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 MySpace labels itself as “an online community that lets you meet 
your friends’ friends,”111 where you can “share photos, journals 
and interests with your growing network of mutual friends.”112  
While most adults are dumfounded by these sites, “they function 
very much like the malls and burger joints of earlier eras,”113 
where young people go “to hang out, gossip, posture, dare, and 
generally figure out how the world works.”114 
Social-networking sites “have literally exploded in popularity 
in a few short years.”115  A recent poll shows that “87 percent of 
those aged 12 to 17 use the Internet on a regular basis.”116  In 
addition, “of this 87 percent, approximately 61 percent report 
having personal profiles on networking Web sites like MySpace[] 
[or] Facebook. . .”117  While other sites are certainly utilized, 
MySpace is the most popular of the social-networking sites.118  
MySpace “currently has more than 100 million profiles, with 
230,000 new members signing up everyday.”119  In July of 2006 
MySpace “became the most-visited Web site in the United States 
over Google and Yahoo Mail,120 and accounted for “81% of visitors 
to leading social-networking sites, according to Hitwise, a market 
research company.”121  The thoughts of one teenager, “[if] you are 
not on MySpace, you don’t exist,”122 demonstrate that MySpace is 
“a cultural requirement for American high school students.”123 
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 B. Fears Over Social Networking Sites 
Since social-networking sites have exploded in popularity they 
have become the focus of intense parental, and thus political, 
concern.124  It is true that “[a]mong the many millions of people 
visiting these sites, some, indeed are sexual predators, and there 
have been some highly publicized accounts of teenagers who’ve 
been lured into offline meetings at which they have been 
[sexually] assaulted.”125  In what has been deemed the first 
lawsuit of its kind, a fourteen-year-old girl and her mother sued 
MySpace and its parent company News Corporation Incorporated, 
alleging that the girl was raped after meeting a man she met on 
the site.126  The complaint details how the girl, even though she 
was under the age of fourteen, created a profile and was soon 
contacted by Peter Solis (Solis), a nineteen-year-old community 
college student (who had told the girl he was fourteen), whom she 
then began communicating with on a regular basis.127  The girl 
“eventually met him for dinner and a movie after which they drove 
in his car to the parking lot of an apartment complex, where, the 
complaint alleges, he sexually assaulted her.”128  The complaint 
“makes claims against MySpace and News Corp[oration] for 
negligence, gross negligence, fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation and against Solis for sexual assault and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress,”129 for which the 
plaintiff “seeks damages for present and future medical and 
psychological care, pecuniary loss, mental anguish, psychological 
trauma, pain and suffering, and emotional distress.”130  The 
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 complaint details what the plaintiff deems to be “a disturbing 
number of incidents [that] have occurred nationwide in which 
adult MySpace users contacted young underage MySpace users on 
MySpace,”131 then “arranged to meet the minors, and often 
sexually assaulted them.”132  The plaintiff contends, “there are 
absolutely no meaningful protections or security measures to 
protect young underage users from being contacted by sexual 
predators on MySpace.”133  Understandably “parents are 
traumatized by such stories,”134 however there is real debate over 
whether these concerns are warranted.135 
Many argue that the “national media coverage of MySpace 
and other similar sites has overplayed a few instances of child 
predation online,”136 and created a situation that is “ripe for moral 
panic.”137  The media would have people believe that social-
networking sites are “a haven for online sexual predators who 
have made these corners of the Web their own virtual hunting 
ground.”138  “The latest wave of parental concern seems to have 
been largely spurred by ‘To Catch a Predator,’ a series on the NBC 
news magazine program ‘Dateline’ that began in September of 
2004.”139  Through the use of hidden cameras, this program has 
offered “visual evidence,”140 of pedophiles coming to meet children 
they initially contacted over the Internet.141  Seen as the 
“complete and utter tipping point,”142 “To Catch A Predator,” has 
the American public “convinced the Internet Bogeyman is going to 
come into their window.”143 
Danah Boyd, a Ph.D student at the School of Information at 
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 the University of California-Berkley, has done extensive research 
on social-networking sites, and argues that “[t]he media coverage 
of predators on MySpace implies that 1) all youth are at risk of 
being stalked and molested because of MySpace; 2) prohibiting 
youth from participating on MySpace will stop predators from 
attacking kids,”144 and that “[b]oth are misleading; neither is 
true.”145  Statistics prove that “kids are more at risk at a church 
picnic or a boy scout outing than they are when they go on 
MySpace.”146  The risk is often covered extensively, while few 
actual cases emerge, exploiting anxiety and feeding fears.147  
When people are allowed to “indulge[] in fear mongering”148 there 
is naturally “a call to take action, even if it is wrong, a call to 
action which races well ahead of any serious research or 
thoughtful reflection on the matters at hand.”149 
Unfortunately, “it was in this atmosphere that the House of 
Representatives passed the Deleting Online Predators Act, or 
DOPA.”150  Given the fervor of “MySpace Madness,”151 the 
legislation was eagerly embraced by politicians who wished to 
appear “pro-child and pro-family.”152  The DOPA was proposed by 
Senator Michael Fitzpatrick, a Republican Senator from 
Pennsylvania,153 who was a member of the Suburban Caucus, “a 
newly formed group of Republican representatives who are 
focused on addressing the concerns of suburban voters.”154 
Legislative history demonstrates that Congress played upon the 
fears promulgated by the media, and touted the DOPA as 
legislation that would combat “the dark underside of social 
networking Web sites, which have been stalking grounds for 
sexual predators who are preying on children all across the 
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 nation.”155  Advocates of the legislation argued, “[s]ocial 
networking sites such as MySpace and chat rooms have allowed 
sexual predators to sneak into homes and solicit kids,”156 and 
through these cyber-relationships, children are being 
victimized.157  Reports to Congress detail the process of 
“grooming,” where “by communicating with children regularly 
over the Internet, the child predator is able to befriend the child 
and make him or her comfortable with sharing personal 
information with someone he or she has not met face-to-face,”158 
and then “[e]ventually these communications become sexual in 
nature, often as a precursor to asking the child to meet the 
predator or to share sexual images of herself or himself.”159  The 
DOPA was described as a new tool to protect our children from 
online sexual predators, and its supporters challenged anyone to 
oppose.  The truth is “[w]ith the media whipping the nation into 
hysteria about the perils of MySpace, what politician wouldn’t 
want to be seen as protecting kids?”160  The fear factor was alive 
and well, and “whatever their real opinion, politicians. . .vote[d] 
for DOPA rather than risk being painted as pro-predator.”161  
When panic is a component, “the Web gets censored in an 
increasingly broad, slipshod way,”162 which was clearly the case 
with the DOPA.  The DOPA “raises questions about how much the 
federal government should regulate the Internet,”163 and while 
protection is a necessary goal it should not be “pursued to the 
detriment of a legitimate and often vital exchange of ideas.”164  
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 The DOPA raises “red flags for all First Amendment 
advocates,”165 because it “threatens free speech and education 
online, while doing little to deter online predators.”166 
Congress, faced with growing media hype over isolated 
incidents of child predation, and genuine concern for child safety, 
passed the DOPA.  While Congress’ intentions were undoubtedly 
righteous, the DOPA goes beyond the goal of protecting children 
and infringes on First Amendment rights. 
IV. THE DELETING ONLINE PREDATORS ACT 
Officially, the Deleting Online Predators Act would “amend 
the Communications Act of 1934 to require recipients of universal 
service support for schools and libraries to protect minors from 
commercial social networking sites and chat rooms.”167  The 
legislation conditions E-rate funding for schools upon proof that 
they are: 
Enforcing a policy of Internet safety for minors that 
includes monitoring the online activities of minors and 
the operation of a technology protection measure with 
respect to any of its computers with Internet access that 
(I) protects against access through such computers to 
visual depictions that are obscene; child pornography; or 
harmful to minors; and (II) protects against access to a 
commercial social networking website or chat room unless 
used for an educational purpose with adult 
supervision.168 
In addition, E-rate funding for libraries is conditioned upon 
certification that the library: 
Is enforcing a policy of Internet safety that includes the 
operation of a technology protection measure with respect 
to any of its computers with Internet access that protects 
against access through such computers to visual 
depictions that are obscene; child pornography; or 
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 harmful to minors; and protects against access by minors 
without parental authorization to a commercial social 
networking website or chat room, and informs parents 
that sexual predators can use these websites and chat 
rooms to prey on children.169 
While the final definition of a commercial social-networking 
website will be determined by the Federal Communications 
Commission, the DOPA suggests that the Commission: 
Take into consideration the extent to which a website is 
offered by a commercial entity; permits registered users 
to create an on-line profile that includes detailed personal 
information; permits registered users to create an on-line 
journal and share such a journal with other users; elicits 
highly-personalized information from users; and enables 
communication among users.170 
The bill would allow access to these sites in schools with adult 
supervision and only if the site is being accessed for an 
educational purpose.171  In libraries access to the blocked sites 
would be allowed during use by an adult or by minors with adult 
supervision to enable access for educational purposes.172  Finally, 
the DOPA requires the Federal Trade Commission to: 
Issue a consumer alert regarding the potential dangers to 
children of Internet child predators, including the 
potential danger of commercial social networking 
websites and chat rooms through which personal 
information about child users of such websites may be 
accessed by child predators, and establish a website to 
serve as a resource for information for parents, teachers 
and school administrators, and others regarding the 
potential dangers posed by the use of the Internet by 
children, including information about commercial social 
networking websites and chat rooms through which 
personal information about child users of such websites 
may be accessed by child predators.173 
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 V. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS WITH THE DOPA IN LIGHT 
OF THE RULING IN UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY 
ASSOCIATION 
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court held that unlike 
invasive radio or television, the Internet is not “subject to the type 
of government supervision and regulation that has attended the 
broadcast industry.”174  For the Court, the Internet is entitled to 
the highest degree of First Amendment protection similar to the 
protection afforded to print media.175  However, the Court has 
consistently acknowledged that the government has a compelling 
interest in protecting children from physical and psychological 
harm, including obscene and indecent material.176  As a result, 
the government can apply restrictions for children in areas where 
they would not be allowed to limit adults, and these restrictions 
are often given deference by the courts.177  According to the Court, 
Congress finally found an acceptable balance between these 
competing concerns when it passed the CIPA,178 the only child 
protection Internet regulation to pass judicial scrutiny thus far.179  
The DOPA has been compared to the CIPA, as proponents see this 
new legislation as simply an extension of what had already been 
deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court.180  The CIPA is 
considered “the dominant federal law in the area of schools, 
libraries, and the Internet,”181 so it is seems crucial to analyze the 
constitutionality of the DOPA under the same framework utilized 
by the Court in United States v. American Library Association.  
Even when analyzed under the American Library Association 
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 structure the DOPA is constitutionally problematic because the 
filters lead to extensive overblocking of constitutionally protected 
speech. 
A. Level of Scrutiny 
With the CIPA, the Court held that “the government has 
broad discretion to make content based judgments in deciding 
what private speech to make available to the public.”182  The first 
crucial step in the Court’s analysis was determining whether a 
library is considered a public forum for purposes of First 
Amendment examination.183  The public forum analysis 
determines the level of scrutiny the Court will apply to the 
challenged legislation.184  Content-based restrictions aimed at a 
public forum require strict scrutiny, while content-based 
regulations aimed at a non-public forum only have to survive 
rational basis.185  While examining the constitutionality of the 
CIPA, the Court held that libraries are not considered public 
forums for purposes of the First Amendment, and that libraries 
offer their resources “to facilitate research, learning, and 
recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and 
appropriate quality.”186  Thus, the Court reviewed the CIPA under 
a rational basis standard, but only with a plurality of justices 
agreeing.187  Although American Library Association did not 
discuss schools, the Court has held that “school facilities may be 
deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by 
policy or by practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use 
by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as 
student organizations.”188  In addition, “[t]he government does not 
create a public forum by inactions or by permitting limited 
disclosure, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional 
forum for public discourse.”189  For the Court, “the Internet is 
simply another method for making information available in a 
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 school or library.”190  Therefore any constitutional challenge to the 
DOPA, which is aimed at both schools and libraries, will likely be 
subject to rational basis review.  Rational basis review requires 
the government to only show a legitimate state interest and that 
the law in question is rationally related to that interest.191  Even 
under rational basis, which is viewed as an undemanding 
standard, the DOPA does not pass constitutional scrutiny because 
the commercial social-networking definition is so broad that it is 
irrational. 
Some argue that the DOPA should be subject to a higher 
degree of scrutiny.  This argument is analogous to Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in American Library Association.192  For Breyer the 
CIPA should have been analyzed under “heightened, but not 
strict, scrutiny,”193 where the Court should have “examin[ed] the 
statutory requirements in question with special care.”194  This 
was especially necessary when “complex, competing constitutional 
interests are potentially at issue or speech-related harm is 
potentially justified by unusually strong governmental 
interests.”195  Under this heightened scrutiny, the Court must 
determine “whether the harm to speech-related interests is 
disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the 
potential alternatives.”196  To resolve this question the Court 
should consider “the legitimacy of the statute’s objective, the 
extent to which the statute will tend to achieve that objective, 
whether there are other, less restrictive ways of achieving that 
objective, and ultimately whether the statute works speech-
related harm that, in relation to that objective, is out of 
proportion.”197  Ultimately Justice Breyer found that even under 
the heightened scrutiny, “[g]iven the comparatively small burden 
that the Act imposes upon the library patron seeking legitimate 
Internet materials, I cannot say that any speech-related harm 
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 that the Act may cause is disproportionate when considered in 
relation to the Act’s legitimate objectives.”198  Because the 
decision in American Library Association was only a plurality 
opinion, many argue that rational basis review will not be the last 
word on such filtering issues.  It is possible that in the future the 
Court might review legislation such as the DOPA under Breyer’s 
heightened scrutiny standard, a view more in keeping with 
decisions prior to American Library Association.199  Reviewing 
legislation under  heightened scrutiny allows the Court to 
question the fit of the law and its objectives, as well as less 
onerous filtering alternatives.200  These issues were discussed at 
length in earlier cases deciding the constitutionality of 
Congressional attempts at regulating the Internet for children.201  
Logically if the DOPA fails rational basis, it also would be 
constitutionally infirm under a heightened scrutiny as well. 
B. Broad Definition of Commercial Social-Networking Sites 
Leads to Overblocking 
Critics challenged the CIPA because of “its tendency to 
overblock access to constitutionally protected speech that falls 
outside the categories software users intend to block.”202  The 
objective of the CIPA was to “block images that constitute 
obscenity or child pornography, and to prevent minors from 
obtaining access to material that is harmful to them,”203 however 
challengers argued that the legislation screened out material that 
was constitutionally protected.  This was of particular concern 
regarding adults, for they would “be denied access to a substantial 
amount of non-obscene material harmful to children but lawful for 
adult examination, and a substantial quantity of text and pictures 
harmful to no one.”204  The Court seemed to summarily dismiss 
this argument by holding that “such concerns are dispelled by the 
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 ease with which patrons may have the filtering software 
disabled.”205  The CIPA allowed the filters to be disabled “to 
enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purposes,”206 
and stated that adults can ask for the filters to be disabled at 
anytime.207 
While a disabling feature salvaged the CIPA, it is unlikely 
that the DOPA’s disabling element would produce the same result.  
The CIPA filters were aimed at preventing certain types of 
harmful information to reach minors, so websites were filtered 
based on content,208 however, the DOPA proposed filters, created 
to prevent harmful information from reaching minors, appear 
more focused on technology than content.  Instead of blocking sites 
that simply contain harmful information, the DOPA would make 
restrictions based on the technology of the website,209 under the 
assumption that sites utilizing this technology are “a haven for 
online sexual predators who have made these corners of the Web 
their own virtual hunting ground.”210  Essentially the DOPA 
would require blocking access to the social-networking sites 
themselves, without even looking at whether there was harmful 
material on the site.  This restriction would reach more 
constitutionally protected speech, for both minors and adults, than 
a filter that might prevent initial access to 
www.SuperBowlXXX.com  because it contains the keywords 
“XXX.”211  While the majority of the speech blocked by the CIPA is 
harmful to minors, most of the speech blocked by the DOPA is not 
harmful, and thus constitutionally protected.212  Although the 
DOPA allows access to social-networking sites for educational 
purposes with adult supervision,213 this is likely not enough when 
one considers the sheer magnitude of websites caught in the cross-
 
 205. Id. at 209. 
 206. Id. at 201 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) and 47 U.S.C. § 254 
(h)(6)(d)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 207. See id. (quoting U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(d)). 
 208. See Children’s Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2001). 
 209. Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 210. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5884 (2006) (statement of Rep. Upton). 
 211. See Ann Beeson & Chris Hansen, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace 
Burning, ACLU Legal Department, Mar. 17, 2002, http://www.aclu.org/ 
privacy/speech/15145pub20020317.html. 
 212. See 152 CONG. REC. H5885 (2006) (Mr. Stupak quoting the American 
Library Association). 
 213. See Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 fire.  The majority of the blocked websites would contain speech 
that is protected both for children and adults.  The language of the 
DOPA is “overly broad and too restrictive,”214 and thus is 
irrational in scope. 
Even with disabling provisions, the number and assortment of 
websites that would be ensnared in the DOPA’s proposed 
definition for commercial social-networking sites is intolerable 
even under a rational basis standard.  The DOPA would “put off-
limits a wide swath of the Internet: MySpace, but also Blogger, 
AIM, parts of Google and Yahoo!, and perhaps even news sites like 
the NYTimes.com (which allows visitors to create profiles and add 
comments).”215  In addition the DOPA would block blogging tools, 
mailing lists, video and podcast sites, and photo sharing sites,216 
and even sites like Amazon.com (where you can make a wish list) 
and the government’s own First Gov website.217  The potential for 
children to obtain or encounter harmful material through social-
networking sites, “may not be enough to overcome the free speech 
problems that the bill creates by its broad restrictions on access to 
and use of this and similar sites,”218 even under rational basis. 
When one takes into consideration the potentially positive 
attributes of the material being overblocked by the DOPA, the 
lack of a rational relationship between the objective of protecting 
children, and the all encompassing commercial social-networking 
definition is clear. The DOPA’s description of a commercial social-
networking site does not take into account the “real pedagogical 
value”219 of Internet sites labeled under the definition.  Teachers 
are beginning to: 
Use blogs for knowledge sharing in schools; they use 
mailing lists to communicate expectations about 
homework with students and parents;”220 “[t]hey are 
discovering that students take their assignments more 
seriously and write better if they are producing work 
which will reach a larger public rather than simply sit on 
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 a teacher’s desks;”221 and they are “linking together 
classrooms around the country and around the world, 
getting kids from different cultural backgrounds to share 
aspects of their everyday experience with each other.”222 
If according to the Court, the “worthy mission”223 of libraries 
and schools is to “facilitate learning and cultural enrichment,”224 
it seems unlikely that it would accept such a tenuous link between 
protecting children, and blocking all social-networking sites. 
In addition to the loss of educational tools, “there are 
countless positive uses for networking applications that are not 
necessarily related to formal education.”225  The definition of a 
commercial social-net-working site would include “educational 
tools used to provide distance education, community forums that 
allow children to discuss issues of importance, online e-mail 
programs through which family members can communicate with 
each other and with teachers and librarians at their local schools 
and libraries, and even find one another in case of emergency.”226  
The commercial social-networking site definition found in the 
DOPA appears to assume that all sites that fit into the definition 
harbor some material that is harmful to children, but the 
definition fails to take into consideration “the value of Interactive 
Web applications.”227  Social-networking sites “include support 
groups for teenagers with physical and emotional disabilities, 
forums for the exchange of ideas, and even tools to help kids 
become acclimated to new surroundings.”228  For instance, “David 
Smith, executive director and founder of Mobilizing America’s 
Youth, the Washington D.C. based group that operates 
Mobilize.org, said that many students . . . are finding that social 
networking sites can be a great tool for social activism.”229  In 
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 March of 2006, “thousands of high school students across the 
country, including an estimated 40,000 in Southern California, 
walked out of school in protest of the anti-illegal immigration 
legislation, many of which were organized in part on MySpace.”230  
Danah Boyd, argues that “giving youth access to a public of their 
peers, MySpace provides a fertile ground for identity development 
and cultural integration.231  In addition, the DOPA may “increase 
the digital divide,”232 because “lower-income kids may have their 
only access [to the Internet] at schools or libraries,”233 and thus 
would be prevented from “participat[ing] in online 
communications, websites, and from learn[ing] the skills that 
come from the use of such sites.”234  Research proves that these 
“[n]ew Internet-based applications (also known as social-
networking technologies) for collaboration, business, and learning 
are becoming increasingly important, and young people must be 
prepared to thrive in a work atmosphere where meetings take 
place online and where online social networks are essential 
communication tools.”235 
In American Library Association, the Court determined that 
under the CIPA, the number of overblocked sites would not create 
a significant restraint on constitutionally protected speech, 
because the content-based filters were specifically targeted “to 
prevent computer users from gaining Internet access to child 
pornography, obscenity or material comparably harmful to 
minors,”236 and the ease with which the filters could be 
disabled.237  Alternatively, the DOPA would place a significant 
burden on protected speech because the technology-based filters 
have little rational connection to the proposed basis for the 
legislation, which is protecting minors from obscene material, 
child pornography, and any other material that might be deemed 
harmful to minors.238  While “it is important to protect children 
from predators, laws should not inflict the collateral damage of 
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 preventing Internet use.”239  Given the widespread filtering 
authorized under the DOPA, even the disabling feature does little 
to cure the constitutional infirmity of overblocking.  Because the 
DOPA would purposefully block access to many valuable “websites 
whose benefits outweigh their detriments,”240 a library patron or 
student would be forced to ask to release a significantly higher 
percentage of websites they wished to visit  This does not equate 
with the “ease with which patrons may have the software 
disabled,”241 for inadvertently blocked websites under the CIPA.  
The DOPA as it was written would not survive constitutional 
scrutiny under rational basis because blocking access to all 
commercial social-networking sites is unreasonable when the 
focus of the legislation is to protect children from harmful 
material on the Internet.  If the mandated filters from the CIPA 
are formatted to block harmful material, the definition espoused 
in the DOPA does not add additional safeguards; it simply blocks 
additional protected speech.  The DOPA is so overbroad it is 
irrational, and thus does not pass constitutional muster. 
VI. THE DEMISE OF THE DOPA AND THE BIRTH OF THE 
PROTECTING CHILDREN IN THE 21ST CENTURY ACT 
Luckily the DOPA never became law.242 However, even if it 
had, it would have been struck down on First Amendment 
grounds.  After passing in the House of Representatives by an 
overwhelming majority thanks to unusual bipartisan support,243 
the legislation lingered in the Senate after having been referred to 
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.244  
When a new session of Congress began in January of 2007, all 
proposed bills and resolutions that had not passed (including 
DOPA), were removed from consideration.245  In addition, the 
DOPA’s main sponsor, Michael Fitzpatrick, lost his bid for re-
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 election in November of 2006 when he was defeated by the 
Democratic challenger, Patrick Murphy.246  Although this 
momentarily allowed school children across the country to breathe 
a sigh of relief,247 commentators agreed that it was very “possible 
that in the next session . . . the issue of social networking 
technologies might come to the forefront again.”248  Harsh critics 
of the DOPA worry that another MySpace-related panic will lead 
to new legislation aimed at social-networking sites.249 
These fears were cemented on January 4, 2007 when Senator 
Ted Stevens of Alaska proposed the Protecting Children in the 21st 
Century Act.250  Although the legislation is in its very early stages 
and has just recently been referred to the Senate Commerce, 
Science and Transportation Committee,251 many are already 
labeling the legislation as the “DOPA Jr.,”252 or “DOPA II.”253  
The asserted purpose of the new legislation is “to amend the 
Communications Act of 1934 to prevent the carriage of child 
pornography by video service providers, to protect children from 
online predators, and to restrict the sale or purchase of children’s 
personal information in interstate commerce.”254  The second 
section of the new bill is even called “Deleting Online 
Predators,”255 and this section contains virtually the same 
language as the DOPA.256  In addition to the DOPA language, this 
section also calls for “a policy of Internet safety for minors that 
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 prevents cyberbullying and includes monitoring the online 
activities of minors and the operation of a technology protection 
measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet 
access.”257  As written, the Protecting Children in the 21st Century 
Act would raise the exact same constitutional concerns as the 
DOPA, with the additional concern that this legislation is still 
viable and susceptible to the same fear mongering.  On Tuesday, 
February 13, 2007, “Dateline” aired the results of its ninth 
undercover investigation in the “To Catch a Predator” series.258  
The continual visibility of such remote threats is bound to keep 
“MySpace Madness”259 alive and well, and the pressure on 
Congress to protect our nation’s children will be stronger then 
ever. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In addition to the constitutional questions surrounding the 
DOPA and similar legislation, there is the realization by many 
that this type of legislation would do little to protect children from 
danger on the Internet.260  The reality is, “Internet protection is a 
moving target, and social networking is evolving more quickly 
than the legislation aimed at regulating it.”261  Many advocates of 
child safety believe that the most effective way to protect children 
is through education where children can “learn how to use all 
kinds of applications safely and effectively, and where young 
people can learn how to report and avoid unsafe sites.”262  It is 
difficult to see the wisdom in legislation that would “actually drive 
children to go to unsupervised places, to go online, where they will 
become more vulnerable to child predators.”263  To truly shield 
children from harmful material, Congress cannot let emotion and 
fear play a predominant role in legislation, because “reacting in 
ignorance and fear. . . they increase the risks and discard the 
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 benefits of these emerging cultural practices.”264  Congress should 
“take the initiative to research, identify, and develop the most 
effective means to protect minors without restricting their access 
to constitutionally and socially essential materials.”265  The DOPA 
does not represent the most effective means to protect children 
from harmful material on the Internet because it would be struck 
down as a violation of the First Amendment due to pervasive 
needless overblocking. 
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Undocumented Immigrants and Their 
Personal Injury Actions: Keeping 
Immigration Policy Out of Lost Wage 
Awards and Enforcing the 
Compensatory and Deterrent 
Functions of Tort Law 
Immigration is by definition a gesture of faith in social 
mobility.  It is the expression in action of a positive belief in the 
possibility of a better life.  It has thus contributed greatly to 
developing the spirit of personal betterment in American society 
and to strengthening the national confidence in change and the 
future.  Such confidence, when widely shared, sets the national 
tone.  The opportunities that America offered made the dream real, 
at least for a good many; but that dream itself was in large part the 
product of millions of plain people beginning a new life in the 
conviction that life could indeed be better, and each new wave of 
immigration rekindled the dream. 
                                                                       John F. Kennedy1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today approximately 10.5 million undocumented immigrants2 
 
 1. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 67-68 (1964). 
 2. For the purposes of this article, the population of immigrants who do 
not have documentation to reside legally in the United States will be referred 
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STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1192 (4th 
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claims which afford them remedies under the law.  See id.  Furthermore, the 
term “alien” even when used alone, carries its own negative implications.  Id.  
The term is isolationist, relegating even “legal” immigrants to the outer 
 live within the borders of the United States and the number keeps 
growing.3  The undocumented population is increasing at the 
average rate of 408,000 people per year.4  Combined with the 
documented population, the immigrant population is at its largest 
level in history and continues to increase.5  It is against this 
backdrop that the topic of immigration receives extensive publicity 
via the media and, with the advent of the internet, public opinion 
is much more accessible.6  While at first glance, public sentiment 
about immigrants appears increasingly negative, public opinion 
fluctuates dramatically over short periods of time.7  This wavering 
opinion of and uncertainty about the immigrant population is not 
surprising, however, considering that the factual basis on which 
such opinions are premised is mixed and inconsistent at best.8 
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AND THE FOREIGN BORN: 1995 TO 2000, at 1 (Aug. 2003), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-11.pdf.  The total immigrant 
population (documented and undocumented) in 2000 was 31.1 million, an 
increase of 57% in 10 years.  Id. 
 6. The advent of the internet perhaps allows more fringe views on 
immigration to be accessible to the average citizen.  There are innumerable 
websites devoted to anti-immigration policy which might give rise to an 
inference that Americans are anti-immigrant.  See, e.g., Border Guardians, 
http://www.borderguardians.org (promoting the burning of Mexican flags at 
anti-immigration rallies); Boycott Mexico, http://www.boycottmexico.com 
(calling Mexico the “neighbor from hell”); NoInvaders.org, http:// 
www.NoInvaders.org (listing the names, addresses and related information of 
companies across the United States that allegedly hire undocumented 
immigrants). 
 7. In a recent Gallup Poll, people were asked whether they favored 
reducing immigration.  Only 39% of respondents to the June 2006 poll 
favored a reduction in immigration.  See Gallup’s Pulse of Democracy: 
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social and environmental areas of American life is diverse.  There is no 
consensus.  Is it a wonder Americans are confused?  For example, some argue 
that immigration causes economic disadvantage for low-skilled Americans 
who must compete for jobs with immigrants, see, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, 
HEAVEN’S DOOR – IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 63-64 
 This inconsistency seeps not only into the minds of Americans 
but also into the law.  While controlling immigration, with an 
emphasis on undocumented immigration, is the traditional focus 
of immigration law,9 there is an insidious movement to address 
immigration issues through the back door of tort law by denying 
undocumented immigrants a full course of remedies for their 
injuries.10  Specifically, attempts have been made to deny 
undocumented immigrants the right to collect lost wages11 in 
personal injury actions with varying results.12  The result of 
focusing on immigration policy when awarding lost wages in tort 
actions is nothing less than erratic.13  Some undocumented 
immigrants are denied any right to collect lost wages,14 whereas 
others are allowed to collect lost wages based on American wage 
rates,15 while yet others are allowed to establish lost wages based 
on the wage rates of their country of origin.16  The focus on 
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 immigration policy thus negates the compensatory nature of tort 
law by inadequately and sporadically compensating 
undocumented immigrants for injuries they suffer as a result of 
another’s negligence. 
As a hypothetical example, assume Ms. A, an undocumented 
immigrant from Guatemala, has resided in Rhode Island for 12 
years.  Ms. A has worked all twelve years at a local mill on a full-
time basis at the rate of $8.00 per hour.  While walking home from 
work one evening, she is hit by a drunk driver.  Ms. A sustains 
serious injuries and is out of work for one year, losing over 
$16,000.00 in wages.  Under the present system of awarding lost 
wages, there are three possible outcomes to this scenario.  First, 
Ms. A finds herself before a court whose primary agenda is 
promoting federal immigration policy and is thus denied lost 
wages because she is in the country illegally.  Alternately, Ms. A 
finds herself before a court that tries to balance tort policy and 
federal immigration policy resulting in an award of past lost 
wages based on the rate of pay she would earn in Guatemala, 
$2.00 per hour, leaving her with a lost wage award of 
approximately $4,000.00.  Finally, Ms. A finds herself before of a 
court whose interest in a personal injury case is to abide by the 
compensatory and deterrence functions of tort law, in which case 
Ms. A is granted the opportunity to collect lost wages based on 
American wage rates, thus being fully compensated for her injury. 
This Note argues that whether or not an immigrant is 
documented or undocumented, lost wage awards in personal 
injury actions should always be based on American wage rates.  
There is no legal basis for denying undocumented immigrants lost 
wage awards based on American wage rates in personal injury 
actions.  The Supreme Court has never decided such a case.  In 
addition, while the Federal Government is responsible for 
developing immigration law and policy, awarding lost wages to 
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions is not 
preempted by federal immigration policy.  Finally, when the 
courts fail to award lost wages based on American wage rates, the 
compensatory and deterrent functions of tort law, which should be 
the primary consideration in personal injury cases, are completely 
diminished.  Not only do lost wage awards based on an 
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 undocumented immigrant’s home country wage rates diminish the 
efficacy of tort principles, but they also hinder the enforcement of 
immigration law.  Awarding lost wages based on American wage 
rates serves a dual purpose in the enforcement of immigration 
law.  First, it serves as a deterrent for employers who might 
otherwise be willing to hire undocumented immigrants to work in 
unsafe working conditions and take the risk knowing that even if 
an immigrant is injured, the employer may not have to pay lost 
wages.  Second, even when the negligent party is not an employer, 
the backlash employers might face when a negligent party is 
forced to pay an undocumented immigrant lost wages serves as a 
secondary deterrence function which promotes immigration policy. 
Part II of this Note outlines the historical development of the 
areas of immigration law and tort law, delineating the unique 
policies driving each area of the law.  Part III of this Note 
examines the issue of awarding lost wages to undocumented 
immigrants and the bases of analysis in addressing the manner 
and method of awards.  Specifically, there is a close examination 
of the Supreme Court case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB17 and a discussion of why this lost wage case arising out of 
a conflict between two federal labor law statutes is not applicable 
to tort actions.  Further, this Note addresses the preemption 
argument against awarding lost wages.  This Note analyzes how, 
in fact, lost wage awards in personal injury actions are not 
preempted by federal immigration policy.  Part III of this Note 
examines the policy arguments supporting awards of lost wages to 
undocumented immigrants.  This Note concludes with the 
suggestion that lost wage awards in personal injury cases of 
undocumented immigrants should always be based on American 
wage rates in order to promote the policies of tort law and that, 
further, in promoting tort policy, immigration law and policy will 
be best served. 
 
 17. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND TORT LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A.   Evolution of  Immigration Law 
1.    Early Developments 
Prior to the 1800s, immigration law was primarily committed 
to the control of the states.18  Immigration legislation was largely 
unnecessary in a fledgling nation in need of populating itself.19  
The policy of the time was come one, come all.20  Unspoken 
promises of religious freedom and a tolerant government induced 
immigrants to leave their homelands.21  With undeveloped land 
and a new world came the knowledge that a hard-working person 
could create a new life and accumulate wealth.22  States passed 
few anti-immigration laws at this time because of the need for and 
value of labor.23  Furthermore, early attempts by the federal 
government to restrict immigration met with animosity.24  Thus, 
federal regulation was generally restricted to pro-immigrant 
legislation.25  Under this policy of promoting the growth of a 
fledgling country, the nation grew exponentially.26 From 1790 to 
1850 approximately 2,515,000 foreigners migrated to the United 
States.27 
 
 18. LEGOMSKY, supra note 2, at 2. 
 19. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[1] 
(2004). 
 20. Id.  There is some dissent as to how inclusive immigration laws were 
even under state control.  See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of 
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835-36 
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 22. Id. at 10. 
 23. Id. at 17. 
 24. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[1].  The Alien Act of 1798 gave the 
President power to remove any alien he thought to be dangerous from the 
U.S.  Id.  The Act was allowed to lapse after a two year time period because it 
was so unpopular.  Id. 
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ships carrying immigrants to the U.S. was passed.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: 1820-
1924, at 99 (1926). 
 With the late 1800s came increased involvement by the 
federal government in the area of immigration.  The first general 
immigration law28 enacted by the Federal Government was a tax 
of 50 cents imposed on any non-citizen passenger coming by ship 
to the United States.29  During this time period, labor groups were 
organizing with an agenda focused on limiting the influx of 
contracted labor from outside of the United States.30  While the 
agenda was focused on labor issues, much of the labor group 
agendas also carried racial undertones.31  Under the pressure of 
labor groups and other anti-immigrant proponents, the rise of 
immigration restriction began in 1882 with the enactment of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act,32 which banned the entry of Chinese 
laborers into the United States.33  In 1885, Congress passed a 
law34 to discourage the importation of foreign laborers unless they 
were needed for a new industry in which there was unmet 
demand.35  The law was amended in 188836 to allow for 
deportation of certain contract laborers.37  It is important to note 
that much of this legislation passed during a period of time in 
which depletion of open land and the competitive labor force was 
increasing.38  Thus, the open policy of immigration which incited 
 
 28. Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. 
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 37. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[2]. 
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 development of a nation quickly turned into immigration control.  
Even during this time period, the focal point of many of the 
immigration laws was not only centered on labor but, more 
importantly, on employers.39  Finally, in 1891, immigration came 
under federal control40 with the creation of the Bureau of 
Immigration.41 
While earlier legislation generally focused on labor and 
employment issues, the development of the Bureau of 
Immigration brought about an even more exclusionist 
immigration policy.  The Bureau’s creation incidentally occurred 
in the “depression-scarred” 1890s.42 The 1891 act that created the 
Bureau also excluded from entering the United States various 
groups including paupers, people suffering from contagious 
diseases, and people convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.43  The 
act further called for deportation proceedings against anyone who 
entered the country illegally.44  In 1903, the list of excludable 
immigrants grew to include such groups as beggars and 
epileptics.45  In 1907, the feeble-minded and children without 
parents were added to the ever-growing list of excludable 
immigrants.46  While exclusion of the above classes of immigrants 
was originally intended to limit entry for those immigrants who 
were unable, due to physical or mental health problems, to care 
for themselves, the restrictions ultimately were used to exclude 
physically and mentally capable but poor immigrants.47 
Restrictive immigration regulation reached its zenith in 191748 
with the passage of legislation requiring a literacy test for all 
incoming immigrants.49  While the earlier exclusionist laws 
targeted what were thought to be “undesirables,”50  the literacy 
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 46. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. 
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 49. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 46. 
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 test was a general restriction on all immigrants to the United 
States signaling a nuanced shift in immigration policy in the 
United States.  Even though the literacy test was only enacted in 
1917, it was discussed and promoted as early as 1912,51 at which 
time immigration was reaching its peak.52  Compounding the 
problem was the fact that World War I brought with it a sharp 
decrease in immigration,53 but people realized that the end of the 
War would bring along with it refugees from war-torn, ravaged 
countries,54 resulting in mass immigration.  Thus, the political 
climate of the times facilitated passage of the literacy 
requirement.  While the literacy requirement was ineffective in 
limiting immigration to the United States, its significance lay in 
the fact that it garnered overwhelming support despite its 
restrictionist nature. 55 
By the end of World War I, immigration began to increase but 
not at the “flood” rates that many anticipated.56  Even so, the 
trend of restrictionist immigration policy continued influenced 
largely by the post-war economic depression.57  Many of the 
unemployed were war veterans, and this fact combined with the 
threat of jobs being taken away from these men by immigrants, 
stirred up “anti-immigrant hysteria.”58  At this time the United 
States adopted a quota system59 to control immigration, beginning 
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 with the Quota Law of 1921,60 a temporary measure that 
remained in place until 1924 when a permanent quota policy61 
was enacted by Congress.62  The quota laws signaled another 
subtle shift in immigration policy towards decreasing immigration 
altogether.63  The quota policy implemented by the Immigration 
Act of 1924 limited immigration by nationality, based on the 
number of people of that nationality in the United States in 1920 
up to 150,000.64  The result was a decrease in immigration of 
nationalities governed by the quota system, particularly southern 
and eastern European immigrants.65  The restrictive limitations 
on immigration that developed over the years remained largely 
unchanged until 1952. 
2.    The Immigration and Nationality Act 
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), which codified existing legislation, loosened some 
restrictions barring naturalization of East Asians, and simplified 
reunification of husbands and wives.66  The most restrictive 
aspect of the previous immigration laws, however—the national 
origins quota system based on 1920 census statistics—remained 
intact.67  While still largely restrictive, the more liberal elements 
of the legislation were the result of the post-Cold War sentiment 
which emphasized America’s role as the leader of the free world.68  
The national origins quota system was finally abolished in 1965 
and replaced with a fixed quota system.69  This change occurred 
as a result of pressure from the Democratic platform of the early 
1960s which described the national origins quota system as “a 
policy of deliberate discrimination” contradicting “the founding 
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 principles of this nation.”70  The pressure for immigration reform 
continued under the administration of President John F. Kennedy, 
and abolition of the system came to fruition under the 
administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.71  Other than 
abolition of the national origins quota system, however, 
immigration law remained largely restrictionist in scope, with the 
focus always on control.72  The system remained largely 
untouched until the mid-1980s, when the focus began to shift back 
to employment and labor concerns.73 
3.    The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198674 (IRCA) 
represents the single most extensive change to U.S. immigration 
laws since the demise of the quota system in 1965.75  Fear of 
undocumented immigration was at a peak during the 1980s as a 
result of economic factors including inflation, recession, runaway 
interest rates, and the highest unemployment rates since the 
Depression.76  Implemented as a result of national dissatisfaction 
with an immigration policy that was ineffective in preventing 
undocumented immigration,77 the primary policy behind IRCA 
was to deter illegal immigration.78  IRCA aimed to reduce 
undocumented immigration via a multi-directional approach 
emphasizing three areas: first, controlling illegal immigration;79 
second, imposing penalties on employers80 who hired 
undocumented immigrants;81 and third, allowing legalization for 
certain undocumented immigrants already in the United States.82  
While IRCA continued to place restrictions on immigration policy 
in the United States, Congress emphasized that employer 
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 sanctions were the “most humane, credible and effective way to 
respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens.”83  Thus, 
the focus of punitive sanctions was not on the immigrant as much 
as it was on the employer.84  Furthermore, in making allowances 
for undocumented immigrants already in the United States, 
Congress focused not only on the contributions of these 
immigrants, but also on their victimization and exploitation.85  
While the focus of overall immigration policy remained on 
restriction, punishing undocumented immigrants was not in the 
minds of our legislature.86 
4.    Developments After IRCA 
Since IRCA, various legislative acts have continued to place 
controls on immigration to the United States.  The Immigration 
Act of 1990, a great example of the historical ambivalence of the 
United States towards immigration, increased the number of 
immigrants allowed into the United States in future years while 
simultaneously restricting due process rights of deportees.87  By 
the mid 1990s, the ambivalence tipped towards restriction with a 
proposed ballot initiative in California that prohibited 
undocumented immigrants from attending public schools.88  The 
ambivalence culminated in 1996 with the passage of a series of 
restrictive acts.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
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 Responsibility Act of 199689 (IIRAIRA) restricted immigration by 
increasing border patrols, increasing punishments for 
immigration law violations, providing for the building of more 
barriers on the United States/Mexico border, and placing 10-year 
bans on admission for immigrants attempting to enter the United 
States after having been illegally in the United States at any 
time.90  Other acts passed during this time decreased the rights of 
legal immigrants to food stamps and supplemental social security 
income.91  The tides had turned once again towards decreasing 
immigration to the United States. 
B.   Evolution of Tort Law92 
1.    Early Developments 
The political and economic pressures that influenced the 
development of American immigration policy emphasizing 
restriction and control lie in stark contrast to the amorphous 
policies underlying the development of tort law in the United 
States.  While immigration law was slowly federalized in the late 
1800s,93 tort law evolved into its own distinct field of law.94  The 
development of tort law was a direct result of the industrial 
revolution, which brought with it not only jobs but also modern 
machines and tools capable of crushing, slicing, and crippling 
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 those who were unfortunate enough to cross their paths.95  With 
modernization came increased risks, and by the late 1800s and 
early 1900s industrial accidents accounted for about 35,000 deaths 
and close to 2,000,000 injuries per year.96  The development of tort 
law thus arose “out of the various and ever-increasing clashes of 
the activities of persons living in a common society.”97  Increased 
modernization brought with it “losses, or injuries of many kinds 
sustained by one person as the result of the activities of others.”98  
“The purpose of the law of torts was to adjust these losses and to 
afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the 
result of the conduct of another.”99 The resulting system for 
combating these newfound risks was one focused on negligence, 
which arises when the conduct of one person fails to meet a 
standard of reasonable care and results in injury to another.100  
Thus, an important policy underlying the development of tort law 
was compensating individuals for injuries sustained as a result of 
another person’s faulty conduct.101 
While compensating the injured for their injuries was a 
primary consideration of tort policy, there was some tension in the 
early period of tort law resulting from the desire to redress the 
injured as balanced against the economic growth and wealth 
which in the late 1800s were thought to be for the “greater good of 
society.”102  The same machines that happened to cut off one 
man’s finger were giving thousands of other men jobs, and 
producing, for example, railroad tracks that would be laid across 
the country by tens of thousands of other men.103  There was 
concern about placing so much liability on companies that it would 
still the American economy.104  The courts developed numerous 
doctrines to counter these concerns.  The doctrine of contributory 
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 negligence came into use in the United States in the 1850s, forcing 
any plaintiff in a personal injury case not only to prove that 
defendants were negligent but also to show that the plaintiff 
herself was faultless.105  In 1842, the fellow-servant rule, which 
barred employees from suing their employers for injuries caused 
by the negligence of other employees, developed in American 
courts.106  Other doctrines, such as the doctrine of immunity of 
charities,107 assumption of risk,108 and the doctrine of imputed 
negligence,109 continued to immunize companies from tort 
actions.110  Negligence theory during this time period in history 
had a marked affect on the ability of tort law to function as a 
compensatory system.111  Arguably, during these early stages, tort 
law was primarily about balancing economic interests against the 
welfare of the injured, with a slight tendency to favor industry.112 
Despite the fact that tort law development in the 1800s was 
quite restrictionist, the courts were loath to encourage 
carelessness.113  After all, another equally important policy 
behind the development of tort law was that of impeding socially 
unreasonable conduct.114  The more that people are held liable for 
injuring others, the stronger the incentive to prevent similar 
harms from occurring.115  Therefore, the driving force behind 
liberal changes in tort policy during this time period was the goal 
to counter the restrictionist nature of early developments in tort 
law.116  Judges rejected the doctrine of imputed negligence.117  
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 The vice-principal doctrine developed, allowing injured employees 
to sue their employers if their injuries were due to the negligence 
of a supervisor.118 Legislative acts imposed higher standards of 
care on tortfeasors,119 created negligence per se laws,120 and 
imposed safety regulations on corporations.121  Finally, many of 
the restrictionist rules were rejected by juries, who would “let 
their hearts dictate results.”122  While ultimately the restrictionist 
developments of the 1800s exceeded the expansionist 
developments, the policies of compensation and deterrence 
survived. 
2.    Early 20th Century Developments 
The early 20th century saw a general stability in the system of 
tort law, with cases during this period tending to clarify tort 
doctrine.123  Some change did occur during this period, however, 
particularly in the area of causation.124  These developments 
resulted from a shift in theoretical legal thought, from a more 
scientific methodology to one largely influenced by the realism of 
the 1900s.125  The nature of legal analysis took a turn toward 
more policy-oriented doctrine.126 According to some scholars, the 
case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad127 marked the shift in the 
concept of causation, from a legal doctrine to an issue of public 
policy.128  The Palsgraf case involved two men, one carrying a 
package, trying to board a train.129  The guard on the train tried 
to help the men onto the train as it moved away and, in the 
process, dislodged the package, which fell to the rails and 
exploded.130  Mrs. Palsgraf, who was standing near the platform 
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 but at a distance, was hit in the head by a scale that fell as a 
result of the explosion.131  The Cardozo majority opinion focused 
on the fact that the railroad owed no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf 
because she was not within the zone of danger, making her injury 
unforeseeable.132  The Andrews dissent was policy-driven, 
reasoning that everyone owed “to the world a large duty of 
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the 
safety of others.”133  After this decision, causation was 
increasingly seen as an aspect of tort theory that involved policy 
considerations such as fairness and social justice.134  This policy 
shift complemented the notions of redress and deterrence that had 
originally influenced the development of tort law. 
 
3. The Mid to Late 20th Century Developments 
 
Spurred by the public policy activism of the 1960s, which 
abolished the national origin quota system,135  the mid to late 20th 
century signaled a further shift in tort theory, strengthening the 
deterrence and compensation policies of tort law with the 
expansion of tort liability.136  The scope of liability broadened with 
the abolition of immunities for charities and government.137  
Comparative negligence replaced the contributory negligence; the 
latter had barred recovery for plaintiffs bearing any responsibility 
for the negligence, while the new doctrine merely apportioned 
liability, allowing plaintiffs some recovery.138  The National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966139 was a response to 
the realization that the most effective way to address highway 
safety and decrease injuries and deaths was through better 
product design.140  The 1972 Consumer Product and Safety Act141 
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 placed a new emphasis on protecting consumers and deterring 
poor manufacturing practices.142  The policymakers of the era 
therefore emphasized and promoted the deterrence function of tort 
doctrine. 
From the late 20th century to the present, the trend of 
expanding liability has slowed, largely as a result of lobbying by 
corporations concerned about the skyrocketing cost of liability.143 
There have been a couple of notable exceptions, one in the area of 
medical malpractice: the loss of chance doctrine allows patients to 
recover in instances where doctors negligently diagnose their 
conditions, even if their pre-diagnosis chances of recovery were 
less than 50%.144  There was also an increase in the ability of 
crime victims to sue landlords, public agents, and agencies for 
negligence.145  However, expansion of liability has been largely 
curtailed as a result of the legislative movement towards tort 
reform.146  This type of tort reform focuses on reforming punitive 
damages and pain and suffering damages, and on revising rules 
for joint and several liability.147  Even so, the principles of 
deterrence and compensation remain alive and well hundreds of 
years after their development. 
C.    Countervailing Interests of Immigration Law and Tort Law 
When comparing the underlying purposes of immigration law 
and tort law, it is notable from the historical development of each 
area of law that each serves a separate and distinct function in 
our society.148 Moreover, these functions lead in two very different 
directions.  Immigration legislation, often influenced by the 
prevailing political winds, serves to appease the masses by 
excluding the powerless, whereas tort law serves to protect the 
masses by holding negligent companies and people accountable for 
their actions, and by allowing the injured to be compensated for 
the injuries they have suffered.149  Because each area of law 
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 serves a distinct and arguably useful150 function, the question 
then becomes whether or not awarding lost wages to 
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions serves the 
policies of each area of law.  Despite what may seem like 
countervailing interests, the policies of both tort law and 
immigration law are best served by awarding lost wages to 
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions based on 
American wage rates. 
III. BASING LOST WAGE AWARDS ON AMERICAN WAGE RATES 
A.   The Country-Wide Inconsistencies 
In awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants in 
personal injury actions, courts across the country take four 
general routes.  First, courts allow lost wages to be based on 
American wage rates.151  Second, courts limit the award of lost 
wages to wages immigrants would earn in their country of 
origin.152  Third, courts elect not to award any lost wages 
whatsoever for undocumented immigrants.153  Finally, courts give 
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 juries154 the opportunity to award wages based on either 
American wage rates or country of origin wage rates.155  The 
inconsistencies in lost wage awards arise as a result of some 
courts emphasizing policies underlying immigration law156 while 
other courts emphasize policies underlying tort law.157  These 
inconsistencies reveal the tensions the courts face in both 
considering fairness to the injured and honoring the purposes of 
immigration law and tort law.  To compound the problem, the 
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of awarding lost 
wages in personal injury actions of undocumented immigrants; 
thus, the states are left to fend for themselves.158 
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 In considering awards of lost wages for undocumented 
immigrants in personal injury actions, a tri-focal pattern evolves: 
first, because there is no Supreme Court decision with respect to 
lost wages in personal injury actions, proponents rely on Hoffman 
as applicable to personal injury actions.159  Second, the courts 
focus on preemption of state tort law by federal immigration 
policy.160  Finally, the courts emphasize the policy arguments for 
and against both tort law and immigration law.161  However, a 
closer examination of cases across the United States will show 
that awarding “American” lost wages to undocumented 
immigrants promotes the policies behind both immigration law 
and tort law despite their countervailing interests. 
B.   The Role of Hoffman Plastics in Tort Actions 
Although there is no Supreme Court decision on awarding lost 
wages to undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions, 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB162 and its predecessor 
Sure-Tan v. NLRB163 are often cited as a bar to such awards.164  
In the Hoffman case, Jose Castro, who was not legally authorized 
to work in the United States, was laid off from his employment 
with Hoffman Plastic Compounds as a result of his participation 
in a union organizing campaign.165  Castro filed a complaint with 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) arguing that the 
layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act.166  The NLRB 
agreed with Castro and ordered back pay from the date of 
termination to the date the employer discovered Castro was 
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 unable to work.167  Hoffman Plastic Compounds petitioned for 
review, arguing that IRCA, which made it unlawful to both 
employ undocumented immigrants and to use fraudulent 
documents to gain employment as an undocumented immigrant, 
precluded the NLRB from awarding back pay.168  The Supreme 
Court agreed with the petitioner and held that “federal 
immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in IRCA, foreclosed 
the Board from awarding back pay to an undocumented alien who 
has never been legally authorized to work in the United 
States.”169  The Court reasoned that in enacting IRCA, Congress 
had implemented a comprehensive scheme to deter the 
employment of undocumented immigrants, and that allowing a 
back pay award in a labor dispute violated specific prohibitions of 
federal immigration law.170 
While there have been numerous attempts to apply Hoffman 
in personal injury cases,171 such application poses several 
problems due to the limited holding of Hoffman. The Hoffman 
court’s decision involved resolving an apparent conflict between 
two federal statutes, IRCA and the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).172  In contrast, tort actions are generally governed by 
state statutory regulation.  Further, a prevailing issue in Hoffman 
was the conflict between IRCA’s purpose of deterring employment 
of undocumented workers and awarding lost wages as a result of 
employer violations of NLRA.173  Federal labor law governs 
employer/employee relationships.  The same cannot be said, 
however, for cases that arise under tort law.  Tort law does not 
regulate employer/employee relationships but governs negligent 
behavior by negligent parties regardless of whether such a party 
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 is an employer, a friend, or a stranger.  Many personal injury 
cases arise as a result of car accidents,174 medical malpractice,175 
fireworks injuries,176 slips and falls,177 and subcontractor work,178 
to name a few.  Furthermore, while the undocumented 
immigrants in Hoffman were unnecessarily terminated from their 
employment, they did not suffer any physical injuries that 
prevented them from working or living their daily lives.179  In 
contrast, when undocumented immigrants seek lost wages under 
tort law, they suffer physical, sometimes permanent injuries.  
Hoffman, which resolved a labor law conflict, is thus inapplicable 
in personal injury cases, and this view is supported by courts 
across the country. 
Courts across the United States overwhelmingly reject 
application of Hoffman to tort actions of undocumented 
immigrants.  While the court in a New York case, Madeira v. 
Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., found that the plaintiff’s 
immigration status was relevant to determining the nature and 
extent of the lost wage award, the court explicitly rejected the 
defendant’s argument that, pursuant to the decision in Hoffman, 
an award of lost wages would be in contravention of IRCA.180  
Beside the fact that the case was based on diversity jurisdiction, 
an award of lost wages to an undocumented immigrant in a 
personal injury action based on state common law does not offend 
the holding of Hoffman, the court held, because Hoffman does not 
bar undocumented immigrants from utilizing state courts to seek 
compensation for a defendant’s tortious conduct.181  The Majlinger 
court dismissed Hoffman along the same lines, arguing that to 
read Hoffman as extending to personal injury actions would 
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 expand Hoffman’s limited holding.182  In Tyson Foods Inc., v. 
Guzman, the Texas Appellate Court also rejected application of 
Hoffman in personal injury actions.183  While the defendant 
argued that Hoffman precluded awarding undocumented 
immigrants lost wages, the court’s analysis of Hoffman limited its 
scope.184  The Tyson case involved a common law personal injury 
claim, whereas Hoffman involved an employer’s violation of labor 
laws.185  Thus, the lower court’s award of past and future lost 
wages was upheld as to Mr. Guzman, who was injured when hit 
by a forklift as he rounded up chickens.186  Overall, the courts go 
to great lengths to distinguish between the Hoffman line of cases, 
which involved labor policy considerations, and personal injury 
cases, which involve disputes between two private citizens as a 
result of tortious conduct.187 
Even where a court applied Hoffman to a personal injury 
case, this application was limited in scope.188  In Hernandez-
Cortez, the only personal injury case to use Hoffman, the plaintiffs 
were injured in a car accident while being illegally transported 
from Mexico to North Carolina.189  The plaintiffs sought past and 
future lost wages based on projected earnings rather than on 
actual earnings.190  The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ 
contention that Hoffman did not preclude the ability of 
undocumented immigrants to recover wages for work actually 
performed.191  However, the court distinguished the instant case 
from other personal injury cases which rejected the application of 
Hoffman, because in the instant case there were no wages earned 
and no actual work performed.192  The court was unwilling to 
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 award lost wages based on an entirely imaginary figure.193 The 
court relied heavily on the fact that the undocumented 
immigrants in this case did not work at all in the United 
States.194  Application of Hoffman  in this particular case did not, 
therefore, support any arguments that Hoffman should be applied 
generally in other personal injury actions because of the 
Hernandez-Cortez is so easily distinguished.  Personal injury cases 
rejecting Hoffman have all involved injured parties who sought 
lost wage awards based on actual work in the United States,195 
unlike the instant case. 
C.   State Tort Law and the Preemption Argument 
1.    Preemption Basics 
Courts which bar lost wage awards often rely on federal 
immigration legislation which allegedly preempts such awards. 
Deterring the employment of undocumented immigrants in the 
United States is a focal point of federal immigration law.196  
Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a197 bars the employment of 
undocumented immigrants,198 provides mechanisms by which an 
employer is to examine the appropriate documentation of 
employees,199 and includes penalties for employers who fail to 
abide by the statutory provisions.200  The argument that develops 
in cases wherein undocumented immigrants seek lost wage 
awards for their personal injuries is that the “wages” earned in 
the past, or those that could be earned in the future, are a result 
of illegal employment in the United States.201  Because 
immigration law seeks to deter employment of undocumented 
immigrants, courts have argued that federal immigration policy 
preempts any lost wage award based on illegal employment.202 
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress is empowered to 
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 preempt state law.203  Preemption arises in one of three ways.  
First, state law may be preempted by explicit statutory language, 
known as express preemption.204 Second, “[i]n the absence of 
explicit statutory language signaling an intent to preempt, a court 
may infer such intent where Congress has legislated 
comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation.”205  This 
type of preemption is known as field preemption.  Third, federal 
law preempts a state law that stands as an obstacle to the 
purposes of the federal law, a type of preemption known as conflict 
preemption.206  Thus, unless a state statute is expressly 
preempted, field preempted, or conflict preempted, it will survive 
the Supremacy Clause.  In the case of awarding lost wages to 
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions, such 
awards survive all three prongs of the analysis. 
2.    Express Preemption 
There is little contention as to whether or not a lost wage 
award to documented immigrants in personal injury actions is 
expressly preempted by federal immigration policy, particularly 
IRCA.  Federal immigration statutes only preempt “any State or 
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who 
employ”207 undocumented immigrants.  Congress thus limited 
express preemption to sanctions against employers, not 
employees.  For example, in summarily rejecting the express 
preemption argument, the Majlinger court reasoned that in 
enacting IRCA, Congress gave no indication nor did it provide that 
undocumented immigrants would be barred from their ability to 
sue in state courts for personal injuries or barred from the right to 
recover lost wages.208  What Congress did choose to do was to 
implement employer sanctions.209 
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 3.    Field Preemption 
While the federal government has the exclusive authority to 
regulate immigration,210 this authority cannot be construed to 
give the federal government exclusive authority to regulate 
immigration through tort law.  The premise on which field 
preemption arguments are based is that field preemption 
prohibits an award of lost wages because the federal government 
has exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and this power 
was exercised by Congress in its enactment of INA and IRCA.211  
While this may be true, such an argument fails to consider that 
lost wage awards in personal injury actions are based on state tort 
law which is not a regulatory “arm” or extension for immigration 
policy.  Any lost wage awards that result from a personal injury 
action are a result of tort policy, not immigration policy.  Take, for 
example, the case of Gorgonio Balbuena, a native of Mexico, who 
suffered severe head trauma after falling from a ramp while 
pushing a wheelbarrow, then sought redress under common law 
negligence and labor law theories.212  The court quickly dismissed 
the defense’s field preemption argument, noting that while IRCA 
occupied the spectrum of immigration law, the state law in this 
case occupied regulation of health and safety.213  In fact, the 
federal government does not occupy the field of common-law torts, 
which is traditionally an area of state control.214  Thus, an award 
of lost wages in personal injury actions does not fall within the 
scope of field preemption. 
4.    Conflict Preemption 
Awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants under 
state tort law is not an obstacle to Congress’ objectives in 
implementing IRCA or federal immigration policy in general.215  
The manner in which Congress intended to combat illegal 
immigration via adoption of IRCA and other immigration statutes 
supports the notion that such awards are not counter to federal 
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 immigration law.216  As previously discussed, federal immigration 
law, including IRCA, places a burden on employers only.217  It was 
never the intent of Congress to place immigrants, documented or 
undocumented, in a position of undue hardship or suffering.218  
Historically, Congress chose not to punish undocumented 
immigrants by making “their contracts void and thus unjustifiably 
enriching employers of such alien laborers.”219  To the contrary, 
while Congress could very well implement legislation penalizing 
undocumented immigrants for accepting jobs or preventing 
undocumented immigrants from collecting lost wages, Congress 
has chosen not to do so.220 
In addition, occupational health and safety falls under the 
broad police power of states, and barring access to lost wage 
claims by injured undocumented workers decreases employer 
incentives to abide by the state’s labor laws.221  Rejection of the 
conflict preemption argument by the courts is even more 
understandable in light of the fact that IRCA’s legislative history 
expressly indicates that there was no intent “to undermine or 
diminish in any way labor protections in existing law.”222  
Furthermore, awarding lost wages in tort actions is 
complementary rather than contradictory to immigration policy 
because it makes the employment of undocumented immigrants 
less attractive to “unscrupulous employers.”223  “Only by 
equalizing defendants’ potential liability for injuries to authorized 
and unauthorized workers can the objectives underlying both 
federal immigration law and this State’s tort law and workplace 
safety statutes be realized.”224 
D.   Policy Battle: Immigration vs. Tort Law 
1.   Where to Draw the Line 
If Hoffman is inapplicable to personal injury cases because of 
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 its limited scope and state tort law is not preempted by federal 
immigration law, then there should be no problem with awarding 
American rate lost wages to undocumented immigrants in 
personal injury actions.  Furthermore, in addition to legal 
arguments that support awarding American lost wages to 
undocumented immigrants, policy factors support the theory.  
Underlying the majority of court decisions in such personal injury 
cases is the struggle to balance the countervailing interests in tort 
law and immigration law.  Historically, tort law serves the 
function of compensating injured parties and deterring negligent 
behavior.225  Immigration law serves to control the flow of 
immigration into the United States.  Strict enforcement of tort law 
principles will promote the policies behind both tort law and 
immigration law.226 
2.    Enforcement of Tort Policies 
Juliet Neme was struck by a car while crossing the street.227  
Mr. Rosa was severely injured when an aerial lift tipped over and 
fell on him while he was working.228  Mr. Hagl’s employer was 
hired by a factory to do some welding work and, because of the 
factory’s negligence, Mr. Hagl fell into an open grease pit.229  Mr.  
Melendres was enjoying an employee picnic when he decided to 
join in the fun of diving into a lake from the dock.230  The facility 
owners had not posted any signs barring diving or jumping into 
the lake.231  Other people at the picnic had been diving into the 
lake.232  Unfortunately, unlike the others, Mr. Melendres’s last 
dive into murky waters of the lake left him paralyzed.233  All of 
these people have several things in common: they are all 
undocumented immigrants working in the United States, they 
were all seriously injured and, most importantly, they all lost 
wages as a result of their injuries.234  Under tort principles, the 
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 losses these injured parties bore, including lost wages, should be 
redressed.235  However, barring or decreasing recovery to the 
injured if they are undocumented immigrants places the emphasis 
on immigration control and not the principles of tort law. 
In upholding an undocumented immigrant’s right to lost wage 
awards based on American rates of pay, courts should emphasize 
the compensatory function of tort law.  Someone who is injured as 
a result of another party’s negligence has a right to recover 
damages for his injury.236  The right to recover lost wages is not 
limited to Americans but is a right that runs to immigrants 
regardless of whether or not they are appropriately 
documented.237  What is important is not the injured party’s 
immigration status, but redressing a wrong that has occurred.238 
Deterrence should also be a primary consideration in 
awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants.  Even courts 
that express some disfavor with the policy of awarding “American” 
lost wages come to the conclusion that doing so is important for 
the deterrence function of tort law.  When Mr. Rosa filed a 
negligence claim against various defendants as a result of injuries 
he sustained when an aerial lift tipped over and fell on him, he 
sought damages which included a claim for lost wages at United 
States wage rates.239  The Superior Court of New Hampshire 
transferred questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire all 
surrounding the issue of whether or not the defendant was 
entitled to lost wages.240  The Supreme Court acknowledged the 
strong policies against awarding lost wages at U.S. rates in light 
of the policies underlying federal immigration law.241  However, in 
the same instance, the court recognized that the deterrence 
principles of tort doctrine are in and of themselves an important 
enough policy to allow lost wage awards against employers who 
“knew or should have known” of the worker’s status.242  The court 
found the fact that tort liability acts as a deterrent to reduce the 
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 risk of injuries to be compelling.243  As Justice Dalianis so 
eloquently put it: 
To refuse to allow recovery against a person responsible . 
. . would provide an incentive for such persons to target 
illegal aliens for employment in the most dangerous jobs 
or to provide illegal aliens with substandard working 
conditions.  It would allow such persons to treat illegal 
aliens as disposable commodities who may be replaced 
the moment they are damaged. Such a result is 
incompatible with tort deterrence principles.244 
Thus, the deterrence function of tort law has been a primary 
consideration when the courts undertake to allow lost wage 
awards in the personal injury actions of undocumented 
immigrants. 
3.    Immigration Policy in Tort Decisions 
Even as they promote tort policy, lost wages awards also serve 
the secondary role of furthering federal immigration policy.  
Holding a defendant liable for lost wages regardless of the 
plaintiff’s immigrant status is compatible with and promotes the 
IRCA’s policy of deterring employment of undocumented 
immigrants.245  Preventing undocumented immigrants from 
access to all remedies would not promote federal immigration 
policy, but would create incentives for employers to hire 
undocumented immigrants, “secure in the knowledge that such 
employees would have no recourse in pursuing proper wages. . .” 
for their injuries.246  By holding a negligent party as accountable 
to an undocumented immigrant as that party would be to an 
American employee, courts can reduce the incentive to hire 
undocumented workers.247  Enforcement of tort law thus not only 
supports the deterrence and compensation principles of tort law, 
but also enforces deterrence of the hiring of undocumented 
immigrants—the actual purpose of IRCA.248 
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 In addition to serving as a deterrent to the hiring of 
undocumented immigrants, awarding lost wages in tort actions 
serves federal immigration policy by keeping the burden on 
employers, thus comporting with the intent of IRCA.249  Under 
IRCA, the emphasis is not on the duty of employees but on the 
affirmative duty of employers to make sure that employees are 
properly authorized to work in the United States.250  The intent of 
IRCA was to hold employers accountable for unauthorized 
employment; in fact, sanctions under IRCA are against employers, 
not undocumented immigrants.251  Employers could avoid liability 
issues by not hiring undocumented immigrants.252  As opposed to 
frustrating the policy objectives of IRCA, awarding lost wages 
supports these policies.253 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Injured plaintiffs who are deprived of their ability to work 
because of their injuries should be able to avail themselves of all 
tort remedies, including lost wage awards, regardless of their 
immigration status.  Not only should undocumented immigrants 
be allowed to collect lost wage awards in tort actions, those 
awards must be based on American wage rates.  Regardless of 
immigration status, undocumented immigrants who seek lost 
wage awards have, with limited exceptions, worked in the United 
States.  As a result of injuries sustained due to another’s 
negligence, they are prevented from continuing to work to their 
previous capacity.  Tort law is about compensating the injured.  
When a plaintiff seeks a lost wage award, he is merely seeking to 
be compensated for his loss.  Immigration status has absolutely 
nothing to do with the loss suffered.  If an immigrant was earning 
an American wage before his injury, his compensation should be 
that same American wage. 
Tort law also serves as a deterrent to future negligence.  This 
deterrent effect in and of itself is an important reason to award 
American lost wages to undocumented immigrants.  We send a 
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 dangerous message when we punish the injured and not the 
tortfeasor by limiting or rejecting their ability to collect lost wage 
awards.  Not only are we sending the message that undocumented 
immigrants are a disposable commodity but we are also conveying 
the message that unsafe work conditions, unsafe products, poor 
driving skills, and other negligent behaviors are completely 
acceptable.  To diminish the ability of undocumented immigrants 
to collect American lost wages is to eliminate the deterrence 
function of tort law. 
Finally, awarding American lost wages to undocumented 
immigrants in personal injury actions keeps immigration as a 
secondary issue, which is where it should be in tort decisions.  
Basing tort law decisions on immigration policy is nothing less 
than dangerous.  Such decisions diminish the efficacy of tort law.  
More importantly, decisions that focus on immigration policy 
remove the burden of setting immigration policy from its rightful 
owners, the legislature and the federal government.  If, in fact, 
there is an immigration “problem,” it is the legislature’s job to fix 
it.  “[E]nforcement of immigration laws is the role of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. . .”254 not the courts that 
are sought out by plaintiffs to remedy their injuries. 
While immigration policy should take a back seat in tort law 
decisions, awarding American wages to undocumented 
immigrants in personal injury actions actually promotes 
principles of immigration law, diminishing the strength of any 
arguments to the contrary.  A broad range of immigration 
legislation focuses on employers.255  In implementing IRCA, 
Congress emphasized that employer sanctions were the most 
appropriate way to deal with the issue of undocumented 
immigration, which is largely a function of economic necessity.256 
Failing to award American lost wages in personal injury actions 
thus diminishes the deterrence function of employer sanctions 
imposed by immigration legislation further compounding the 
immigration “problem.”  Employers have no reason to discontinue 
illegal hiring practices if those practices result in economic benefit 
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 to employers. 
Perhaps the best way to enforce access to lost wages and other 
remedies in tort actions is for the states to implement legislation 
protecting the rights of immigrants in tort actions.  Presently, 
California is the only state that legislates that all people, 
regardless of immigration status, have access to all “protections, 
rights and remedies available under state law.”257  This type of 
legislation protects immigrants and allows tort law to function as 
it was intended.  Further, this type of legislation sends a message 
that may not have much to do with the law but says a great deal 
about our nation and its policies; that the injured should be 
treated fairly and with dignity regardless of who they are or where 
they come from.  In the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
“remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I 
especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists.”258 
Wendy Andre* 
 
 257. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3339(a) (2006). 
 258. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, REMARKS BEFORE THE DAUGHTERS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 21, 1938, published in THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 259 (1941). 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., 
University of Massachusetts (Humanities & Social Sciences).  I wish to thank 
my husband Mike and my children Christopher, Haley and Madison for their 
continual encouragement and support.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Peter Margulies for his insightful comments and suggestions. 
 564 
Virtually Face-to-Face: The 
Confrontation Clause and the Use of 
Two-Way Video Testimony 
INTRODUCTION 
Technological advancements have touched many aspects of 
our society, including the way we communicate with one another, 
the way we conduct business, and the way we entertain ourselves.  
Technology has also had an impact in the legal field.1  E-mail 
provides lawyers with the luxury of immediate and constant 
contact with clients, the ability to exchange documents 
instantaneously with clients and opposing counsel, and the 
convenience of electronically filing documents with courts.2  
Technological advancements, however, have raised questions 
concerning the extent that such improvements will affect 
courtrooms.  One issue that has been raised is the use of live two-
way video testimony in criminal trials. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . 
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”3  This clause, 
which is only applicable to criminal prosecutions, is incorporated 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus 
making it binding among the states.4  The right to confront ones 
accusers has also long been held as an important aspect of a fair 
trial.5 
There are several variations of electronic witness testimony in 
criminal trials.  First, the United States Supreme Court has held 
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 that under a “case-specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation 
Clause does not prohibit a [s]tate from using a one-way closed 
circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child 
witness in a child abuse case.”6  Under this procedure, rather than 
testify in the courtroom, the child witness is examined in a 
separate room by the prosecutor and defense counsel during the 
trial.7  The examination is recorded and displayed on a video 
monitor for those in the courtroom to observe.8  Although the 
defendant can see the witness, the witness cannot see the 
defendant.9  The procedure permits the defendant to communicate 
electronically with defense counsel, and objections and rulings are 
made as though the child witness was present in the courtroom.10  
Two-way closed circuit testimony is essentially the same set up 
and procedure, except the witness can see the defendant over a 
video monitor set up in the room where the witness is testifying. 
While the Supreme Court has approved the use of one-way 
closed circuit television in child sexual abuse cases,11 it has yet to 
hear a case concerning the use of live two-way video testimony.  
The circuit courts of appeals, however, are split on the issue.  The 
Second Circuit held that the two-way closed-circuit television 
procedure, which permitted an ill witness in the Federal Witness 
Protection Program to testify from a remote location, did not 
violate the defendant’s right of confrontation.12  More recently, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit held that witness testimony 
provided via two-way video conference at trial violated the 
defendant’s right of confrontation.13 
In 2002, the Supreme Court considered a proposal to amend 
Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would 
have expressly permitted testimony via video transmission.14  The 
proposal provided: 
In the interest of justice, the court may authorize 
 
 6. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990). 
 7. Id. at 841. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 841-42. 
 10. Id. at 842. 
 11. Id. at 860. 
 12. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 13. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315-19 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 14. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 93 (2002) [hereinafter Amendments] (statement of 
Scalia, J.). 
 contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in open 
court of testimony from a witness who is at a different 
location if: 
(1) the requesting party establishes exceptional 
circumstances for such transmission; 
(2)  appropriate safeguards for the transmission are 
used; and 
(3) the witness is unavailable within the meaning of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4)-(5).15 
The Court declined to adopt the proposal, however, for failure 
to “limit the use of testimony via video transmission to instances 
where there has been a case-specific finding that it is necessary to 
further an important public policy.”16  In commenting on the 
proposal, Justice Scalia not only disagreed with the proposal’s 
acceptance of video conference testimony whenever the parties 
were unable to take a deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 15, but also with the Advisory Committee’s 
suggestion that two-way video presentation “may be used 
generally as an alternative to depositions.”17  Thus, the Court 
rejected the proposed amendment, but more on the basis that it 
permitted liberal use of video transmission testimony, not because 
it would necessarily violate defendants’ right to confrontation in 
exceptional cases.18 
This comment proposes that live two-way video testimony is 
constitutional under the Sixth Amendment for several reasons.  
First, its use is consistent with the goals and protections intended 
by the common law right of confrontation as it has been used 
throughout history.  Second, the procedure is more protective of 
defendants’ interests under the Confrontation Clause than 
currently accepted methods of presenting testimony, such as Rule 
15 depositions and evidentiary hearsay exceptions.  Finally, the 
use of live two-way video testimony takes advantage of modern 
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 technology, making criminal trials more cost-efficient and 
convenient, and increases foreign witness participation in trials 
with foreign components not otherwise under the jurisdiction of 
United States courts. 
HISTORY 
There is some debate over the origins of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Some scholars suggest that the right of confrontation 
became a common law right as a result of the Sir Walter Raleigh 
trial.19  Others claim that Raleigh’s trial provides merely a 
“convenient but highly romantic myth”20 rather than the impetus 
for the Sixth Amendment.21 
The concept of confrontation can be traced back to biblical 
times.22  Over two thousand years ago, as Governor Festus and 
King Agrippa discussed the proper treatment of the prisoner Paul, 
Festus stated: “It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any 
man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers 
face[-]to[-]face, and have license to answer for himself concerning 
the crime laid against him.”23  At a trial arranged by Festus, 
Paul’s accusers confronted him and “laid many and grievous 
complaints against [him], which they could not prove.”24 
Face-to-face confrontation was also prevalent during the 
Roman Empire.25  The Roman Emperor Trajan instructed the 
Governor of Bithynia that in prosecuting Christians “anonymous 
accusations must not be admitted in evidence as against any one, 
as it is introducing a dangerous precedent, and out of accord with 
the spirit of our times.”26 
Confrontation surfaced in sixteenth century England when 
the English established a jury system in which jurors decided a 
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 defendant’s guilt or innocence by applying the facts presented.27  
Under this system, witnesses were sworn and asked to look upon 
the prisoner.28  The witness then made his accusations against the 
accused face-to-face, which the jury would consider in deciding 
whether the accused was guilty or innocent.29 
Despite confrontation’s crucial role in England’s early judicial 
system, whether it was an absolute right was hotly debated.30  
Originally, confrontation extended only to ordinary trials in the 
assizes.31  In an attempt to protect the innocent, Parliament 
enacted a statute in 1552 that required two accusers to be brought 
before persons accused of treason.32  But because Parliament had 
little influence at the time, the Crown ignored the statute, thus 
“proof of treason usually consisted of confessions exacted from 
alleged coconspirators under torture,” as the Sir Walter Raleigh 
trial demonstrates.33 
Raleigh was prosecuted in 1603 for the crime of high treason 
and accused of plotting to make Arabella Stuart the Queen of 
England.34  The only evidence to support his conviction was a 
document containing the confession of an alleged coconspirator 
named Lord Cobham, whose confession was obtained by torture.35  
Raleigh, representing himself, demanded confrontation: “The 
proof of the [c]ommon [l]aw is by witness and jury; let Cobham be 
here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and I have 
done.”36  Raleigh’s request, however, was not honored, and he was 
convicted and executed.37  Interestingly, Lord Cobham’s 
confession proved to be false, as he recanted in a letter to 
Raleigh.38 
Political prisoners did not receive the right of confrontation 
until the John Lilburne trial, a man also known as “Freeborn 
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 John.”39  Lilburne, a Quaker minister, was accused of illegally 
smuggling books into England that attacked bishops.40  At trial, 
Lilburne refused to answer questions regarding the activity of 
others in relation to the crime.41  Instead, he proclaimed: 
I know it is warrantable by the law of God, and I think by 
the law of the land, that I may stand on my just defence, 
and not answer your interrogatories, and that my 
accusers ought to be brought face to face, to justify what 
they accuse me of.42 
 For his silence, the Star Chamber sentenced him “to [a] fine, 
to stand in the pillory, to be whipped, and to stay in jail until he 
was willing to answer questions.”43 But in a subsequent assembly 
with Charles I, Parliament demanded Lilburne’s release, stating 
that his sentence was “illegal, and against the liberty of the 
subject: and also bloody, cruel, barbarous, and tyrannical.”44  As a 
result, England provided its accused with the right to 
confrontation.45 
The right to confrontation, however, did not travel with the 
English colonists to America, probably because many of them 
lacked training in the law.46  Furthermore, problems inherent in 
traveling to distant and unknown lands to colonize prompted the 
colonial leaders to favor swift and rigorous execution of 
judgments.47  Thus, the right to confrontation had to develop over 
time in the American colonies. 
The Salem witch trials were influential in establishing the 
right to confrontation in the American legal system.48  In the 
1600s, the existence of witches was such a concern in 
Massachusetts that officials tortured individuals to learn the 
identity of alleged witches.49  Many were accused of being witches 
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 based on these largely unsupported accusations.50  Once accused, 
the suspected witches were “tried [before] a special tribunal . . . in 
Salem without the opportunity to face their accusers, and 
hanged.”51  Judge Saltonstall, one of the judges on the tribunal, 
was so concerned with the methods and criteria used to convict 
the alleged witches that he resigned.52 
This tragic story, stained with false convictions and death, 
finally ended when the Massachusetts legislature got involved.53  
Troubled by the Salem witch trials, Reverend Increase Mather, 
Massachusetts Colony’s Ambassador to England, insisted that the 
Massachusetts legislature remedy the situation.54  In response, 
the legislature issued a mandate requiring the tribunal to provide 
the accused with an opportunity to face his accusers before final 
conviction.55  As a result, the accusations decreased substantially, 
because many were unwilling to face those they were accusing.56  
The lack of evidence which ensued caused the Governor to dismiss 
the Salem tribunal on October 29, 1692.57 
Many of the other colonies also realized the importance of 
confrontation.  The Carolinas were one of the first colonies to 
adopt confrontation as a rule of procedure.58  Connecticut used a 
jury system that incorporated the right to confront one’s 
accusers.59  Moreover, the New Hampshire General Assembly 
recognized confrontation in a series of criminal laws, and New 
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania later followed.60 
Furthermore, the notion of confrontation played a part during 
the years leading up to the American Revolution.  In 1774, the 
First Continental Congress published Address to the Inhabitants 
of Quebec to justify the American cause to the French settlers.61  
The address stated: 
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 The next great right is that of trial by jury.  This 
provides, that neither life, liberty, nor property, can be 
taken from the possessor, until twelve of his 
unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage, 
who from that neighborhood may reasonably be supposed 
to be acquainted with his character, and the characters of 
the witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full inquiry, face to 
face, in open court, before as many of the people as 
[choose] to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath 
against him.62 
Prior to the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, the 
Second Continental Congress recommended that the states set up 
new government structures to better serve their constituents.63  
Following the recommendation, Virginia’s Bill of Rights provided: 
In all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right 
to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be 
confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for 
evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury.64 
Following Virginia’s initiative, Pennsylvania’s constitution 
provided that “in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man 
hath a right to . . . demand the cause and nature of his accusation, 
to be confronted with the witnesses, to call for evidence in his 
favour, and a speedy public trial.”65  Delaware, Maryland, North 
Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire also 
adopted similar clauses in their state constitutions.66 
Although the United States Constitution of 1778 provided for 
trials by jury in all criminal cases, the right to confrontation was 
only given in cases of treason.67  Many states objected and wanted 
more procedural safeguards.68  Patrick Henry, fighting against 
ratification in Virginia, maintained that without certain 
procedural safeguards, Congress may resort to civil law instead of 
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 common law, or even torture to obtain confessions.69  Several 
states, including Virginia, New York, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire, agreed to ratify the Constitution if the first Congress 
proposed a federal Bill of Rights.70  As a result of the ensuing 
compromise, the Sixth Amendment was born and the right to 
confrontation was formally entrenched in the American legal 
system.71 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS 
The Supreme Court acknowledged in its earliest 
interpretations that the right of confrontation is not absolute, as it 
“must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and 
the necessities of the case.”72  One of the oldest exceptions to 
confrontation is the hearsay exception.73  As early as 1895, the 
Supreme Court considered in Mattox v. United States whether the 
defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation had been violated 
by admitting to the jury prior testimony of two deceased 
witnesses.74  There, after a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment pursuant 
to defendant’s writ of error and remanded the case for a new 
trial.75  Because two government witnesses died during interim, at 
the second trial the government introduced into evidence “a 
transcribed copy of the reporter’s stenographic notes of their 
testimony [from the first] trial.”76  The Court held that this 
procedure did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to 
confrontation because “[t]he substance of the constitutional 
protection [was] preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has 
once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him 
to the ordeal of a cross-examination.”77 
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 Since Mattox, the Court has continued to delineate how 
hearsay evidence may be admitted without violating the 
Confrontation Clause.  In California v. Green,78 the Court 
considered whether the admission of a witness’s prior testimony 
from a preliminary hearing violated the defendant’s right to 
confrontation.79  The Court recognized that while the 
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules are designed to serve 
similar principles, the Confrontation Clause is not merely a 
codification of the common law hearsay rules and exceptions.80  In 
any event, the Court held that “the Confrontation Clause is not 
violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as 
long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full 
and effective cross-examination.”81  This is because the essential 
elements of confrontation have been adequately preserved; the 
witness is under oath and subject to cross-examination for the jury 
to observe.82 
Following Green, the Court again considered whether the 
admission of hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause 
in Ohio v. Roberts.83  This time, however, the witness whose 
testimony the prosecution admitted into evidence did not testify at 
trial.84  In such a case, the Court found that the Confrontation 
Clause requires the prosecution to first “demonstrate the 
unavailability of . . . the declarant whose statement it wishes to 
use against the defendant.”85  A witness is not unavailable unless 
the prosecution has made a good-faith effort to produce him at 
trial.86  Next, if the prosecution meets this burden, the statement 
can be admitted only if there is an “indicia of reliability” that 
serves the “underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the fact-
finding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to 
test adverse evidence.”87  The reliability requirement is satisfied if 
the evidence “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or 
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 possesses “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”88  The 
Court held that the defendant’s right to confrontation was not 
violated because the prosecution showed that the witness was 
constitutionally unavailable,89 and because defense counsel cross-
examined the witness at the preliminary hearing, thus providing 
the transcript with an indicia of reliability.90 
Then, in the landmark case Crawford v. Washington,91 the 
Court expounded the relationship between hearsay and the 
Confrontation Clause.  In that case, Michael Crawford was 
charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing a man 
who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.92  Crawford claimed 
he acted in self-defense, but Sylvia’s statement to police 
contradicted his account of the incident.93  The state marital 
privilege prevented the prosecution from compelling Sylvia to 
testify in court without Crawford’s consent, but the trial court 
allowed the prosecution to introduce Sylvia’s tape-recorded 
statement to the police.94  With this evidence, the prosecution 
successfully convinced the jury that that Crawford did not act in 
self-defense.95 
The Court reversed Crawford’s conviction, finding that the 
introduction of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation 
Clause.96  In order to preserve the integrity of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Court – in concluding that the reliability prong of 
the Roberts standard was vague and manipulative – created a new 
rule.97  The Court held that an out-of-court statement that is 
“testimonial” in nature may not be admitted in criminal cases 
unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.98  Thus, 
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 the defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine his accusers is at the 
core of the Confrontation Clause. 
In addition to hearsay exceptions, the Court created another 
exception to face-to-face confrontation after a series of child sexual 
abuse cases.  In the first case, Coy v. Iowa, 99 the Court considered 
whether the placement of a screen between testifying child victims 
and the defendant at trial violated the defendant’s constitutional 
right to confrontation.100  Coy was charged and convicted of 
sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls.101  The trial court 
granted the state’s motion for the placement of a screen between 
the defendant and the witness stand during the children’s 
testimony.102  Once lighting adjustments were made, Coy could 
dimly see the children through the screen as they testified, but 
they could not see him at all.103  On appeal before the Court, Coy 
argued that the procedure deprived him of his right to face-to-face 
confrontation with adverse witnesses.104  The Court agreed, and 
reversed his conviction.105 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia focused on the 
importance of requiring face-to-face confrontation.106  Scalia noted 
that physical confrontation makes it less likely that a witness will 
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controlled by state law and Roberts.  Id. 
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 lie on the stand as “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a 
person to his face than behind his back,”107 and even if the 
witness does lie, it will likely be less convincing when recited 
before the defendant.108  Furthermore, the trier of fact will have a 
better opportunity to draw its own conclusions on the veracity of 
the testimony based on the witness’s demeanor.109  Therefore, 
because the children could not see Coy through the screen as they 
testified, the procedure violated Coy’s right to confrontation.110 
While the Court noted that the “rights conferred by the 
Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other 
important interests,”111 it declined to address whether there were 
any exceptions.112  Rather, the Court expressed that if any 
exceptions existed, they would be permitted “only when necessary 
to further an important public policy.”113  Because there were no 
individualized findings justifying a need for special protection of 
the child witnesses, no plausible exception to the defendant’s right 
to confrontation existed.114 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor opined that rights 
under the Confrontation Clause “may give way in . . . appropriate 
case[s] to other competing interests so as to permit the use of 
certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from 
the trauma of courtroom testimony.”115  She suggested that the 
use of one- or two-way closed-circuit television for introducing 
child witness testimony – even if it does not adhere to the general 
requirement of face-to-face confrontation – may not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because such procedures may be necessary 
to further the compelling state interest of protecting child 
witnesses.116 
Two years later, Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion 
for the decision that recognized the exception to the Confrontation 
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 Clause for child sexual abuse cases.117  In Maryland v. Craig, 
Sandra Craig was convicted of several sexual offenses involving a 
six-year old girl.118  Prior to trial, the state moved to have children 
who Craig allegedly abused testify via one-way closed circuit 
television as permitted by a Maryland statute.119  Craig objected, 
arguing that the procedure violated her rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.120  The trial court overruled her objection 
and granted the state’s request because it found that the children 
would suffer severe emotional distress if they testified in the 
courtroom.121  Additionally, the trial court noted that the 
procedure preserved the values confrontation promoted: 
permitting the defendant to observe and cross-examine the 
witnesses while the jury watched.122 
On appeal, the Court examined the Confrontation Clause, 
noting that the clause’s central concern “is to ensure the reliability 
of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to 
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before 
the trier of fact.”123  The Court reiterated the four essential 
elements imposed by the Confrontation Clause: (1) personal 
examination of witnesses, who are (2) testifying under oath, (3) 
subject to cross-examination, and (4) observed by a jury that will 
assess their credibility.124  While the Court reaffirmed the 
importance of face-to-face confrontation – “the core of the values 
furthered by the Confrontation Clause”125 – the Court also 
recognized that it is not an indispensable condition of the Sixth 
Amendment.126  In other words, the Confrontation Clause does 
not provide an absolute right to face-to-face confrontation, but 
rather “a preference that must occasionally give way to 
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 considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”127  
In short, face-to-face confrontation should be dispensed with only 
when “necessary to further an important public policy and only 
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”128 
In applying this test to Maryland’s one-way closed circuit 
television procedure, the Court first found that the procedure 
sufficiently assured the reliability of the fact-finding process 
because the testifying child had to be competent, was placed under 
oath, cross-examined, and could be observed by the judge, jury, 
and the defendant.129  Next, the Court held that the state’s 
interest in protecting children in child abuse cases from the 
trauma of testifying is adequately important to justify the use of 
procedures that dispense with the defendant’s right to face-to-face 
confrontation, as long as the state makes a sufficient showing of 
necessity.130  The finding of necessity is case-specific, and requires 
the trial court to determine whether the procedure (or one-way 
closed circuit television) is necessary to protect the particular 
child witness.131  Additionally, necessity requires a finding that 
the child witness would be traumatized by the defendant’s 
presence, not by courtrooms in general.132  Such trauma must be 
more than “mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to 
testify.”133 
USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TESTIMONY OUTSIDE OF MINORS AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT CASES 
The use of alternative forms of testimony in child abuse cases 
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 has risen dramatically since Craig.134  The federal government 
and nearly all states have enacted statutes providing for 
alternatives to face-to-face confrontation when necessary to shield 
child witnesses or other sensitive witnesses.135  The protections 
provided by these statutes vary according to age, the nature of the 
underlying crime, and the extent of the victim’s vulnerability.136 
Craig dealt only with child witnesses and their susceptibility 
to psychological trauma due to their immaturity.  While Craig 
permits a defendant’s right to confrontation to succumb to 
important state interests regarding child witnesses, the Court is 
yet to hear a case involving the use of alternative techniques with 
adult witnesses.  Indeed, cases in the lower courts with adult 
witnesses testifying via closed-circuit television or videotape since 
Craig have been sparse.137  But several states do have statutes 
that allow certain adults to testify via closed-circuit television, 
such as victims of physical attacks, victims of sexual abuse, and 
mentally infirm crime victims.138 
Several circuit courts have heard cases concerning closed-
circuit testimony by adult witnesses, with various results.  The 
Second Circuit considered the use of two-way closed circuit 
television testimony in United States v. Gigante.139  In that case, 
the government charged Vincent Gigante with violating the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 
RICO conspiracy, conspiracy to murder, extortion conspiracy, and 
a labor payoff conspiracy.140  Because Gigante was affiliated with 
the New York Mafia, the government’s case naturally consisted 
mainly of testimony from former mafia members, which included 
Peter Savino, a former associate.141  At the time of Gigante’s trial, 
Savino was in the Federal Witness Protection Program and in the 
final stages of an inoperable, fatal cancer at an undisclosed 
location where he was being medically supervised.142  Per the 
government’s request, the trial judge held a hearing and found, 
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 based on medical reports and testimony, that Savino could not 
appear in court due to his poor health.143  Therefore, the trial 
judge permitted Savino to testify via two-way closed-circuit 
television at trial.144  The procedure allowed the jury, defense 
counsel, judge, and defendant to see and hear Savino on video 
screens in the courtroom, and Savino could likewise see and hear 
the participants in the courtroom on a video screen from where he 
was testifying.145  After the jury convicted Gigante, he challenged 
the procedure on appeal, claiming it violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation and that no compelling 
government interest justified the deprivation of this right.146 
The Second Circuit upheld the defendant’s convictions and 
found that the trial court’s use of two-way closed-circuit testimony 
did not violate Gigante’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.147  Despite the court’s admonishment that closed-
circuit television testimony “must be carefully circumscribed,” it 
found that its use effectively preserved Gigante’s confrontation 
rights.148  First, the court noted that the closed-circuit procedure 
used for Savino’s testimony preserved all of the necessary 
elements of in-court testimony: “Savino was sworn [under oath]; 
he was subjected to full cross-examination; he testified in full view 
of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [he] gave this 
testimony under the eye of Gigante himself.” 149  Next, the court 
found that Craig did not apply, because while Craig restricted the 
use of one-way closed-circuit television testimony to instances in 
which the witness could not view the defendant, the trial judge in 
Gigante’s case utilized a two-way system that effectively 
preserved face-to-face confrontation.150  Free from Craig, the court 
held that “[u]pon a finding of exceptional circumstances, . . . a trial 
court may allow a witness to testify via two-way closed-circuit 
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 television when this furthers the interest of justice.”151  Savino’s 
terminal cancer diagnosis and participation in the Federal 
Witness Protection Program, along with Gigante’s own poor 
health and inability to travel for a distant deposition, presented 
exceptional circumstances, and therefore Savino’s testimony did 
not violate Gigante’s right to face his accuser.152 
Contrary to Gigante, the recent decision of United States v. 
Yates from the Eleventh Circuit held that trial testimony via two-
way closed-circuit television violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.153  There, Anton Pusztai and Anita Yates 
faced charges of mail fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United 
States, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and several 
prescription-drug-related offenses arising out of their involvement 
in an internet pharmacy.154  In a pre-trial motion, the government 
moved to permit two witnesses to testify at trial from Australia 
through live two-way video conference.155  The government argued 
that the two witnesses were “essential witnesses to the 
government’s case-in-chief,” and although the witnesses agreed to 
testify by video conference, they were unwilling travel to the 
United States and were beyond the government’s power of 
subpoena.156  The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that 
the testimony would deny them face-to-face confrontation and 
thus violate their Sixth Amendment rights.157  The trial court 
granted the government’s motion because the two-way video 
conference procedure allowed the defendants and witnesses to see 
each other during the testimony, thus preserving the defendants’ 
right to confrontation.158  The trial court also found that the 
government had an “important public policy of providing . . .  [this] 
crucial evidence, and that the [g]overnment also ha[d] an interest 
in expeditiously and justly resolving the case.”159  Similar to 
Gigante, the witnesses were sworn under oath and acknowledged 
that their testimony was subject to penalty for perjury.160  As the 
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 witnesses testified via video conference, the defendants, jury, and 
judge could see them, and the witnesses could likewise see 
everyone in the temporary courtroom.161  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on all counts.162 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants argued that 
the video conference testimony violated their Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation under Craig because it was not necessary to 
further an important public policy.163  In response, the 
government argued that Craig did not apply for two reasons: (1) 
the witnesses testified via two-way rather than one-way video 
conference, and (2) because two-way video conference testimony 
protects defendants’ confrontation rights more than depositions 
permitted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15,164 
whenever deposition testimony is admissible, two-way video 
conference testimony should be as well.165  In rejecting both 
arguments, the court noted that Craig provided “the proper test 
for admissibility of two-way video conference testimony,”166 and 
further emphasized that the Eighth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits agreed.167 
Next, the court found that the trial court failed to apply the 
Craig test, which required an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether an important public policy existed that necessitated the 
denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial, and whether 
the reliability of the testimony was otherwise guaranteed.168  In 
examining the trial court’s decision, the court held: 
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 [While] [t]he [g]overnment’s interest in presenting the 
fact-finder with crucial evidence is . . . an important 
public policy[,] . . . under the circumstances of this case 
(which include the availability of a Rule 15 deposition), 
the prosecutor’s need for the video conference testimony 
to make a case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the 
type of public policies that are important enough to 
outweigh the [d]efendants’ rights to confront their 
accusers face-to-face.169 
In other words, the court found it significant that the witnesses 
could have been deposed pursuant to Rule 15, which would have 
guaranteed the defendants an opportunity to confront their 
accusers face-to-face at the deposition.170 
In his dissent, Judge Tjoflat disagreed with the majority’s 
analysis and holding, stating that “[i]t is beyond reproach that 
there is an important public policy in providing the fact-finder 
with crucial, reliable testimony and instituting procedures that 
ensure the integrity of the judicial process.”171  Indeed, as Tjoflat 
emphasized, these are the same public policies the Craig Court 
found important enough to uphold the use of the one-way closed 
circuit television procedure.172  Moreover, he argued that the 
majority’s position regarding the possibility of implementing a 
Rule 15 deposition was irrelevant as to the necessity of using the 
two-way video conference procedure in furthering the important 
public policy of providing reliable evidence at trial.173  In fact, 
because the two procedures are “not equivalent,” the trial court 
has the discretion to determine whether a deposition is an 
inadequate replacement for trial testimony.174  According to 
Tjoflat, this is exactly what the trial court did in making a 
carefully “considered determination that live, two-way video 
transmission of unavailable witnesses’ testimony was necessary to 
further the[se] important public polic[es] . . . that Craig 
demands.”175 
Tjoflat also opined that the majority failed to properly analyze 
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 the two-way video conference procedure.  The court assessed the 
testimony as if it were given in court, as opposed to hearsay, 
which involves out-of-court statements.176  Under Crawford, 
testimonial statements of witnesses not present at trial are 
admissible “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only 
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.”177  Tjoflat found that while the witnesses’ statements in 
this case were undeniably testimonial, they satisfied Crawford 
because the defendants were given a full opportunity to cross-
examine the otherwise unavailable witnesses.178  Thus, he 
concluded that the two-way video conference procedure “passes 
constitutional muster.”179 
Judge Marcus also dissented, arguing that the two-way video 
conference procedure “fully comported with the text, historical 
purpose, and modern understanding of the Confrontation Clause,” 
and that the majority erroneously applied Craig.180  Even if Craig 
did apply to this case, however, Marcus believed the two-way 
video conference procedure was necessary to obtain the testimony 
of the foreign witnesses.181  Furthermore, he contended that the 
procedure satisfied the Confrontation Clause because “Yates and 
Pusztai had every opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses 
against them, and those witnesses testified under oath and under 
the gaze of the defendants, the judge, and the jury.”182  He artfully 
suggested that the majority’s conception of the Confrontation 
Clause imposed a “one-size-fits-all requirement,” in that so long as 
there is a face-to-face meeting between the defendant and the 
witness, it is sufficient regardless of whether the meeting takes 
place in the courtroom or in a Rule 15 deposition.183  Like Tjoflat, 
Marcus also relied on Crawford, stating that if a face-to-face 
meeting is not possible due to the true unavailability of the 
witness, the Confrontation Clause imposes a “less stringent 
confrontation requirement,” requiring only that the defendant 
have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.184  Moreover, 
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 Marcus advocated that cross-examination under the two-way 
video conference procedure is more effective than a Rule 15 
deposition because it allows the trier of fact to observe the 
witness’s demeanor.185  In conclusion, he stated that “the 
majority’s holding . . . disserves the Constitution and slights the 
paramount public interest of admitting competent and reliable 
testimony into evidence in criminal trials.”186 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TWO-WAY VIDEO TESTIMONY 
Two-way video conference testimony in criminal trials is 
constitutional because it provides the necessary protections and 
upholds the goals intended by the Confrontation Clause.  The 
procedure is also more protective of defendants’ right to 
confrontation than other accepted methods of testimony, such as 
Rule 15 depositions.  Further, two-way video testimony is superior 
to one-way video testimony, which the Supreme Court has already 
deemed constitutional.187  This alternative testimonial procedure 
should not be limited to situations similar to the facts in Craig, 
but instead should apply in situations “where necessary to further 
an important state interest, [while maintaining] the truth-seeking 
or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.”188 
Video conference testimony fulfills the requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause as intended throughout history.  As 
exemplified by Paul’s trial in biblical times, the prosecution of 
Christians under Roman Emperor Trajan, the trials of Sir Walter 
Raleigh and Freeborn John in seventeenth century England, and 
by the Salem witch trials in colonial America, the main goals of 
the right to confrontation were (1) to afford the defendant the 
opportunity to receive accusations directly from the mouth of his 
accuser, (2) to prevent false accusations against the defendant by 
those unwilling to state such allegations to the defendant’s face, 
and (3) to allow the judge and jury to view the demeanor of the 
witnesses testifying.189  Each of these goals is safeguarded by the 
two-way video testimony procedure. 
First, live video conference testimony provides the defendant 
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 the opportunity to see the witness displayed upon the television 
screen set up in the courtroom as the witness testifies.  This 
allows the defendant to hear the allegations directly from the 
witness – rather than a mere a second-hand account of the 
witness’s testimony – helping ensure that the testimony is 
accurate and the accusations are real.  Second, the witness can see 
the defendant while testifying, which helps prevent false 
accusations.  Specifically, a witness will likely be less inclined to 
provide false testimony if he must look upon the defendant, even if 
it is only through a television monitor.  Third, the video conference 
procedure allows the judge and jury to observe the witness over 
the television screen, providing them with the opportunity to 
observe the witness’s demeanor to determine his credibility and 
the truthfulness of his testimony. 
Some might argue that it is more difficult to judge the 
truthfulness and reliability of a witness testifying on a television 
screen.  While truthfulness and reliability have long been 
considered goals of confrontation, psychological research has 
shown that “most people can do no better than chance in 
determining when a person is telling the truth from observing 
[him] in telling the story.”190  Further, video communication has 
become ever more incorporated into our daily lives: corporations 
and firms use video conferencing to hold meetings in two cities at 
once, and friends and family members use cameras connected to 
their computers to communicate live over the internet 
everyday.191  Thus, there is certainly no reason to believe that 
jurors observing a witness testifying via televised video conference 
would be any more or less capable of making accurate 
determinations regarding the reliability of the testimony.192 
Video conference testimony also fulfills the four elements 
established in Craig: (1) personal examination, (2) testimony 
under oath, (3) cross-examination of the witness by defense 
counsel, and (4) observation of the witness by the jury.193  The 
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 first element of personal examination prevents the usage of 
depositions or ex parte affidavits against the defendant.194  Video 
conference testimony satisfies this element because it subjects the 
witness to personal examination by the parties for the defendant 
to fully observe.  Next, the witness is placed under oath prior to 
the commencement of his testimony.  Although the witness is not 
physically in the courtroom, he is placed under oath at a remote 
location by the same procedure he would be subjected to if he were 
in the courtroom giving his testimony.195  Third, the defendant 
has the same opportunity to cross-examine the witness testifying 
via video conference that he would if the witness was in the 
courtroom.  There is nothing lost when witnesses are cross-
examined during this procedure because the defense counsel may 
still look directly at the witness during the examination, and the 
witness may likewise look directly at the defense counsel and the 
defendant just as he could if he were sitting in the courtroom.  
Finally, the jury is given a full opportunity, and quite possibly a 
better opportunity, to view the witness and his demeanor during 
video conference testimony, because the witness is projected onto 
a television or screen, potentially presenting him in a larger and 
closer light than the jurors would otherwise be able to see with the 
witness on the stand. 
Nowhere in the text of the Sixth Amendment do the words 
“face-to-face” or “physical” appear.196  In fact, the text of the 
Confrontation Clause only requires the “right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against [the defendant].”197  As scholar Akhil 
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guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) 
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 Reed Amar noted, “in a Constitution ratified by, subject to, and 
proclaimed in the name of, the people, it would be unfortunate if 
words generally could not be taken at face value.”198  The concept 
of “face-to-face” confrontation is met by the use of live, two-way 
video conference testimony because both the defendant and the 
witness can see each other as the witness testifies. 
Critics of the two-way video conference procedure claim that 
confrontation was meant to afford the defendant the opportunity 
to be in the physical presence of the testifying witness.  Justice 
Scalia stated in Coy that “the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing 
before the trier of fact.”199  On the other hand, the concurrence 
and dissent both noted that the Confrontation Clause could not 
literally require physical presence because that would be 
inconsistent with deeply rooted hearsay exceptions.200  The Craig 
Court further clarified that “the word ‘confronted,’ . . .  cannot 
simply mean face-to-face confrontation,” because it would prohibit 
the admission of hearsay statements made by absent declarants, 
contrary to the Court’s long history of hearsay jurisprudence.201  If 
the Confrontation Clause was interpreted to mean physical 
presence in every situation, many long standing common law 
hearsay exceptions would become unconstitutional.202  Thus, the 
Confrontation Clause “merely state[s] a principled preference for 
live testimony.”203 
Two-way video testimony is more protective of the interests 
intended to be protected by the Confrontation Clause than already 
accepted methods of presenting testimony.  Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 15, for example, allows parties to substitute 
live witness testimony with deposition transcripts at trial.204  
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 Under this rule, the testimony of the unavailable witness is taken 
either by stenographic or videographic record.205  Stenographic 
testimony is read to the jury, usually by having the attorney for 
the examining party read the deposition questions while another 
person plays the witness and reads the answers.206  If the acting 
witness makes any changes in tone of voice or reflects even a hint 
of emotion, the opposing party can object on the grounds that the 
reader is improperly interpreting the testimony.207  Under this 
method, the jury is deprived of the opportunity to assess the 
witness’s demeanor.208  As Justice White explained in Green, an 
important policy of the Confrontation Clause is to “permit[] the 
jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor 
of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in 
assessing his credibility.”209 
Videographic depositions under Rule 15 are no better than 
their stenographic counterpart.  Although videotaped depositions 
allow the jury to observe the witness’s demeanor, the deposition is 
usually taken weeks, months, or even years before trial, often 
because the same circumstances making the witness unavailable 
for trial require the deposition be taken far in advance.210  And 
even if the witness can testify by the time of trial, most judges will 
not want to interrupt the trial to take a deposition.211  Moreover, 
both stenographic and videographic depositions deprive attorneys 
the opportunity to adapt their examinations to the evidence that is 
presented during the course of trial.212 
Live two-way video testimony corrects many of the problems 
associated with the already approved and widely used Rule 15 
deposition procedure.  It allows the trier of fact to observe the 
witness’s demeanor as he is questioned, and also permits 
attorneys to craft their examination in light of the evidence and 
testimony that has been presented at trial.  Additionally, cross-
examination is more effective under the two-way video conference 
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 procedure than with Rule 15 depositions because it allows the 
judge to rule on objections as they are raised and to supervise the 
course of questioning and counsel’s conduct.213 
Furthermore, two-way video testimony better serves the 
interests intended to be protected by the Confrontation Clause 
than the one-way closed-circuit television procedure approved in 
Craig.214  It is superior because not only does it allow the 
defendant, the jury, and the judge to see the witness – just as one-
way closed-circuit television – but it also allows the witness to see 
the defendant and the courtroom as he testifies.  Thus, using two-
way video testimony during trial “allows the witness to see the 
jury and the defendant, . . . achieving the Confrontation Clause’s 
important goal of bringing the accuser face[-]to[-]face with the 
accused and the factfinder, albeit through the medium of a 
television screen.”215 
There are also numerous other advantages to using video 
conference testimony in criminal trials.  The procedure is 
convenient, cost-effective, efficient, and comports with modern 
notions of globalization and technological advancements.  Indeed, 
globalization has had a significant impact on the practice of 
federal criminal law.216  As the means of travel and 
communication have progressed, it has become easier to engage in 
international commerce.217  Yet consequently, crimes such as 
fraud, which at times may utilize international commerce, have 
increased.218  Unfortunately, “the ability of nations to work 
together to prevent or prosecute international crime has lagged 
far behind the ability of the criminally inclined to exploit their 
new economic opportunities.”219  Therefore, it is often necessary in 
these cases to obtain evidence from any country in which the 
defendant may have conducted dealings in the course of 
committing the fraud.220  The prosecutor is often unable to 
subpoena key witnesses due to the fact that they are located 
outside of the United States and not subject to its jurisdiction.221 
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 Moreover, one of the greatest advantages to using live two-
way video testimony is that it provides a better alternative for 
obtaining foreign witness testimony.222  Yates is a good example of 
when two-way video testimony becomes important.  In his dissent, 
Judge Tjoflat argued that two-way video testimony was necessary 
because the witnesses were beyond the subpoena power of the 
trial court, as they were citizens of, and resided in, Australia at 
the time of trial.223  With the advent of improved technology that 
makes it easier to conduct business and commerce globally, 
procedures like two-way video conference will become increasingly 
important when foreign witnesses cannot be subpoenaed by 
courts.  Two-way video testimony therefore presents the 
opportunity to obtain testimony from foreign witnesses in a 
manner that not only complies more fully with the Confrontation 
Clause than current methods – such as Rule 15 depositions – used 
by courts, but that is also more effective and efficient in today’s 
world. 
Justice Scalia, among other critics, argues that video 
conference testimony “improperly substitute[s] ‘virtual 
confrontation’ for the real thing required by the Confrontation 
Clause in a criminal trial.”224  However, with the arrival of new 
technology, Americans have generally become increasingly less 
likely to participate in face-to-face interactions.  Beginning with 
the telephone, where people no longer needed to meet face-to-face 
to verbally communicate, and expanded by the internet, people 
now regularly make decisions through digital communications.225  
Further, studies have found that jurors respond the same to live 
witnesses as those testifying via video conference.226 
CONCLUSION 
Presenting testimony via two-way video conference is 
constitutional under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
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 Amendment because it is consistent with the goals and protections 
intended by witness confrontation throughout history.  It provides 
the defendant with the opportunity to see and hear the witness as 
he testifies, and the witness knows that the defendant is watching 
and listening.  It further permits the judge and jury to observe the 
witness’s demeanor.  Additionally, live two-way video testimony is 
more protective of the defendant’s right to confrontation than 
other currently accepted and widely used practices such as Rule 
15 depositions and common hearsay exceptions under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Moreover, live two-way video testimony is 
superior to the one-way closed-circuit television procedure 
approved by the Supreme Court, and is more consistent with 
normal testimonial procedures.  Finally, the two-way video 
conference procedure is more efficient and effective in the 
courtroom because it provides key witnesses who would otherwise 
be unable or unwilling to testify the opportunity to do so in a 
manner that still gives the defendant his basic right of 
confrontation.  For these reasons, live two-way video testimony is  
consistent with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
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